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INTRODUCTION 
Some puzzling findings 
In the early seventies researchers from the department of cultural psychology of the 
University of Nijmegen (The Netherlands) constructed a scale to measure political attitudes 
(the POVO scale1). The construction process was prototypical of attitude scale construction 
in psychology. First, the researchers investigated the major political ideologies of the 
twentieth century: anarchism, communism, radical and democratic socialism, pragmatism, 
liberalism, conservatism, and fascism. They argued that these eight political ideologies 
could be set out on a left-to-right scale, from anarchism on the extreme left to fascism on 
the extreme right (Hagendoorn et al., 1970). Initially, the researchers formulated 120 
items which were believed to represent aspects of all eight ideologies. In the course of a 
series of empirical studies among university students they reduced the number of items. 
Items that did not load substantially on the first factor in a one-dimensional factor analysis 
were discarded (Pinxteren, 1972; Hopmans, 1976; Janssen and Voestermans, 1978). 
Whenever items had high factor loadings on the one factor they were considered to reflect 
accurately one of the political ideologies ranging from left to right. This procedure 
resulted in a political attitude scale of sixteen items: two items for each of the eight 
ideologies. 
In 1974 and 1975 Janssen and Voestermans (1978) administered the scale to 1500 
university students from various disciplines. As expected, all items again loaded 
substantially (loadings >.35) on the first factor in a principal component analysis, which 
reflected the left-right dimension. The sum of the factor scores on this scale showed a 
strong correlation with preferences for political parties (r=.69). Ten years later, 
Rooyackers and Westerhof (1987) obtained similar results in a sample of psychology 
students. 
However, Janssen and Voestermans (1978) also administered the POVO scale to 522 
respondents in a sample of the Dutch population at large. They simplified the phrasing of 
the items somewhat, but without changing the face validity of the scale. In contrast to the 
easily interpretable outcome of the factor analysis using the student sample, no successful 
factor analysis could be performed for the general Dutch sample. A left-right dimension 
was clearly lacking in the answers. Furthermore, the sum of the scale scores was not 
related to preferences for political parties (r=.10). 
Two studies carried out in the eighties provided similar findings. Young people between 
fifteen and eighteen years of age filled out the POVO scale. The left-right dimension 
appeared again in a sample of respondents from 'higher' educational institutes (Hagendoorn 
and Janssen, 1983), whereas it was not found for respondents who attended 'lower' 
educational institutes (Raaymakers, Meeus and Vollebergh, 1986)2. 
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Broad formulation of the research problem 
Apparently, different respondents arrived at their answers to the POVO scale in very 
different ways. In attempting to understand why some respondents do give coherent 
answers while others do not, several intriguing questions come to mind. 
Attitude scaling 
In the first place, one might ask, what are the implications of these findings for attitude 
scaling? Are findings such as these specifically related to the particular attitude scale that 
was used here or are they related to some more basic problem inherent in attitude scaling 
as such? In order to try and formulate an answer to this question we have to understand the 
practice of attitude scaling. Social psychologists generally carry out their studies in the 
psychological laboratory, using (psychology) students as subjects (Jahoda, 1986; Sears, 
1986). Although researchers have given some thought to the problems associated with this 
highly specific population (e.g. Hovland, 1959; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), Danziger (1986) 
points out the real issue at stake. He asserts that "college students [were] used as the sources 
of data in investigations that claimed to be studying abstract psychological relationships 
which operated irrespective of social context" (p.58). The findings of the POVO scale 
indicate, however, that college students differ greatly from a general Dutch sample in how 
they arrived at answers to the items. 
For this reason, the description of attitude scaling concentrates on the practice of survey 
researchers (part of whom are of course (social) psychologists), since they are the ones 
who administer attitude scales to broader populations than college students. In doing so, 
they ran up against a number of problems that were not encountered by social 
psychologists who confined themselves to studying college students. These problems appear 
to be the key to clearing up our main problem. Chapter 1, "Survey questionnaires", 
describes the history of survey research as well as current survey research practice, in 
order to outline the main assumptions, or the paradigm, on which current survey research 
practice rests. As will also become clear, survey research is closely linked to the 
psychological methodology of attitude scaling. 
Psychological differences in attitude structures 
Secondly, we need a psychological interpretation of what organizes the responses to 
attitude scales: what does it mean if people give coherent answers, and how do respondents 
arrive at such answers? In social psychology, the coherence and underlying structure of 
attitudes has been, and still is, one of the major research topics (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). 
In the early sixties Philip Converse critically used these kinds of social psychological 
studies to assess the different ways in which respondents generate answers to survey 
questions. The first part of Chapter 2, "The Converse debate", describes his work. The 
second part of chapter 2 contains some highlights of the debate prompted by his critical 
studies. These include more recent social psychological studies on attitude structures as 
well as studies on the relationship between attitude structures and survey response. 
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Socio-cultural dynamics related to differences in attitude structures 
Thirdly, if it is the case that some respondents do and others do not give organized 
answers, it may be asked who do and who do not. The studies discussed in chapter 2 attach 
great significance to the relationship between people's involvement in a domain and the 
attitude structure they develop about it. Furthermore, the findings from the POVO scale 
seem to imply that education plays a major role in whether people give answers that are 
organized along a left-right dimension. This question will be dealt with more thoroughly in 
Chapter 3, "The social significance of producing political opinions". This chapter will 
provide a description of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, which focuses especially on the 
social and cultural dynamics at play in the production of coherent views on politics. 
Bourdieu shows that the involvement in politics, and the concomitant consumption and 
participation show an uneven social distribution, which is related to educational level, 
among other factors. 
The specificity of the political domain 
Nearly all the studies discussed in the first three chapters deal with the political domain. 
Since each cultural domain has its own dynamics (Bourdieu, 1992), one might ask to what 
degree the evidence found on the political domain will also be found in other cultural 
domains. For example, it is not clear whether the specific ideological division of the 
political domain has any effects on the organization of attitudes and survey responses. One 
might also ask whether the relationship between interest in the political domain and 
socio-cultural position differs from that in other domains. A more detailed examination of 
the specificity of the political domain will be presented in Chapter 4, "Towards research 
hypotheses". This examination includes a description of another cultural domain which was 
selected for this study: the domain of health and illness. The basic ideological dimension of 
conflict in this domain is different from that in the political domain. It will be shown in 
chapter 4 that the medical domain is characterized by a conflict between orthodox, rational 
medicine on the one hand and alternative, non-rational medicine on the other. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that involvement in medicine shows a more even social 
distribution than involvement in politics. 
Formulation and assessment of the research questions 
It may be clear by now, that the conceptual tools discussed in these chapters have been 
derived from rather disparate disciplines and research traditions, ranging from the 
political science of public opinion, which is associated with survey research, through social 
psychological studies on attitude structures, to the French sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Making use of different traditions has the advantage that some of the issues that are 
neglected in one tradition are thought about in the other and a combination will enable us 
to arrive at a more comprehensive view on the research problem. 
Such a comprehensive view, to be developed in chapters 1 to 4, connects the research 
problem to the four issues described above: the practice of attitude scaling in survey 
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research, the psychological mechanisms involved in giving coherent survey responses, the 
social and cultural dynamics associated with giving coherent survey responses, and the 
specificity of the domain for which an attitude scale is developed. An extensive 
investigation of the topics mentioned above was carried out in the survey discussed in the 
present study. This investigation deals with two major questions: 
- are differences in attitude structures found in both the political and the medical domain? 
- if such differences in attitude structures are found, does their social distribution in the 
political domain differ from that in the medical domain? 
The existing evidence discussed in chapters 1 to 4 enables us to envisage the hypothetical 
answers to these research questions. These hypotheses will be formulated at the end of 
chapter 4. 
The present study, designed to answer these research questions, was carried out within 
the tradition of attitude scaling and survey research. The construction of attitude scales for 
both the political and the medical domain, to be presented in Chapter 5, "The design of the 
study and measurement procedures", follows the paradigm of survey research. However, 
the analyses of the data, which will be described in Chapter 6, "Results", differ in some 
respects from the analyses usually carried out in survey research, since the present study is 
intended to provide information about the basic assumptions of this paradigm, which 
usually go unexamined. The main object of the analyses in the present study is to provide 
insight in the different ways in which respondents arrive at answers on survey questions. 
Chapter 7, "Summary and conclusion", will critically examine the relationship between the 
findings and the research questions and hypotheses, and the broader problem of the 
assessment of attitudes. 
The epilogue will present an outline of a theoretical perspective that is required if we 
are to understand the issue of whether and how people who give less coherent answers on 
the survey questions express their attitudes otherwise. Some possible methods of studying 
these kinds of attitudes will also be discussed. The epilogue closes with a general conclusion 
on attitude theory and attitude research. However, both the theoretical and the 
methodological considerations given in this last chapter remain only a first step towards a 
new methodology of attitude research for which the empirical study presented in this book 
will provide the rationale. 
1 SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
Paul Sikkema (1989), a staff member of the Dutch Inter/View survey agency, estimated 
that in 1988 three million survey interviews were held in the Netherlands, on a population 
of 15 million inhabitants. His agency alone accomplished 430,000 survey interviews in that 
same year. These huge numbers illustrate the widespread use of, and faith in survey 
questionnaires for the collection of information on population characteristics, behavior, 
preferences, opinions and the like. As a cultural product, or a social technology, the survey 
questionnaire is taken for granted nowadays. 
The acceptance of the survey questionnaire is the result of a historical process in this 
century. A rough sketch of the history of the survey will be given in the first section of 
this chapter. In this section which is based on a number of studies by other researchers1, 
the institutionalization and the technological developments of the survey are described in 
relation to the socio-economic conditions and ideological legitimizations which paved the 
way for the development of the survey. In the course of this historical process a consensus 
was found with regard to survey methodology, which will also be described. 
Within this consensus, a great deal of research has been carried out to further improve 
the quality of the survey. The second section deals with these attempts at improvement. 
This section gives a more detailed description of the survey and helps to further make 
explicit the specific form it should ideally take. 
The description of the historically grown consensus on the survey and the presentation 
of the efforts to further improve its quality will also reveal the assumptions inherent in this 
social technology, or its paradigm. It was explained in the introduction that this is the main 
goal of this first chapter. 
1.1 A short history of the survey 
Conditions of the rise of the survey 
In Van Ginneken's (1986) view, the genesis of the survey method is related to the social 
and economic developments in the beginning of the twentieth century. In his analysis, he 
concentrates on the United States, which can be seen as the cradle of present-day survey 
methodology. Van Ginneken notes the rise of a mass society, which differs radically from 
the traditional European societies in its social organization. Two developments are 
important. Firstly, the mass media (newspapers, weeklies, movies, radio) all developed 
rapidly in the first two decades of the century. Secondly, a national market came into 
being: large industrial firms were established, and all kinds of new commodities were 
produced, especially luxury goods like soft drinks, cigarettes, and cars. This national 
market in turn entailed the spread of intervention by means of advertising and public 
relations in order to establish a brand name and persuade the consumers to buy articles. 
Other intervention strategies were also created in this period. After the introduction of 
universal suffrage, election campaigns developed quickly. During the First World War, 
propaganda became a matter of necessity. 
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The aim of each of these intervention practices was to influence opinions and behavior. Of 
course, the question arose as to whether they were successful. Furthermore, since 
manufacturers were no longer directly in contact with consumers, it became necessary to 
develop other strategies of obtaining information about the consumption habits and 
preferences of the public. The survey, as used in media research, marketing research, and 
policy research, was accepted as the most suitable means of fulfilling these needs (Van 
Ginneken, 1986). 
Legitimization of the survey 
If it were these socio-economic developments which led to the rise of the survey, its use 
was also legitimated on ideological grounds. The survey was said to be related to 
democratic principles (Ginneken, 1990; Champagne, 1990). Furthermore, although the 
early development of the survey method took place largely outside the universities, the 
survey soon became associated with science. The use of measurement metaphors like 
thermometer or barometer is an illustration of this association (Bourdieu, 1987b).2 
Of course, successes in predicting the outcome of elections also paved the way for the 
acceptance of the opinion poll. Especially Gallup's success in forecasting the outcome of 
the 1936 presidential elections served this function (J. Converse, 1987). 
Institutionalization 
The first specialized survey agencies were established in the thirties. From the very 
beginning, these institutes sprang from various institutional environments, which still exist 
nowadays: government, business, mass media, universities, and independent agencies. In all 
these settings the use of the survey has expanded over the past SO or 60 years3. 
The diversification of interests and uses of the survey was the main reason for 
institutional specialization. Whereas the independent agencies carry out surveys for all 
intents and purposes, the organizations in other settings have more precise goals. Surveys 
are used in the marketing of all kinds of commodities such as food or TV programs. In 
universities they are used in fundamental scientific research in political science, sociology, 
economy and psychology4. As a guide to government interventions, they are used to 
provide statistics on population characteristics and all kinds of social problems. In politics 
they are used to assess 'public opinion': the preferences of the people on different issues, 
the popularity of politicians and parties, and the forecasts of election results. The faith in 
survey questionnaires is very clearly illustrated by the fact that nowadays public opinion is 
generally defined in terms of the outcome of opinion surveys (Champagne, 1990; 
P.Converse, 1987). 
Technological developments 
As for the development of the data collection technology5, Jean Converse (1987) identifies 
three ancestors of survey research in the United States. In the first place she mentions the 
so-called social surveys, which were carried out especially to provide information on the 
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living conditions of the poor. Although similar efforts were made by others before him, 
Jean Converse gives credit to Charles Booth (1902/1969) for having carried out the first 
comprehensive survey in an attempt to give a scientific answer to the question of who and 
how numerous the poor were in London. Booth collected brief case histories in great 
abundance, and by classifying and adding them up he converted them into quantitative 
summations which provided a comprehensive view of the London poor. 
Next, in the beginning of this century, psychologists and sociologists became interested 
in the measurement of opinions, attitudes and similar subjective phenomena. This interest is 
related to the rise of the same intervention strategies that were associated with the 
development of the survey (Van Ginneken, 1986). The emergence of social psychology as a 
field of scientific study in the 1920s owes a great deal to the development of both the 
concept of attitude6 and of attitude measurement, introduced by psychologists such as 
Thurstone and Floyd and Gordon Allport (McGuire, 1986; J. Converse, 1987). In 
sociology, attitude measurement also developed in the twenties, for example in the work of 
Bogardus on social distance. Attitude measurement techniques which had been developed in 
academic environments had found their way into survey methodology from the outset, but 
even more so after survey research "migrated to the universities" (J. Converse, 1987) in 
the forties and fifties (Van Ginneken, 1990). 
Jean Converse (1987) mentions market research and opinion polling as the third and 
most direct line to present-day survey methodology. She sees Gallup, Roper, and Crossley 
as the most important promoters and innovators of the sample survey in the thirties. 
Quantitatively speaking, too, the private and business survey agencies have always 
outnumbered other institutions carrying out survey research. 
The census survey of the population, official government statistics, and so-called 'straw 
votes' may be added to these three ancestors (Turner and Martin, 1984). National census 
surveys go back far beyond Booth's enterprise7 and governmental statistics can be traced 
back to the seventeenth century, when quantitative studies were carried out on epidemics 
and on life expectancy, for example. In the twentieth century the United States Bureau of 
Census has played an important role in the development of sampling methods. 
The 'straw vote', "an unofficial canvass of an electorate to determine the division of 
sentiment on public issues or on candidates for governmental office" (Turner and Martin, 
1984, p.25) was more or less a competitor of the sample survey in the thirties. The most 
famous straw vote was carried out by the "Literary Digest" magazine, which asked its 
readers to give their opinions on issues such as prohibition, and about their preferences for 
political candidates. Whereas the millions of vote preferences collected by the "Literary 
Digest" failed to forecast the results of the 1936 presidential elections, Gallup needed only 
a few thousand respondents in a sample of the American public to arrive at a correct 
prediction. The sampling procedures of the survey proved superior and a fatal blow was 
dealt to the straw vote. 
Between 193S and 1950, consensus was reached on three important technical problems: 
the sampling procedures, the role of the interviewer, and the role of the respondent 
(Blondiaux, 1991). 
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The object of the sampling procedures is to create a "miniature society" (Blondiaux, 1991) 
which is an accurate reflection of society at large8. In 1936 Gallup used quota sampling, 
which leaves the ultimate selection of the respondent up to the interviewer. However, in 
1948 the major political surveys failed to predict the outcome of the US presidential 
election. The committee that was installed to examine this failure attributed it to the use of 
quota sampling. Probability sampling, in which every member of a population has the same 
chance of being interviewed, became the method of choice. 
Van Ginneken (1990) notes that the face-to-face interview soon predominated the 
administration of questionnaires; it was considered better than mailing questionnaires, since 
the latter generally resulted in lower response rates. This preference brought another 
problem to the fore: the role of the interviewer. As Blondiaux (1991) shows, the 
interviewer came to be defined as a kind of neutral machine recording answers, or a 
"living pencil". Selection, training and control of the interviewers have been questions of 
major concern to survey researchers ever since (Van Ginneken, 1990). 
The third problem encountered was probably the most difficult: do the respondents 
actually know anything about the issues they are asked about and do they tell the truth? 
This problem was restated as a problem in the art of phrasing questions. It was expected 
that writing better questions could solve the problem (Blondiaux, 1991). Questions that use 
a minimal vocabulary and a simple formulation, as well as closed questions of the agree-
disagree type9, were seen as the type of 'better questions' that could solve the problem. 
Textbooks were written to provide rules for the formulation of good questions, for 
example "The Art of Asking Questions" (Payne, 1951). 
The changes in question writing brought about by these attempts have been analyzed by 
Jean Converse and Howard Schuman (1984) and Tom Smith (1987). Examining the 
formulation of questions in public opinion research over the past 50 years, they note the 
widespread use of closed questions. The number of categories per closed question increased 
from a simple trichotomy (e.g. favour/oppose/don't know) to 5, 7 or 11 point scales, 
accompanied by an increase in the use of 'show cards'. The questions are more often asked 
in a balanced form ("do you favour or oppose..."), instead of the unbalanced version ("do 
you approve..."). Smith (1987, p. 107) concludes that there is a shift away from the natural 
language used in the thirties, when surveys were "simple inquiries that were 'what d'ya 
know, what d'ya say' conversations". Nowadays a more specialized 'survey dialect' has 
settled in. 
The problems involved in sampling, interviewer behavior, and question writing are 
accompanied by the formulation of standards on survey research, like the one by Dodd 
(1947), or, more recently, those provided by associations of survey researchers10. 
Scientific committees have discussed survey practices (e.g. Turner and Martin, 1984), and 
sound methodology is discussed at congresses and other scientific fora (e.g. the journal 
"Public Opinion Quarterly"). Of course, as Turner and Martin (1984) show, actual 
practice does not always meet these standards, and less so in journalistic than in academic 
publications. 
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1.2 Survey quality 
The consensus on sampling, interviewer behavior and questionnaire design, which was 
achieved by 1950, has not changed much. This is not to say that the ideal goes 
unthreatened. Two threats are usually mentioned in treatises on survey quality: the 
representativity of the sample and the meaningfulness of the answers (e.g. Groves, 1987; 
Alwin, 1991). Many studies have been carried out to assess these threats and how they can 
be dealt with. The major problems mentioned in these studies will be presented below11. 
Representativity of the sample 
As has been described above, the purpose of the sampling procedures in the survey method 
is to create a 'miniature society' that effectively reflects the society at large. Otherwise 
stated, a sample should be representative of the population from which it is drawn. The 
representativity of the sample is threatened by three non-observation errors: coverage 
error, sampling error, and nonresponse error (Groves, 1987). 
The coverage error refers to the question of whether the list of population members that 
is used to draw a sample (the sampling frame) adequately enumerates all the members of 
the population. A telephone dictionary, for example, does not enumerate all the people 
living in a city: it can be argued that people who cannot be reached by telephone form a 
specific subset of the population under study (e.g. Tuli and Albaum, 1977). Another 
problem arises from the fact that sometimes no reliable sampling frame exists, like in 
research on very specific groups (e.g. Vietnam veterans; Rothbart, Fine and Sudman, 
1982). If sampling frames are incomplete or non-existent, the results are likely to differ 
from the actual population characteristics. 
Sampling error results from the specific sampling design used. Differences in population 
estimates can for example be related to the use of probability sampling as opposed to quota 
sampling. As has been described above, probability sampling is generally preferred to 
quota sampling. 
A nonresponse error can result if certain members of a sample cannot be interviewed. 
This is also referred to as unit nonresponse, so as to distinguish it from item nonresponse. 
Item nonresponse (which will be discussed in sections 2.2 and 3.2) refers to the fact that 
some respondents, who do cooperate in a survey, leave some questions unanswered. Unit 
nonresponse is a problem, since it is often not random. It is a remarkably stable finding, 
for example, that the higher-educated are overrepresented (Turner and Martin, 1984). 
Furthermore, the response rate for comparable studies declined between 1952 and 1979, 
especially in the large cities (Steeh, 1981), indicating that nonresponse has become a 
greater problem. 
Whereas technical solutions have been found for the coverage and sampling errors, the 
nonresponse error is more difficult to resolve. It is dealt with in three ways. 
Firstly, studies are carried out to find determinants of response rates which can be used 
to suggest better recruitment strategies. For example, older and more experienced 
interviewers who are allowed to conduct fewer interviews obtain higher response rates 
(Singer, Frankel and Glassman, 1983). The response rate is found to be higher in a face-to-
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face survey than in a telephone survey (Groves, 1979). More people are willing to 
cooperate between 6 and 7 pm, in autumn and in spring (Vigderhous, 1981). Sending a 
letter in advance (Traugott, Groves and Lepkowski, 1987), and payment (Singer and 
Presser, 1989) also result in higher response rates. 
Secondly, researchers have tried to find the characteristics of the persons who refused to 
cooperate. Methods used to analyze nonresponse include interviewer estimates of the 
characteristics of non-respondents, external population checks, and attempts to interview 
individuals who refused to cooperate (T. Smith, 1983). The results of these kinds of 
analyses are used to find better strategies to persuade people to cooperate in surveys. 
Thirdly, these results are also used to estimate whether certain groups are likely to be 
under-represented. Weighted adjustments can be used for those groups (e.g. Bethlehem and 
Kersten, 1986). This strategy is found most often in population studies and economics. 
Meaningfulness of the answers 
Survey measurement is intended to measure some characteristics of respondents. However, 
a respondent's answers can be influenced by all kinds of variables. This means that the 
answer to a question can mean something other than what the researcher had in mind. The 
technical description of this problem builds on psychometrical studies, which were carried 
out primarily to analyze the measurement characteristics of psychological tests. Survey 
researchers developed methods of assessing the quality of survey answers in analogy to the 
psychometrical studies on psychological tests12. 
Psychometrists have conceived of the problems regarding the meaningfulness of the 
answers in terms of the reliability and validity of measurements. Reliability refers to the 
reproducibility of the measurement: if a respondent gives an answer once, he should give 
the same answer if he is asked the same or an equivalent question once again. Reliability 
coefficients are obtained via several methods: test-retest (identical questions are asked more 
than once in exactly the same form with some time interval), parallel forms (similar 
questions are asked in slightly different forms in one session), and internal consistency (the 
covariation in answers on items which are part of the same scale and which, accordingly, 
are meant to measure the same underlying phenomenon). 
The use of a perfectly reliable measurement instrument is no guarantee for meaningful 
results. Validity refers to the question of whether the measurement really produces results 
which reflect the characteristic that one is interested in. The validity of answers can be 
checked by different methods (Ghiselli, Campbell, and Zedeck, 1981). Criterion-related 
validity refers to the degree in which a measure corresponds to, is related to, or predicts 
another variable called a criterion (e.g. the predictive value for voting behavior of 
opinions on political issues); construct validity refers to the degree of association between 
measurements of variables that should theoretically be associated; and content validity 
refers to the degree to which what is measured appropriately reflects the content of the 
variable that one is interested in, as examined by qualified judges (e. g. other scientists). 
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In classical test theory, psychometrists have formulated the relationship between a 
measurement and the variable of interest: 
y = T + e (1.1) 
in which у is the value of measurement, Τ is the 'true score' of the variable measured, and 
e is the measurement error13. 
Reliability refers to the proportion of error in the measurement; validity refers to the 
question whether Τ is actually the 'true score' that one is interested in. Classical test theory 
rests on the assumption that there is indeed a 'true score' that becomes manifest if the right 
questions are posed. In chapter 2 this assumption will prove to be central to the research 
problem of this dissertation. 
In survey research the 'true score' that one is interested in may be, for example, a social 
characteristic of the respondents (such as their educational level), an aspect of actual 
behavior (such as how they voted in the last election), or an attitude (such as party 
preference). An overview of the many sources of errors said to threaten the reliable and 
valid measurement of the 'true score' clearly shows what survey researchers understand to 
be the 'true score'. 
Measurement error is divided into a random component and a systematic component. 
The latter is also referred to as bias (Turner and Martin, 1984) or response effects1* 
(Alwin, 1991)15. Sudman and Bradburn (1974) distinguished between three kinds of 
response effects, including characteristics of the answering task, the interviewer, and the 
respondents. Many studies have been carried out to examine the effects of these 
characteristics on the answers given in survey questionnaires16. Table 1.1 (page 12) lists 
some of the characteristics which were found to be associated with response effects. 
In spite of attempts at synthesizing, these studies still present a major problem in that it 
is extremely difficult to generalize across findings. Whenever a response effect occurs on a 
question on one topic, it does not necessarily occur on a question on another topic. Very 
complex interaction between characteristics may occur. This leads Mishler (1986, p.15) to 
draw the rather ironic conclusion: "some variables and perhaps all of them, have some 
effects on some, and perhaps all, types of response under some conditions". 
Although the response effects are difficult to predict, the studies described above all 
have the same goal: the improvement of the quality of answers obtained by survey 
questionnaires via a reduction of response effects. The studies have resulted in specific 
guidelines to avoid response effects, such as those presented in table 1.2 (page 13). 
These studies on the quality of survey answers clearly show which characteristics the 
survey researchers are interested in: the 'personal' or 'private' characteristics as they 
'really' are, i.e. not distorted by social variables. The 'true score' is the behavior, attitude, 
etc. which is not influenced by its measurement 
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Table 1.1 Survey characteristics related to response effects 
task characteristics 
1. mode of administration: 
a. self-administered questionnaires 
- mailing the questionnaire to respondents or using a computer 
b. questionnaires conducted by interviewers 
- face-to-face or by telephone 
2. questionnaire 
a. instruction 
- explanation of legitimate behavior and responses 
- providing some details on the content and reasons of the study 
• stressing anonymity 
b. question content and formulation 
- question content (arousal of anxiety; 'sensitive' topics; salience of the topics) 
- question difficulty (readability; length; abstractness; social distance of the object asked about) 
• question constraint (filter question ("no opinion"); middle alternative) 
- response scales (vague quantifiers ("sometimes", "often"); range of quantifiers) 
- question specificity (balanced or unbalanced; counter arguments; specific wording (e.g. forbid 
vs. not allow); order of the response alternatives) 
с question context (specific question before general one) 
interviewer characteristics 
1. role-independent (sex, age, race, social class) 
2. role-dependent (socio-emotlonal vs. formal style of interviewing; deviating from the questionnaire) 
respondent characteristics 
1. role-independent, e.g.sex, age, education 
2. role-dependent (acquiescence (yea-saying), susceptibility to social desirability) 
note: the categorization of questionnaire characteristics is a slightly modified version of a categorization by Billiet (1989), which 
builds on the cognitive processes that are assumed to cause the response effects. 
1.3 Conclusion 
This chapter described the socio-economic conditions and the legitimization on the basis of 
democratic and scientific principles which paved the way for the development of the 
survey. In the course of the subsequent technological developments, the survey was shaped 
into its current, well-known, form. As an instrument of social technology, the survey has 
become taken for granted, rooted in major social institutions such as government, business, 
the mass media, and the university. 
Although surveys differ in form according to the domain in which they are applied, a 
consensus has been established on survey quality, which rests on two assumptions: 
Firstly, the sample should adequately represent the population at large. Therefore, the 
sampling frame should be adequate, and the nonresponse rate should be minimized. In 
general, probability sampling is seen as the best sampling method. If necessary, adjustment 
strategies can be used. 
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Table 1.2 Rules for the reduction of response effects 
Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen (1982): 
1. Formulate the question very clearly and with high 
readability 
2. Avoid (long) Introductions to the question 
3. Use words that are as neutral, or rather, non-
evaluative as possible 
4. Assure the respondents that their responses will 
be treated anonymously 
5. Inform the respondents about the topic of the 
interview and instruct them with respect to 
proper respondent behavior 
6. Carefully select interviewers with respect to their 
competence 
17. Instruct the interviewers precisely about what is 
expected of them during the Interview 
8. Use an open formulation Instead of a closed one 
9. Add some encouraging but redundant words to 
the question 
10. Locate the question at a point not too early In the 
questionnaire 
11. Formulate the question in a directive way 
note' Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen (1982) formulated these rules on the basis of reviews of research on response effects, the last 
four rules apply to questions on 'sensitive' topics J Converse and Schuman (1987) have written their guidelines for "handcrafting 
the standardized questionnaire" from (be results obtained in the experiments by Schuman and Presser (1981) 
Secondly, the answers given by the respondents should adequately reflect the particular 
characteristic of the respondents that the researcher is interested in. In technical terms, the 
answers should reflect the 'true score' on the characteristic under study. If one is to obtain 
'true scores', the effect of response effects or biases should be minimized. Questions should 
be easy to interpret for all respondents. On these conditions, the 'true' personal, private, 
value can be measured. 
Two problems emerge from this second assumption. Firstly, the attempts to minimize 
response effects have resulted in a specific survey dialect, which differs from everyday 
language. Secondly, classical test theory, which was also applied to the quality of 
measurement in survey research, assumes that there actually is a 'true' value to be 
measured. However, as Roskam (1983, p.3) observes: "If the questions [in survey 
questionnaires] concern matters which the respondent knows about or already has an 
opinion about, one can assume that the question only makes the answer manifest to the 
researcher. The question itself does not interfere with the behavior, knowledge or attitudes 
of the subject. In many cases, however, questions are asked on matters about which the 
respondent does not have a firm or distinct judgment. In such a case, the question becomes 
more like a stimulus to form an opinion or judgment rather than a means of identifying 
already existing opinions or judgments." 
J. Converse and H. Schuman (1987): 
1. the enduring counsel for simplicity 
- use simple language 
- use common concepts 
- use manageable tasks 
- use widespread Information 
2. specific questions are better than general ones 
3. offer a no opinion option 
4. omit the middle alternative and measure intensity 
5. use forced-choice questions, not agree-dlsagree 
statements 
6. relating to wording effects: 
- create split sample comparisons 
- use open follow-ups to closed questions 
- use random probes 
- ask multiple questions on a topic 
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Consequently, one might ask whether there actually is an already existing personal opinion 
or judgment, i.e. a 'true score' to be measured. As was explained in the introduction, the 
findings on the POVO scale also gave rise to this same question. Of course, the issue has 
been raised ever since the beginning of survey measurement (Blondiaux, 1991). Survey 
researchers have tried to cope with it by providing "no opinion" answers to respondents, 
and by phrasing their questions as simple as possible. Whether these solutions are sufficient 
will be the subject of the next chapter. 
2 THE CONVERSE DEBATE 
2.1 The original claim: attitudes and nonattitudes 
When Philip Converse used a survey questionnaire to ask his respondents questions about 
political issues he was struck by two facts. "One was that very many respondents could not 
understand that a battery of pure opinion items had no objective 'right-wrong' scoring, or 
that "don't know" responses were not a confession of the most abject ignorance, to be 
avoided at all cost. The other was the frequency with which respondents chose a response 
alternative dutifully but accompanied the choice with side cues (shoulder-shrugging, 
eye-rolling, giggles, and even sotto voce comments) indicating that they were very much 
out of their element and would pick any alternative haphazardly by way of helping me 
out." (1974. p.650). 
These observations led Converse to the idea that not all respondents had an opinion on 
the questions he asked. While some of them used the option of answering "don't know", 
quite a lot of them felt obliged to give "agree" or "disagree" answers. Apparently, these 
answers do not reflect an attitude that already existed before the questions were asked. 
Converse therefore called them nonattitudes, which he describes as "capricious 
constructions", "meaningless opinions that vary randomly", "no belief at all", "hastily 
fabricated affective judgments", "very ad hoc feelings", and "haphazardly chosen 
alternatives". 
To account for his observations and to empirically assess the differences between 
attitudes and nonattitudes, Converse developed a theory on the nature of belief systems1. 
His theory is based on psychological theories about attitudes2 and on sociological theories 
about (American) political ideology. From this interdisciplinary point of view3. Converse 
(1964a, p.207) defines a belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which 
the elements are bound together by some form of constraint". Converse uses the term 
ideology* as a synonym of a belief system. 
Converse (1964a) describes four of the many different properties by which belief 
systems are characterized. Firstly, the number of elements in a belief system, or its range, 
can differ. Converse concentrates on political belief systems with relatively wide ranges. 
Second, the elements in a belief system can differ in content "from the remote, generic, 
and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or 'close to home'. Where political 
objects are concerned, this progression tends to be from abstract, 'ideological' principles to 
the more obviously recognizable social groupings or charismatic leaders and finally to 
such objects of immediate experience as family, job, and immediate associates" (p.213). 
Third, as may be clear from the definition, belief systems also differ in the degree of 
constraint between the elements. The fourth property of belief systems which Converse 
found important is the centrality. Converse's description and assessment of the role of 
constraint and centrality will be discussed below. 
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Constraint 
Constraint is used by Converse (1964a, p.256) as a synonym of 'interrelatedness' and 
'interdependence', referring to how different belief elements go together. Converse, a 
social psychologist himself, gives a description of constraint which ties in with the 
prevailing social psychological theories of the fifties and sixties, characterized by an 
emphasis on attitude consistency and attitude change (McGuire, 1986). Theories on attitude 
consistency analyze the relationships between belief elements. 
McGuire (1960) found that logical relationships can occur, but Converse argues that this 
does not happen too often in political belief systems. An example of logical relationships 
between political beliefs are those between beliefs about government income, government 
expenditure, and budget balance. In political belief systems psychological relations 
predominate more. In the literature, disparate concepts are used to analyze psychological 
relations between attitudes: balance, congruence, affective-cognitive consistency, and 
cognitive dissonance5. Although emphasizing different aspects of psychological constraint, 
they all explain how beliefs which are not in a strictly logical sense related can be seen as 
belonging together. Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that people have a dislike for 
inconsistencies between belief elements. If, for some reason or other, they experience 
inconsistency, they will change their attitudes in order to resolve the inconsistency. Besides 
its function in attitude change, constraint is said to serve the psychological functions of 
economizing belief systems and of reducing uncertainty. 
Citing contemporary studies on attitude consistency. Converse asserts that psychological 
constraint is often based on a few crowning postures, which serve to glue together a 
certain range of more specific attitudes. In the political domain, the liberal-conservative 
yardstick is often found to be such a central posture (e.g. Lipset, 1963). 
However, as Converse (1964a, p.209) argues, "the sources of constraint are much less 
logical than they are psychological - and less psychological than social". In describing 
social sources of constraint, Converse elaborates especially the social processes of the 
creation and diffusion of belief systems6. Belief systems are shaped into 'apparently logical 
wholes' in only a small part of a population, an elite, from where they are diffused among 
the mass public. With regard to different issues, or clusters of issues, different elites may 
exist. The transmission of these 'packages of ideas' relies on two classes of information. 
Firstly, straightforward information about which ideas go together, and secondly, the 
"contextual knowledge" (Downs, 1957) which specifies why ideas belong together. The 
first is far more easy to transmit than the second. 
The political elite has the tightest grip on political belief systems, since they use them 
every day. In the mass public, on the other hand. Converse distinguishes different strata: a 
small group has contextual knowledge and is aware of the reasons why ideas belong 
together; a larger stratum is only aware of which ideas go together; and large parts of a 
mass public may even be completely unaware of the co-occurrence of idea elements. 
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Use and recognition of an ideological yardstick 
In an empirical study Converse (Campbell et al., I960; Converse, 1964a) assessed whether 
respondents use and recognize yardsticks, which may serve as standards to unite belief 
elements. In an analysis of the respondents' evaluations of the current political scene. 
Converse distinguished five levels of sophistication. Only a small proportion of the sample 
(2 г%) correctly applied an abstract, ideological principle, such as the liberal-conservative 
standard. Others (9%) used these kinds of principles in a more superficial way, and not 
always correctly. Most respondents described politics in terms of group interests (e.g. 
Negroes, big business, rich people, labour or working man; 42%) or in terms of the nature 
of the times (e.g. states of peace, or economic disaster associated with a certain party; 
24%). The remainder (22 г%) did not employ any politically significant terms. 
Recognition of the labels 'liberal' and 'conservative'7 was somewhat more widespread than 
active use, but the two are highly correlated. Respondents who are more educated and 
more politically active were found to be more aware of the meaning of ideological 
distinctions. 
Constraint between belief elements 
One might argue, however, that less educated people have difficulties in articulating the 
abstract principles which organize their beliefs. Specific beliefs might be very well 
organized, after all, on a more concrete level. To assess whether this was true, Converse 
measured constraint as the intercorrelation between the answers on specific survey items. 
The assortment of issues that people were asked questions about is "a purposive sampling 
of the more salient political controversies at the time of study, covering both domestic and 
foreign policy" (Converse, 1964a, p. 229). Converse (1964a) compared a political elite 
(candidates for the United States Congress) with a sample of the United States electorate. 
The correlations, which were calculated only for those respondents who claimed to have an 
opinion on the issue, were much higher for the elite than for the mass public8. Converse 
concluded, therefore, that the differences in the use and recognition of ideological labels 
are mirrored by the differences in constraint between people's views on political issues. 
Converse argues that the lack of constraint observed especially among the lower 
educated is not related to limited cognitive abilities, since individuals with little education 
who are highly involved in politics can arrive at constrained beliefs and will actually use 
and recognize abstract ideological labels. 
Furthermore, Converse does not suggest that lower-educated or less interested people do 
not have any beliefs about politics at all. Their beliefs are only less often organized 
according to abstract ideological principles than the beliefs of higher-educated and more 
interested people. Without a thorough grasp of these principles it is more difficult for 
them to recognize the relations between specific policy items. Whenever items deal with 
issues that can also be connected by applying other standards, like items on race, 
respondents can give constrained answers. Indeed, Converse (1964a) found that the 
correlation between two items dealing with race were more constrained in the mass public 
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than the items on domestic and foreign affairs, and they were even more constrained than 
the two items on race in the political elite. 
Centrality 
In addition to the level of constraint, Converse assessed the centrality of political belief 
systems. The centrality dimension can be conceptualized psychologically, either in a 
motivational or a cognitive sense. An example of the former approach is the functional 
relationship between attitudes and underlying needs, such as 'ego-involvement' (Katz, 
1960). Although both will certainly be related, Converse is more interested in cognitive 
centrality (citing M. Rosenberg (1960b) for example), since it can be measured more 
easily than motivational centrality. Cognitive centrality is defined by Converse (1970, 
p. 182) as the proportion of 'mental time', or attention, paid to an attitude object over 
substantial periods of time. In social terms, people for whom an attitude object is central 
form an issue public, i.e. the public that shows great interest in a specific issue. This is also 
the public which will recognize the belief elements that are diffused from the top layers of 
society. 
Converse describes some concomitants of cognitive centrality. Heightened attention 
increase the chances that people store information. In the following, the level of 
informedness will be referred to as knowledge. Heightened attention also increases the 
number and variety of associative bonds between attitudes and will therefore be related to 
higher degrees of constraint (Converse, 1970). Converse (1970) holds that the centrality 
dimension is highly functional in processes of attitude change: more central attitudes are 
generally more resistant to change. As a result, they will show greater stability in the 
course of time (Converse, 1964a). 
On the one extreme of the centrality continuum, there is an attitude that is highly 
central. This kind of attitude is based on heightened attention. It will be related to other 
information elements and to other attitudes and it will be stable. On the other extreme we 
find that no attitude exists at all. Converse also refers to this pole as a nonattitude. 
The centrality dimension is independent of the positive-negative continuum, which 
indicates the direction of an evaluation. For example, a person may express a positive or 
negative evaluation which is not based on a great deal of knowledge about the evaluated 
object (Converse, 1975). Converse (1970) claims that the centrality should always be 
measured as a core property of attitudes. In psychological attitude research, however, the 
dimension of centrality has received "only moderate lip service and remarkably slight 
experimental attention" (1970, p.181). 
The empirical assessment of centrality 
Converse empirically assessed three concomitants of centrality: attitude constraint, 
knowledge and attitude stability. His analyses of attitude constraint were described above. 
Converse asserts that knowledge is the most easily measured concomitant of centrality. The 
measurement of knowledge "is likely to be far easier and reliable than the measurement of 
the attitude itself' (1970, p. 183). Although much is known about the often low levels of 
the Converse debate 19 
informedness about politics in the mass public, the underlying knowledge base of the 
opinions themselves is seldom explored (Converse, 1975). As an example, Converse 
mentions a survey, which asked people to give their opinions on the position which the US 
government should take with regard to the construction of the Berlin wall. Almost half the 
respondents proved unaware of the fact that Berlin was encircled by large numbers of 
hostile military troops. As Converse explains (1975), this kind of information is highly 
useful in the interpretation of survey responses. 
Converse assessed the stability of beliefs by measuring the test-retest reliabilities of the 
same items that he had used in the assessment of constraint. In a panel study, the same 
respondents were asked identical items in 1956, 1958, and 1960. For those respondents 
who said they had an opinion on the items, only one question was rather reliable over a 
two-year period (tau-beta over .70): the question on party identification. For specific 
policy issues the test-retest reliabilities were much lower (all below .50), depending on the 
content of the item. Converse (1964a; Converse and Markus, 1979) found that stability is 
greater for items on moral issues than for items on domestic or foreign issues. Items on 
the civil rights of race groups are in between. The item "the government should leave 
things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle", which most 
adequately corresponds to the liberal-conservative yardstick, showed the least stability in 
time (below .30). 
Apart from constraint, knowledge and stability, Converse (1964a) used "no opinion" 
answers as a measure of cognitive centrality. He took these answers for self-confessed 
nonattitudes. Converse (1970) also asserts that low centrality might be related to test 
fatigue and response set. If respondents are asked to repeatedly express opinions on items 
about which they hardly have any opinion, test fatigue and response set may occur. 
However, he does not provide any empirical proof to substantiate this argument. 
The black-and-white model 
Converse showed that constraint and stability are rather low in the mass public. These 
findings indicate that a lot of the answers that are given do not reflect any attitude that 
already existed prior to measurement, as Converse had expected on the basis of his 
interviewing experience. On the basis of the analyses of constraint and stability, however, 
he could not distinguish between attitudinal and nonattitudinal answers. In order to achieve 
this, Converse used the panel study in which the same respondents answered questions on 
political issues in 1956,1958, and 1960. 
If respondents gave the same answer on an identical question in 1956 and 1958, 
Converse assumed they really had attitudes; if respondents gave different answers on each 
occasion, he assumed they chose an answer at random, which implied a nonattitude. The 
correlation between the answers in 1958 and 1960 should be close to 1.0 for the first 
group, whereas this correlation should be close to 0.0 for the group giving random 
responses. This is called the black and white model. The evidence provided by Converse 
fits this model rather well, especially for the 'power and housing' item mentioned above9. 
For the items which fitted less well into the black-and-white model, Converse assumed that 
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there might be a 'third force' of opinion holders who do give meaningful answers, but who 
have changed from one real attitude to another real attitude. 
Conclusion 
Some clear-cut conclusions arise from Converse's theory and findings about belief systems. 
Belief systems containing various idea and attitude elements vary on different aspects. 
Converse described four aspects: the range of the belief system, the characteristics of its 
elements, the constraint among its elements, and its centrality. In fact, these may be 
reduced to three aspects, since constraint is a concomitant of centrality. As will be outlined 
below, the finding that belief systems differ on these aspects has consequences for the 
interpretation of survey response, as well as for the interpretation of political phenomena. 
The interpretation of survey response 
Respondents who have different belief systems arrive at answers on attitude questions in 
different ways. On the one end of the axis there are respondents who do not have an 
attitude (a nonattitude) about the issue they are asked questions about. They may choose a 
"no opinion" answer, but many of them appear to fabricate agree/disagree answers 
haphazardly on the spot. There are even respondents who express opinions on groups that 
do not exist (Hartley (1946), cited by Converse (1970)). On the other end there are 
respondents who give answers which reflect pre-existing central attitudes. If respondents 
have attitudes prior to their measurement, this is indicated by the use, or at least 
recognition, of yardsticks which can serve as standards to integrate a belief system, as well 
as by higher levels of knowledge, constraint and stability. 
Constraint and stability were found to exist in degrees, varying across items. Items on 
racial issues were interrelated more strongly in the mass public than items on domestic and 
foreign policies. Similar differences in degree were found on the stability coefficients. 
Furthermore, the stability coefficients were higher for moral issues and higher still for 
party preferences. These findings can be generalized as follows: an item can be 
meaningfully interpreted if respondents can apply a standard to it; two items can only be 
seen as interrelated if the same standard can be applied to both. Consequently, the level of 
centrality and the level of constraint depend, firstly, on the number of yardsticks that can 
be used as standards to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of an item (or, as the case may 
be, of the relationship between two items), and secondly, on the proportion of people in 
the sample who use that yardstick. In other words, the level of centrality and constraint 
depend on the proportion of the people in the sample who form an 'issue public'. Converse 
calculates that the issue public is less than 50% of the total public for each of the items he 
used, and even less than 20% for the 'power and housing' item. 
It follows that respondents who are part of an issue public arrive at meaningful answers, 
even if they do so in different ways, using different standards. It can be said that they 
actually have a 'true value', which can be made manifest simply by asking a question. 
Their answers will be stable and constrained. Since stability is a coefficient of test-retest 
reliability and since intercorrelations are coefficients of parallel-test reliability, it can be 
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concluded that their answers are reliable. The other respondents do not arrive at 
meaningful answers: they do not have an attitude with regard to the issue at stake. For 
them there is no subjective state to be measured or, otherwise stated, there is no 'true 
value'. Their answers will be rather unstable and unconstrained, i.e. unreliable. Therefore, 
the assumption of classical test theory that there is a true value to be measured may not be 
true in attitude research. 
The interpretation of political phenomena 
The differences in belief systems described above also have consequences for the 
interpretation of political processes and public opinion (Converse, 1964a). The findings 
show that people in the electorate make sense of politics in a variety of ways. Only a tiny 
minority share the interpretations of the political elite. Nevertheless, political 
commentators and politicians often make use of the terms that are current among the elite 
to explain processes in the mass. The fact that, for example, a Liberal president (Truman) 
was replaced by a Conservative one (Eisenhower), and that a greater number of candidates 
from the Republican party were elected to the American Congress, which happened to 
occur in the early fifties, are often interpreted as a swing to conservatism. But, as 
Converse demonstrated, the term 'conservatism' means little or nothing to large parts of 
the electorate and is therefore not accurate. In Converse's (1964a) view, these erroneous 
interpretations can be attributed to the fact that commentators and politicians tend to meet 
only a highly specific sample of the electorate, which consists of people who are more 
attentive to politics, and who are more familiar with the belief systems of the elite than the 
general electorate. 
Public opinion, which is equalled to the outcome of opinion polls nowadays (see 
Chapter 1), is also often interpreted in the terms used by the elite. Public opinion is often 
reduced to highly simplified statements of the form "a certain percentage is for (or 
against) this or that policy". Such interpretations of public opinion obscure the highly 
fragmented picture, both much more narrow and more diverse, which Converse 
discovered behind the answers collected in a survey. 
2.2 The debate 
Converse's studies have given rise to much debate10. For each year between 1970 and 
1990, about 30 citations of his article on "The Nature of Belief Bystems in the Mass 
Public" (1964a) can be found in the "Social Sciences Citation Index". More than half of 
these are found in political science journals; about one fifth in sociological journals. Until 
198S only some scarce citations were found in psychological journals. Since 1986 
psychologists have paid more attention to Converse's work: about 10 citations were found 
each year in (social) psychological journals11. 
Three aspects of the debate will be described below: psychological theories on attitude 
structures, empirical assessment of attitudes and nonattitudes in surveys, and some false 
assumptions on measurement error. 
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Psychological theories on attitude structures 
Psychological theories on attitude structures focus on four aspects of attitude structure: the 
use of standards of organization other than the liberal-conservative yardstick, the cognitive 
integration of attitudes, attitudes as representational associative networks in memory, and 
attitude centrality. These will be described below. 
Standards of organization 
Some researchers criticize Converse for focusing too much on the use of the 
liberal-conservative yardstick as a means of organizing political attitudes. They argued that 
other standards can also be used to organize attitudes, especially values and social groups. 
Values as standards 
Lane (1962, 1973), one of the first critics of Converse, argued along this line. Lane 
asserted that the liberal-conservative yardstick is not always sufficient as a norm to deduce 
a preference on a political issue. In most cases, additional assumptions have to be made to 
arrive at a political belief. Furthermore, individuals may not use the liberal-conservative 
yardstick at all. There are other standards that can be used effectively in political 
reasoning. Consequently, Lane concluded that politica] beliefs are not always organized in 
accordance with the liberal-conservative ideology. The organization may be highly 
idiosyncratic. In his interviews with fourteen 'working class' men in Eastport, Lane indeed 
found that they held rather elaborate views on politics, centering on values such as 
freedom or equality. 
However, there are two reasons why Lane's study does not contradict Converse's theory. 
In the first place, Converse acknowledged the possibility that belief constraint can be 
idiosyncratic. Converse (1964a) explained that this might reduce the intercorrelations 
between issues, but should not affect the stability of answers. Since the stability of the 
answers was rather low, Converse concluded that not many respondents arrived at answers 
in idiosyncratic ways. 
In the second place, once Lane (1962) started to talk about specific political issues with 
his interviewees, he found that not all of them grasped their significance. Lane observed 
two different ways of reasoning. Some of the interviewees grasped the context of the issue 
they were talking about. Lane (1962) termed this "contextualizing": "temporally to know 
what went before and what is likely to follow, spatially to know the terrain, in human 
terms to see the play of the many motives involved" (p.350). Other interviewees saw the 
issues as isolated from the surrounding context. Lane named this "morselizing". It may be 
clear that those individuals who morselize cannot arrive at coherent answers in a survey. 
Hence, Lane and Converse analyze similar differences in political reasoning, but they do so 
in different words. 
Other researchers12 also paid attention to the role of values or core beliefs in the 
organization of belief systems. While Lane used open interviews, more recent research was 
carried out with survey methods. These surveys used scales which were meant to measure 
a specific value, such as individualism, equalitarianism, free enterprise or democracy. 
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Since the answers on these scales are often found to be related to the answers on questions 
about policy issues, it is concluded that these values function as organizing standards.13 
Social groups as standards 
In a number of studies an attempt was made to assess whether, besides core beliefs and 
values, social groups are used as standards to integrate beliefs14. Political parties and then-
positions, as they are perceived by respondents, can be used to organize beliefs about all 
kinds of political issues. Furthermore, specific subsets of policy issues dealing with social 
groups like race and social class can be constrained by beliefs about these groups. 
In sum, these studies point out the possibility that structuring principles may be at work 
other than the liberal-conservative principle. Converse acknowledged this possibility15. 
Therefore, these studies should not be seen as contradicting Converse's theory. They 
elaborate on other kinds of political reasoning which were also mentioned by Converse. 
Cognitive complexity 
The studies described in the previous section addressed the question of which standards can 
be used to constrain beliefs. Lane (1973) also mentioned that sometimes more than one 
yardstick is used as a norm to deduce a preference on a political issue. The combination of 
different standards is defined psychologically as cognitive complexity16. 
Cognitive complexity primarily denotes the number of standards which people take into 
account when a preference is formed. This is also referred to as differentiation (Tetlock, 
1989). An individual who has a highly differentiated view of politics recognizes that 
different policies can have many, sometimes conflicting, effects, which cannot readily be 
classified on a single standard of judgement. 
Individuals may not only differ in the number of standards which they attach to an 
attitude object, but also in the way they combine these standards to form an attitude. Some 
individuals may see these different standards as unrelated or isolated properties. Other 
individuals may see some relations between standards. The degree to which standards are 
seen as connected is referred to as integration (Tetlock, 1989). Differentiation is thus a 
prerequisite for integration. 
In the integration of different standards the appraisal of these standards also plays a role. 
The evaluations of different standards may be independent, consistent, or in conflict. 
Consistent evaluations of different standards of an attitude object are found to be related to 
more extreme judgments about the object, while independent and conflicting standards are 
found to be related to more moderate judgments (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Differences in cognitive complexity are often equated with the differences in constraint 
described by Converse (Lusk & Judd, 1988; Milburn, 1991). However, the 
intercorrelations between answers, which Converse used to measure constraint, are only a 
minimal measure of cognitive complexity. Once people employ one or more standards to 
form a judgement, they will give constrained answers on the survey questions that are 
related to the employed standard(s). Consequently, both respondents reasoning from rather 
low levels of complexity and respondents reasoning from higher levels of complexity can 
arrive at constrained answers. Only respondents with a highly undifferentiated view of 
24 Statements and stories 
politics Qike the 'morselizers' described by Lane (1962)) will give unconstrained answers 
in surveys. 
Attitude structures as associative networks in memory 
Since the mid-eighties, there has been a noticeable upswing of interest in the concept of 
attitude17. McGuire (1986) sees this increasing interest as a third flourishing of attitude 
research. In the twenties and thirties, research dealt mainly with attitude measurement (see 
also section 1.1). In the fifties and sixties, studies concentrated on attitude consistency and 
change (see also section 2.1). In the contemporary third period the focus is on attitude 
structure™. In this period attitudes have become conceptualized as structured 
representations in long-term memory19. This concept draws on the research on social 
cognition (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) which preceded the current flourishing of attitude 
research, as well as on cognitive psychological research in general. Consequently, 
researchers emphasize cognitive information processing dynamics, which are associated 
with representational attitude-structures20. 
In a series of contributions from this perspective, attitudes as structured representations 
are more specifically equated with associative networks in memory21. The theory is 
derived from previous work by J. Anderson and Bower (1973) on human associative 
memory. These researchers were interested in the storage of semantic information in 
memory. Semantic information was assumed to exist in nodes, associated by links. 
Bower (1981) also studied the representation of affect and emotion, but Fazio (1986, 
1989) explicitly linked the theory of human associative memory to attitude psychology. 
Fazio used the often employed definition of an attitude as an association between an object 
and an evaluation22. He added, however, that both the object and the evaluation are stored 
as nodes in memory. Like any other construct based on associative learning, each node and 
the links between nodes can vary in strength. The strength of the object node, the strength 
of the evaluation node and the strength of the association between object and evaluation 
determine the attitude strength. Attitudes can be associated with other attitudes and can thus 
form attitude structures, or representational networks in memory. The links between 
attitudes can vary in strength. Furthermore, evaluations can be associated with links 
between attitudes. 
Differences in belief systems as described by Converse have been reformulated in terms 
of associative network theory (see Judd and Krosnick, 1989). In addition to such a 
reformulation of the differences in belief systems, some new phenomena are studied. These 
studies focus chiefly on the dynamics of information processing as related to attitude 
structures. Fazio related attitude strength to attitude accessibility. Accessibility is defined as 
the likelihood that an attitude will be activated from memory upon mere exposure to the 
attitude object (Fazio, 1989). The accessibility of an attitude can be readily measured as the 
latency of response to an attitudinal question: the time between the presentation of an item 
and the moment when the respondent gives an answer is easily measured in computerized 
attitude measurement procedures23. Stronger attitudes will be activated automatically, 
whereas less strong attitudes can only be retrieved through an effortful, reflective process. 
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Phenomena such as 'priming' and 'spreading activation' also reflect the dynamics of 
information processing related to attitude structures. Priming denotes the effect of recent 
activation on the probability that an object springs to mind again. Spreading activation 
denotes the fact that activation of one attitude may also induce the activation of a linked 
attitude. Spreading activation will depend on the strength of the association between 
attitudes. For this reason, the study of spreading activation is a study of attitude structure 
(Judd, Drake, Downing and Krosnick, 1991; Tourangeau, Rasinski and D'Andrade, 1991). 
In sum, the differences in belief systems described by Converse have been reformulated 
in terms of associative network theory. Furthermore, attention is paid chiefly to 
information processing, especially to the activation of attitudes from memory. 
Attitude centrality 
Converse observed that the dimension of attitude centrality was badly neglected in the 
social psychology of the sixties. Recently, social psychologists have begun to take a greater 
interest in this dimension (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Some survey researchers, too, made 
a plea for measuring the centrality of attitudes (for example J. Converse and Schuman, 
1987), but their plea does not seem to have met with much response in survey practice. 
Although more attention has been paid to attitude characteristics like centrality, research 
is rather fragmentary. A major problem is that centrality-like aspects are defined in many 
different ways. Various concepts are used to conceive of these aspects, including strength, 
importance, involvement, conviction, certainty and intensity24. Moreover, these concepts 
are measured in a lot of different ways. A related problem is the question of whether 
centrality is one-factorial or not (Raden, 1985). 
Converse distinguished between motivational and cognitive centrality, which he assumed 
to be related. This distinction will be maintained. As has been explained in section 2.1, 
psychologists see motivational centrality as related to psychological needs and functions. 
However, motivational centrality can also be measured directly by asking respondents how 
important or central an attitude is to them, or how much they are involved with, interested 
in, or concerned about an attitude object. Importance will be used interchangeably as a 
short denominator of motivational centrality. 
Converse studied knowledge25, constraint and stability as concomitants of cognitive 
centrality. Cognitive complexity, attitude strength, and attitude accessibility, as these were 
described above, can also be seen as concomitants of cognitive centrality. Indeed, Fazio 
(1989) explicitly equates attitude accessibility with the nonattitude-attitude continuum 
developed by Converse26. Thus, cognitive centrality is assessed on the basis of the aspects 
which the researchers attribute to attitude structures, rather than on the basis of statements 
by respondents, which are often used to measure attitude importance. Some of the 
concomitants of cognitive centrality have been found to be interrelated27. Some 
relationships to importance have also been found28. 
Motivational and cognitive centrality are often confused with more traditional measures 
of attitudes, such as extremity or intensity. However, these measures express the extremity 
or intensity of the evaluation. For example, respondents are often asked: "how strongly do 
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you agree/disagree?". The confusion becomes even greater, since this characteristic of an 
attitude is often referred to as attitude strength, while the same concept is used by others to 
describe some concomitant of cognitive centrality (Raden, 1989). Another source of 
confusion is the fact that relationships between extremity and centrality have been found in 
some cases, but not in others (Raden, 1989; Tesser and Shaffer, 1990). To avoid the 
conceptual confusion in discussions of attitude strength, those measures which refer to the 
strength of an evaluation will be called evaluative extremity in the following. Attitude 
strength in the specific sense in which it is used in the theory on attitude structures as 
associative networks will further be referred to as attitude crystallization. 
Extremity should be distinguished from cognitive and motivational centrality. As 
Converse claimed, extremity need not be related to knowledge, and constraint may well 
exist without the contextual knowledge of why belief elements are related. In fact, the 
question of whether cognitive processes should be assumed to lie at the basis of all 
attitudinal preferences has been widely disputed. Some studies have found evidence of 
direct evaluative appreciations which are not based on cognitive processes. Other studies 
found evidence of direct storage of evaluations in memory, independent from cognitions29. 
Social psychologists have assessed the functionality of motivational and cognitive 
centrality. Stronger and more important attitudes are frequently found to be more resistant 
to attitude change (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), like Converse predicted. Attitudes and 
behavior are found to be more closely related when the attitudes are stronger and more 
important30. Stronger and more important attitudes are also more strongly related to 
selective perception and judgment (Fazio, 1989). It is therefore psychologically useful to 
distinguish and measure a centrality dimension. 
There are few studies on the processes which lead to the formation of central attitudes, 
and hardly any that have been conducted in natural settings outside the laboratory31. It has 
been found, however, that direct personal experience (Fazio and Zanna, 1981), personal 
involvement (Lemmers, 1993), 'repeated exposure' (Bornstein, 1989), systematic cognitive 
elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1987), personal responsibility (Cooper 
and Fazio, 1984), accountability (Tetlock, 1983), and conflicts between important values 
(Tetlock, 1986) are related to more central attitudes. 
Conclusion 
The psychological studies on attitude structures described above can be seen as elaborations 
of Converse's theory on the attitude-nonattitude continuum. They elaborate on each of the 
two interrelated properties of attitude structures that were identified by Converse: 
constraint and centrality. 
As regards constraint, we found that the standards applied to arrive at constraint may 
range from ideological labels such as liberal/conservative to values and social groups. 
These standards may be used independently or they may be integrated. Both the number 
and degree of integration of standards are defined as cognitive complexity. It was argued 
that the constraint measure used by Converse is only a minimal measure of cognitive 
complexity. Apart from these studies, which tend to confine themselves to the content of 
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attitude structures, research has been carried out on the dynamics of cognitive information 
processing, in connection with the conceptualization of attitudes as representational 
structures in memory. Converse's concept of constraint has been reconceptualized in the 
terms of a cognitive psychology of attitudes, in which attitudes are seen as being 
represented in memory via nodes and links. Processes like the activation of attitudes, 
priming and spreading activation have been studied. Although they differ in focus, both the 
studies on cognitive complexity as well as the studies on attitudes as associative networks in 
memory rely on the psychology of attitude consistency of the fifties and sixties, just as 
Converse's theory did. 
As regards centrality, this dimension has received some more attention in recent years. 
There is much confusion about centrality, however. The conceptual problems were 
discussed, culminating in a definition of three aspects of attitudes: motivational centrality 
(or importance), cognitive centrality and evaluative extremity. Cognitive centrality is 
assessed by some concomitants: knowledge, constraint, stability, crystallization, 
accessibility and complexity. It should be remarked once again that centrality and 
constraint are related. Whereas motivational and cognitive centrality are often found to be 
related, it is contested whether these two are related to extremity. It was argued that 
extremity should be seen as an independent aspect. Motivational and cognitive centrality 
were found to be psychologically functional in the guidance of behavior, perception, 
judgment and change. 
Attitudes and nonattitudes in the opinion survey 
Whereas all kinds of methods have been used in the studies described above, ranging from 
psychological experiments through surveys to in-depth interviews, other scholars have 
commented more specifically on the assessment of the attitude-nonattitude continuum in the 
opinion survey. Although the levels of sophistication have also been disputed32, we will 
confine our discussion to those measures which are based on closed questions since these 
are predominant in current survey practice (see section 1.1). 
Three aspects involved in the assessment of attitudes and nonattitudes in survey research 
will be presented. Firstly, some researchers have pointed out problems in the 
interpretation of the stability and constraint coefficients introduced by Converse. Secondly, 
other researchers have found higher levels of stability and constraint than Converse did. 
Thirdly, some other measures relevant to the attitude-nonattitude debate will be discussed: 
"no opinion" answers, answers to questions on obscure and non-existent issues and 
response effects. 
The interpretation of constraint and stability 
Variance and constraint 
Barton and Parsons (1977) asserted that mass-elite contrasts in the intercorrelations 
between issues may have been affected by difference in response variance between the elite 
and the mass public. After all, the magnitude of a correlation coefficient depends on the 
variance of the answers in the subsamples. In an attempt to find a method to measure 
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constraint between attitudes independently of variance, Barton and Parsons (1977) took the 
standard deviation from his own mean of an individual's responses as an individual 
measure of constraint. If a respondent gives conservative answers to all items, his standard 
deviation will be low. This is also true of respondents who give only liberal answers or 
only neutral answers. On the other hand, if a respondent gives liberal answers on some 
items and conservative answers on others, his standard deviation will be higher. Hence, the 
standard deviation of an individual's responses from his own mean can be used as a 
measure of constraint. 
Barton and Parsons claim, however, that it is better to use a measure of 'relative 
consistency'. They argue that an individual's attitudes are constrained if his answers always 
occupy the same position in relation to the distribution of attitudes in the general 
population. This means that a 'centrist' will always pick answers close to the population 
mean. A conservative will always give answers which will end up on the conservative side 
of the population mean. Therefore, 'relative consistency' is calculated in two steps. First, 
the standard scores are computed for a sample, so that each score represents the deviation 
from the population mean. Second, the standard deviation of an individual's standard 
scores across the items is computed as the measure of 'relative consistency'. 
Barton and Parsons tested this measure of relative consistency (see also Boosch, 1986). 
They found that a political elite sample had lower standard deviations across standard 
scores than a mass sample, indicating that their attitudes are more constrained. Higher-
educated respondents were also lower on the relative consistency measure than less 
educated respondents, indicating that their attitudes, too, were more constrained. 
Level of analysis 
Although Converse found that, at the individual level, answers on survey questions were 
unstable for a large part of his sample, it is a very consistent result of survey 
questionnaires that the frequency distributions at the aggregate level are rather constant in 
time. Page and Shapiro (1982) examined a number of questions on public policy issues that 
had been asked in identical wordings between 1935 and 1979 in surveys conducted by the 
National Opinion Research Center or the Center for Political Studies. They found that the 
frequency distributions of the answers are rather stable over time at the aggregate level. 
Inglehart (1985) also found that the distribution of the answers on a 
materialism/postmaterialism scale is rather stable at the aggregate level. He found some 
short-term effects on whether people agreed with materialist views, which were related to 
the economic climate (as measured by inflation rates). Furthermore, the relative positions 
of age cohorts at the aggregate level did not change across time. Inglehart also found 
aggregate stability of personal values measured by means of Rokeach' terminal value scale, 
including values such as a world at peace, family security, mature love and an exciting life. 
This kind of evidence indicates that random answering may not be as widespread as 
Converse thought it was (see also Van Deth, 1989). Whenever respondents answer as if 
they are throwing dice, the dice seem at least to be biased. Taylor (1983) found some 
direct evidence for this idea. In a latent class analysis of the data used by Converse, Taylor 
(1983) found that the marginal proportions of the nonattitude holders in the 
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black-and-white model mirror the proportional distribution of attitude holders on the same 
issue. She concludes: "although their own attitudes are not crystallized well enough to 
produce consistent responses, the non-opinion class is apparently aware enough of the 
considerations that lead opinion holders to their positions (or perhaps aware enough of the 
dominant sentiment among the opiniated) to mirror these in their own collective response" 
(p.391). 
In sum, it can be concluded that the proportion of respondents who give purely random 
answers is smaller than Converse initially assumed. 
When constrained and stable answers are found 
In some new studies, the answers on survey questions were found to be more stable and 
constrained than in Converse's study. Three aspects play a role in finding more stable and 
constrained answers: the state of the political field, the form and content of the questions 
and the characteristics of the respondents. 
In surveys carried out between 1964 and 1972 it was found that the answers were more 
constrained than the answers in Converse's study in the fifties. Two opposing 
interpretations of these findings have been supplied: Nie and his colleagues attributed the 
increased constraint to changes in the political climate; Bishop and colleagues and Sullivan 
and colleagues attributed it to changes in question format33. While the discussion remained 
largely inconclusive, it directs the attention to two possible determinants of constraint. 
The state of the political field 
Nie and his colleagues reasoned that the constraint is higher because the mass public itself 
has changed. For the mass public, politics took on more salient features in the sixties than 
in the fifties, since public debates were more ideologically oriented, and opinions became 
more extreme. Nie et al. argue that the centrality of politics increased in the mass-public. 
People were thinking more about politics and, as a result, attitude strength and constraint 
increased. Nie and his colleagues concluded that the state of the political field and its 
perception by the electorate exert an influence on the structuring of the opinions in the 
mass public. 
The interpretation of Nie et al. was refined by Carmines and Stimson (1982). Nie et al. 
found that the average intercorrelation between all issues increased. Carmines and Stimson 
(1982), however, assessed the constraint among specific issues. They were able to locate a 
growth in constraint especially in racial issues: in the sixties, questions on race were more 
strongly associated both among themselves and with questions on other issues. Carmines 
and Stimson attribute this finding to an increasing political interest in racial issues. While 
in the fifties opinions on race did not follow clear-cut party lines, by the sixties the 
political parties were much more outspoken on racial issues, which were also more often 
discussed during presidential election campaigns. They conclude that, although politics in 
general may have taken on more salient features, the heightened constraint is especially a 
result of a politicization of the race issue34. In Chapter 3 a more precise description of the 
political field and its influence on political attitudes will be given. 
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Question format and content 
Although it seems plausible that the state of the political field can influence the level of 
constraint, this interpretation was challenged by Bishop et al. and by Sullivan et al. They 
pointed out that the format and the wording of the questions used by Nie and his colleagues 
were different from Converse's35. The results cannot be compared directly, therefore. 
First, the question that was asked to filter out those who do not have an opinion was 
altered from "Now would you have an opinion on this or not" to "Have you been interested 
enough in this to favour one side over the other?". As Bishop et al. (1983) found, the 
second question filters out more respondents so that less nonattitudinal answers will be 
found. 
Second, the format was altered from a one-sided Likert-type version in the fifties to a 
two-sided balanced version in the sixties. In experimental studies one half of the 
respondents were asked the questions in the format of the fifties and the other half were 
asked the questions in the format of the sixties. The latter format indeed produced higher 
constraint. Thus, Bishop et al., and Sullivan et al. concluded that the higher constraint is a 
result of the question format and not of a higher salience of politics. However, no 
explanation is offered as to why it is that the different formats influence the constraint of 
the responses. 
Question format, then, is related to the constraint of the answers. Question content can 
also influence constraint, as well as the stability of the answers36. As was also found by 
Converse, in some political areas more stable and constrained answers are found than in 
others. More stable and constrained answers are given when it comes to values, racial and 
moral issues. Answers to questions on political strategies in foreign policy are the least 
stable and constrained. Domestic politics and social welfare have an intermediate position, 
although the latter is higher in stability and constraint than the former. Cluster and factor 
analyses often reveal groups of items which are related to the issue-content, but no overall 
liberal-conservative ideology. Clusters or factors such as welfare (Tourangeau et al., 
1991), abortion (Tourangeau et al., 1991) or race (Carmines and Stimson, 1982) are found 
showing high constraint among the answers37. 
Characteristics of the respondent 
Characteristics of respondents may also influence the proportion of nonattitudes found. In 
discussing the differences between the mass public and congressional candidates, Converse 
(1964a) only compared the level of constraint. Other studies also compared the level of 
stability between mass and elite38. In general, it was found that the answers of elite 
respondents on survey questions about political issues are more stable and more 
constrained. However, the differences that were found depended on the type of elite under 
study: a national elite, like members of a national parliament, differs more profoundly 
from the mass public than a local elite, like members of a City Council or active party 
members (Converse, 1974). 
Converse claimed that differences in constraint are most profound between the elite and 
the mass public, but he also noticed that there are differences within the mass public. 
Although Converse (1964a) first asserted that differences in constraint are related to 
the Converse debate 31 
educational level, he later (1973) commented that this was not the case. Other studies, too, 
have produced conflicting findings on the role of education: some researchers found that 
more educated respondents gave more stable and constrained answers39, while others found 
no differences according to education40. 
It has often been found that respondents who say that politics is important for them give 
more stable and constrained answers41. However, differences are not always found42. Such 
findings may be related to the specific question(s) on the importance of politics that were 
asked. Schuman and Presser (1981) found, for example, that the stability of answers over 
time was related to the importance attached to a particular issue, but not to general 
measures of importance. Political knowledge is also found to be related to giving stable 
and constraint attitudes: the more respondents know about politics, the more reliable and 
constrained their answers are (Norpoth and Lodge, 1985). 
Conclusion 
The studies described above are often presented as contradicting Converse's thesis. Indeed, 
higher levels of stability and constraint have been found. However, although the results 
may differ from those obtained by Converse, they do not contradict his theory. Instead, 
they specify the conditions under which stable and constrained answers are likely to be 
found. As was described in section 2.1, Converse also mentioned the state of the field, 
question content and respondent characteristics as determinants of stability and constraint. 
Hence, he had no difficulty in incorporating most new findings in his theory (Converse, 
1975)43. 
The state of the political field, question format and content as well as respondent 
characteristics are found to be related to the stability and constraint of survey answers. On 
some of these factors, especially educational level, contradictory results have been 
obtained. Furthermore, the relative importance of each of these factors has been disputed. 
Although many researchers tend to take a one-sided stance, e.g. crediting either political 
salience or question format, one should be aware that the different factors may be related. 
Furthermore, interactions may exist: more abstract or difficult questions are quite likely to 
yield higher proportions of nonattitudes, especially among the lower-educated. Research 
on such interactions is virtually absent. 
Other indicators of nonattitudes 
Whereas our description of the assessment of attitudes and nonattitudes in the survey 
focused on stability and constraint until now, some other measures of nonattitudes have 
also been studied. These are item nonresponse, obscure and fictitious issues, and response 
effects. 
Item nonresponse 
As described in section 2.1, Converse took "no opinion" answers for self-confessed 
nonattitudes. It should be noticed, however, that "no opinion" answers may also be given 
for other reasons, for example by respondents who are not sure about their opinion 
(Duncan and Stenbeck, 1988) or by respondents who do not agree with the way the 
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question is posed (Hermann and Streng, 1985; Lenoir, 1988)44. A lot of studies have been 
carried out on "no opinion" answers, or item nonresponse, as they are also called. It has 
been found that the level of item nonresponse is related to both question and respondent 
characteristics. 
Presenting a filter question like "Would you say you have an opinion on this or not?" 
generally results in an increase of 20 to 25% in "no opinion" answers compared to 
questions where no such filter is added (Schuman and Presser, 1981; Bishop et al., 1983). 
As described above, the proportion of "no opinion" answers is related to which specific 
filter question is asked. As regards the content of the question: the more abstract and 
remote an issue (e.g. a question on arms shipment to Turkey), the greater the effect of a 
more strongly worded filter question will be (Bishop et al., 1983). 
While it is often assumed that "no opinion" answers are randomly distributed, it is 
generally found that lower-educated respondents, respondents for whom politics are less 
important and women are more likely to give "no opinion" answers on political 
questions43. These differences are greater when the question is more abstract or difficult in 
its formulation. 
Obscure and fictitious issues 
Converse (1970) mentioned a study by Hartley (1948), which showed that respondents 
even answered questions about non-existent groups. Similar studies have been carried out 
more recently. Schuman and Presser (1981) asked a question on a highly obscure and 
little-debated 'Agricultural trade act' and 'Monetary Control Bill'. Bishop et al. (1980, 
1986) posed a question on a non-existing 'Public Affairs Act'. 
Again, the proportion of respondents who answered the questions was related to whether 
a filter question was added. In cases where a "no opinion" was not explicitly provided, 
about one third of the respondents in these studies gave a substantive answer. When a "no 
opinion" option was provided, this proportion was reduced to 5 to 10%. Blacks were more 
likely to volunteer an opinion than whites, and the less educated more than the better 
educated. This finding is somewhat puzzling, because these groups are usually found to 
give "no opinion" answers on political questions more often. Bishop et al. (1986) argue 
that "blacks and less well-educated respondents may thus be more likely to offer opinions 
on fictitious issues because they are generally less well informed about politics and 
therefore are less able to tell whether the topic is something that 'belongs'. As a general 
principle, then, we would hypothesize that the less knowledgeable a person is about a given 
subject, the more easily he or she can be confused and pressured to give an opinion about 
it." (p.248). It is unclear whether the result is specific to this study. 
Both the analyses of "no opinion" answers and the analyses of answers on questions on 
non-issues illustrate the pressure to give an answer on survey questions. This pressure can 
even be brought to the point where questions are answered that had better be left 
unanswered. If respondents feel under pressure to answer, their answers may very well be 
nonattitudes, as Converse observed. Schuman and Presser (1981) found, however, that the 
answers on obscure issues were not completely random, but might have been induced by 
preceding questions. 
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Response effects 
Converse (1974) hypothesized that "it is probable that extraneous factors like question 
form intrude most sharply on responses where attitudes are least crystallized" (p.565). In 
other words, respondents who have less crystallized attitudes will be more susceptible to 
response effects or response set. Some studies have been carried out to test this 
hypothesis46. Although the results of these studies are not too consistent, it can be 
concluded that whenever differences are found, the magnitude of response effects is 
greater for respondents who are less educated and for respondents who are less interested 
in the issue asked about or in politics in general. Some interaction between issue content 
and respondent characteristics may exist. Bishop (1990), using questions on the federal 
budget and on federal control of wages and prices, found between-subjects differences on a 
greater number of response effects than did Krosnick and Schuman (1988), who used more 
familiar issues like gun control and union membership. Results are especially conclusive 
with regard to the addition of a middle alternative: this answering option is especially 
popular among those who score low on measures of attitude intensity, importance, 
certainty and the like (Krosnick and Schuman, 1988; Bishop, 1990). 
Some false assumptions on measurement error in surveys 
Anticipating possible criticism of his work, Converse (1964a, 1970) suggested that some 
scholars might attribute the low stability coefficients to poor question writing. As was 
explained in section 1.1, the preferred way of dealing with the problem of whether 
respondents know what they are talking about is to find out better ways of writing 
questions. Indeed, some researchers have argued that all low stability coefficients imply 
poor question writing. Their criticism can be summarized as follows: "respondents are not 
vague, questions are vague". 
Reasoning on the basis of psychometric theory, which was described in section 1.2, these 
researchers hold that answers are a function of both a 'true' attitude and random 
measurement error. The random error, or unreliability, is said to reduce the constraint 
and stability coefficients. The stability and constraint of the 'true' attitudes is said to be 
greater in reality than the 'raw' coefficients indicate. Stability and constraint coefficients 
should therefore be disattenuated for measurement error. In the seventies, several 
researchers reanalyzed the data used by Converse from this point of view47. While the 
specific assumptions underlying these reanalyses differed48, they did share the basic 
assumption that the answers are a function of both the 'true' attitude and the measurement 
error. And indeed, after correction for measurement error, the stability was found to be 
much higher than in Converse's calculations, often coming close to 1.0. Achen (1975) even 
found stability coefficients of over 1.0. 
Three objections can be made against this interpretation. Firstly, these researchers do 
not indicate in what respect the questions are vague, nor do they suggest any other 
formulation that is less vague. 
The second objection addresses the technical procedures that were used. The stability 
and constraint coefficients are in fact reliability coefficients: the stability coefficient is a 
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test-retest reliability; the constraint coefficients can be seen as parallel-test reliabilities. 
Whenever these coefficients are corrected for measurement error, it is in fact the 
reliability coefficients that are corrected for measurement error. This is an odd procedure, 
since the coefficients are themselves indicative of measurement error, and should not be 
corrected any further. 
Thirdly, the analyses all rely on the assumption that there is indeed a 'true' score to be 
measured. This is the very assumption Converse criticized. Converse (1964a, p.244) 
argued that some respondents have a 'true' score while others do not. Indeed, he found that 
some respondents gave reliable answers, while others did not, in accordance with the 
black-and-white model. The former will have a true score, the others will not49. The 
critics assumed that questions are either vague for everyone or clear for everyone. 
Converse's findings indicate, however, that what is vague for one respondent (e.g. 
someone who is not interested in a political issue) is not necessarily vague for another 
respondent (e.g. a politician who has to decide about policies on the same issue). The 
critics assumed that the low reliabilities indicate that Converse used a poor measurement 
instrument. Converse argued, however, that measurement error varies with both the 
characteristics of the respondent (like his educational level and his involvement in politics), 
and the characteristics of the question (like abstract formulations and far-away objects)50. 
Converse's findings imply that not everyone has a well-formed central attitude prior to its 
measurement: there is not always a 'true' value to measure. As Converse concludes: "the 
measurement of non-existent states is very unrewarding" (1970, p.177). The reliability 
should thus be interpreted not only as a characteristic of a questionnaire, but as a 
characteristic of the relationship between respondent and questionnaire. Recently, this has 
also been acknowledged in the more sophisticated areas of survey research (e.g. Alwin, 
1991; Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). 
Whereas it is possible to verify whether or not an answer is true for survey questions on 
social characteristics and actual behavior, it is difficult when it comes to attitudes, to decide 
what the true score of a personal attitude should look like. There exists no objective 
measure (or at least one that is commonly agreed upon) to check whether or not an answer 
represents the true personal attitude. In the case of psychological tests designed to measure 
different aptitudes it is possible to decide whether an answer is correct or not, so that a 
'true' score is always possible51. The analogy between psychological tests and opinion 
surveys is, therefore, much more problematic than has often been realized. 
In sum, what can be learned from the debate about whether the instruments or the 
respondents are to blame is that not everyone has an attitude on the questions posed and 
thus not a 'true' score. As a result, the reliability coefficients may range from zero for 
those respondents who did not have an attitude before the measurement to one for those 
respondents who do have a central 'true' attitude. 
2.3 Conclusion on the Converse debate 
One of the concluding remarks of Chapter 1 was that survey researchers try to measure 
the 'true' score of an attribute of the respondents. This 'true' score should not be distorted 
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by the measurement procedure, but it should adequately reflect a personal attribute, 
unaffected by interviewers and question formulations. The question was raised, however, 
whether there is always such a 'true' score to be measured. The Converse debate centred 
on this question. 
In survey research respondents are sometimes asked whether they have an opinion on 
the questions that are put to them. If such a 'filter' question is posed, it might be thought 
that respondents who do not have an opinion are filtered out. The respondents who give 
substantive answers (agree/disagree, yes/no) would at first sight seem to be those who have 
an opinion on the question. This assumption appears not to be true. Respondents often feel 
pressed to give substantive answers, even if they do not have a clear opinion which already 
existed before the question is asked. In fact, respondents even answer questions that had 
better be left unanswered. 
Psychological theories on attitude structures can be used to assess whether an answer 
refers to a preexisting attitude or not. Although the concepts that are used and the 
relationships between them are not always clear, it is nevertheless possible to define some 
important attributes of attitude structures which relate to the attitude-nonattitude 
continuum. Converse used the psychological theories on attitude consistency that were 
prevalent in the fifties and sixties to analyze constraint in belief systems. In addition to the 
logical and psychological sources of constraint analyzed by the psychologists he suggested 
social sources of constraint. Furthermore, Converse drew attention to attitude centrality as 
an important dimension of attitudes. The description of centrality and constraint given by 
Converse has been updated with more recent psychological studies focusing on attitude 
strength and attitude structure. These studies share a cognitive point of view on attitudes. 
In this chapter, a distinction was made between a cognitive and a motivational aspect of 
centrality. Knowledge, accessibility, crystallization, and stability were defined as 
concomitants of cognitive centrality. In extreme cases, a nonattitude may exist. Cognitive 
and motivational centrality were found to be related. In psychological research both 
centrality aspects are found to be functional in some of the most important research 
domains in attitude psychology: the prediction of behavior, biased perception and 
judgment, and attitude change. The relationship between cognitive and motivational 
centrality and evaluative extremity is contested. It is possible, and this has indeed been 
found, for people to express extreme attitudes which are not central. 
Differences in attitude structures were described as differences in constraint and 
complexity. Constraint and complexity are also related to cognitive centrality, since more 
central attitudes are incorporated in more constrained and more complex structures. The 
origin of the standards used to arrive at constraint in attitude structures may differ from 
ideological labels to values and social groups. The number of standards used and their 
integration may also differ, as theories on cognitive complexity have shown. Furthermore, 
attitude structures may differ in range and content of objects, as Converse explained. 
In general, it is assumed in survey research that respondents differ in the evaluative 
direction (pro or con) and evaluative extremity of their attitudes. Consequently, they are 
asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the items presented to them. 
However, it became clear in this chapter that the attitudes of respondents in survey 
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interrogations also differ in centrality and structure. Some respondents may not have an 
attitude at all. If questions are posed, those respondents arrive at answers in different ways. 
Converse demonstrated that some respondents will choose a "no opinion" option. Others 
will pick an agree/disagree or yes/no answer at random. Still other respondents will arrive 
at a meaningful answer, but only if the question matches a yardstick used by the 
respondents to evaluate politics. 
A major criticism that was put forward in the debate following Converse's studies was 
the assertion that Converse exaggerated the number of respondents who answer at random. 
Various additional ways of arriving at answers have been described and empirically 
verified. Firstly, respondents without central attitudes have been found to be more prone 
to response effects. Selecting a middle alternative appeared to be especially attractive for 
those who do not have a clear-cut attitude on a question. Secondly, respondents may give 
an answer which only reflects an evaluation and is thus not related to cognitions or 
contextual knowledge. Thirdly, respondents may have some vague idea about the dominant 
opinions among attitude holders at a certain point in time. 
Whereas these three are alternatives to random answering, there are also alternatives for 
arriving at meaningful answers. They can be summarized under the heading of 
'idiosyncratic ways of reasoning'. As Lane (1962, 1973) argued, respondents may not 
answer along the lines of liberal/conservative ideology and still give meaningful answers. 
It can be hypothesized that idiosyncratic reasoning will occur more often among 
respondents who reason on the basis of rather complex attitude structures. 
It has been demonstrated that respondents will respond in a variety of different ways to 
the survey questions that are presented to them. In this chapter, some measures were 
described that can be used to assess where answers can be placed on a scale ranging from 
nonattitudes to central attitudes. Concomitants of cognitive centrality which can readily be 
measured in surveys with closed questions are knowledge (measured by knowledge tests) 
and "no opinion" answers (which indicate more directly whether respondents have an 
attitude on a question). If a computerized procedure is used, attitude accessibility can be 
measured by response latency (Fazio, 1989). Reliability coefficients can be used to assess 
the crystallization of an attitude: the higher the reliability, the more crystallized the 
attitudes32. To do this, one can use the test-retest reliability as Converse did, or any other 
reliability estimate (e. g. the LISREL estimates used by Norpoth and Lodge, 1985). To 
assess attitude constraint, one can use either the intercorrelations between items, as 
Converse did, or the 'relative consistency' measure developed by Barton and Parsons 
(1977). The latter has the advantage that it is independent from the variance of the 
responses in a sample. In Chapters 5 and 6 we will demonstrate exactly how these 
indicators of cognitive centrality were used in the present study. 
The studies described in this chapter warrant some conclusions on attitude centrality and 
structure. The different indicators of the nonattitude-attitude continuum were found to be 
related. They are also all related more or less similarly to the state of the political debate 
on an issue, the question form and content, and respondent characteristics. As regards 
question content, the proportion of nonattitudes found on a question will depend on the 
number of standards that can be applied to it and on the proportion of respondents who 
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employ such standards. Question form (the formulation of a filter question and one-sided 
versus balanced questions) and question content (racial issues, domestics policies) both have 
an effect on the level of centrality and structure that is found. As regards respondent 
characteristics, more nonattitudes, less central and less structured attitudes are found 
among respondents who are less interested in politics. The relationship with education is 
somewhat less clear, since different studies have come up with different results. 
It can be concluded, then, that not all answers on survey questions reflect a preexisting 
attitude. Answers do not always reflect a 'true' value of an attitude even if respondents 
have the opportunity of giving a "no opinion" answer on a question. In reply to critics 
arguing that questions may be poorly phrased and that this is the reason why no 'true' 
value is found, it was argued that other formulations of question do not change the fact that 
some respondents may not have an attitude about an object they are asked questions about. 
Consequently, it was argued that reliability is not a characteristic of the questionnaire, as is 
often assumed, but a characteristic of the relationship between a questionnaire and the 
respondents. 
Although Converse also pointed out the social nature of attitude constraint and 
centrality, there was a tendency in the debate, especially among social psychologists, to 
focus exclusively on centrality and constraint as individual attributes. Attitude structures 
are studied only in relation to intra-psychological processes. In the next chapter, it will be 
shown how the work of Pierre Bourdieu demonstrates that differences in attitude centrality 
and structure are related to social and cultural processes. 

3 THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF PRODUCING POLITICAL OPINIONS 
A large part of the previous chapter was devoted to psychological theories of attitude 
structure. Such theories describe differences in the cognitive organization of attitude 
structures. They tend to ignore the social processes and structures which lie behind these 
differences in attitude structures. Some studies, which were also described in the previous 
chapter, focus more on social processes and structures. In such studies, the differences in 
attitude structures found in the survey are related to the state of the political field, mass-
elite contrasts, and social characteristics of respondents. This chapter will provide a more 
systematic reflection on the social side of differences in attitude structures. This reflection 
is largely based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu's work is especially suited to elaborate on the social processes and structures 
relating to differences in attitude structures. Bourdieu analyzes how these differences, or 
differences in political opinions as he terms them1, are constituted and function in politics 
in general2. Much like Converse, Bourdieu draws a distinction between the production of 
political opinions by a political elite and the consumption of these opinions in the mass 
public. In his work, differences in political opinions are linked to some political 
phenomena which are often studied as isolated phenomena in other theories on politics, 
such as agenda setting, political participation and political information in the mass-media. 
Hence, the expression of opinions in surveys is seen by Bourdieu as only one in many 
political activities, and one which can only be understood if it is related to the dynamics of 
politics in general. 
Bourdieu's theory on political opinions has its place in a more comprehensive 
sociological theory of culture3. Bourdieu analyzes political opinions as cultural products 
similar to products from other cultural domains, like sports, religion, or works of art, 
literature, and science. Although Bourdieu sometimes uses the concept of culture in a more 
restricted sense, as referring to works of art ("higher culture') only, he generally employs 
the concept in its more general, anthropological sense, referring to all products of 
mankind. Here, the concept of culture will be used only in the second, broader sense. 
Bourdieu also uses the term 'symbolic products' to indicate cultural products in the 
broader sense of the term. Although there are general characteristics in the social 
functioning of symbolic goods, each cultural domain also has its own particularities. 
Whereas, until now, differences in opinions were studied mainly on the political domain, 
this broader conception allows for an elaboration on differences in opinions in other 
cultural domains. After the description of political opinions as only one form of cultural 
products in this chapter, in the next chapter, these views on opinions will also be applied to 
another domain, i. e. health and illness. 
Bourdieu, then, relates the expression of opinions in the survey to the more general 
characteristics of the political domain, which is only a specific domain of cultural 
production. Bourdieu's theory is well-suited for the description of the social processes and 
structures related to differences in attitude structures for another reason, too, since he 
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argues that in order to understand how all kinds of cultural products have been made, it is 
also necessary to investigate how these products have been generated from mental 
structures. Unlike some other sociologists, Bourdieu attaches great importance to the 
mental structures from which cultural products are made.4 The study of social structures is 
only the first stage of research and should be complemented with the study of mental 
structures, Bourdieu (1992) claims. Unlike most psychologists and some other sociologists, 
Bourdieu asserts that the production of cultural goods, too, is bound by the social 
structures in which mental structures developed.5 Therefore, the study of mental structures 
should always be preceded by the study of social structures. 
In this chapter we will give an outline of Bourdieu's work on politics and political 
opinions and explain how it relates to his general sociological theory. 
3.1 The political opinion economy 
In his sociological culture theory, Bourdieu often uses economic concepts to analyze the 
production of symbolic goods, such as products, means of production, profit, interest or 
capital. As Bourdieu's characteristic use of these concepts has often given rise to 
misunderstanding, it is useful to make a general remark here on how he employs them. 
The notion of an economy should not be conceived of as the economy of the free market 
where money is the main form of capital. Bourdieu (1992) holds that this conception of 
the economy is limited to only a specific manifestation of the economy in a more general 
sense of the term. Bourdieu asserts that all human products, including money, have a social 
value. Consequently, the production of highly valued goods will lead to a certain kind of 
profit. Proñt itself does not have to be material, it can also be symbolic as, for example, in 
recognition and esteem in the eyes of others. If people have an interest in producing 
certain cultural goods, such as sports, opinions, art etc., they are, therefore, not only plain 
material interests. Thus, Bourdieu does not reduce the production and circulation of 
symbolic goods to the status of an epiphenomenon of the economic substratum, like some 
Marxist sociologists do. Instead, symbolic goods have social functions of their own. 
Bourdieu distinguishes between two important social structures in the production and 
consumption of symbolic goods. On the one hand there is a field, where an elite produces 
cultural goods. Politics, art, sports, religion, science etc. are all produced in different 
relatively autonomous fields. Although each field has its own dynamics, Bourdieu (1980c, 
1992) claims that it is possible to conceive of some characteristics common to all fields. On 
the other hand these cultural products are consumed by the mass public, which Bourdieu 
(1979,1984c) describes as a social space of class positions. 
The production of political opinions in the political field 
Like every other field, the political field can be visualized as a space in which people 
occupy interrelated positions. Each field is relatively autonomous, i.e. the production of 
cultural goods is more or less independent from other fields and has its own regularities. 
The autonomy of a field in relation to other fields is the result of social, historical 
processes. The field of art, for example, has acquired a relative independence from the 
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economical field. Two aspects of the autonomy of a field will be described here: a field has 
certain boundaries, and its members are relatively independent in the production of 
cultural goods belonging to the field. 
Bourdieu asserts that there is an ongoing struggle in each field about who does and who 
does not rightly belong to the field. Like its autonomy, the boundaries of a field are the 
results of a historical process. They are not given once and for all. The main actors on the 
political field, who occupy legitimate, professional positions are politicians, journalists, 
and political scientists (Bourdieu, 1973b). In relation to the struggle over its boundaries, 
Bourdieu analyzes the prerequisites for gaining access to a position in a field. These 
prerequisites differ from one field to another, but they are predominantly social in all 
fields, and may include, for example, the condition that a person should have the right title 
and know the right people. The trajectories leading to a position in the French political 
field have become more or less institutionalized. The 'sciences-po' fl'Institut d'Etudes 
Politiques in Paris; one of the 'grandes écoles' studied by Bourdieu in "La Noblesse d'Etat" 
(1989)), plays an important role as a gateway to political positions. 
Besides the question who does and who does not belong to a field, there is also a 
struggle about the definition of the cultural products which legitimately belong to a field. 
Just as there is a struggle about what constitutes a work of art, there is a struggle in the 
political field about what are legitimate political goods. Not all social problems are 
recognized as political problems. The definition of specific social problems as legitimate 
political problems is part of the political game. Bourdieu conceives of the social processes 
involved in the production of legitimate political problems as a process of consecration. 
Social problems can be made into political problems, for instance, by political 
commissions authorized to do so6. The authority invested in such a commission, or more 
generally in an important actor on the political field, to work out a position on a new 
political issue, makes it possible for such an issue to be accepted by the actors in the 
political field7. This consecration also implies a more specifically political definition of a 
problem. The problem has to be defined in the specific political language that is valid in 
the field8. An important aspect of such a definition, which is related to the Converse 
debate, is the explanation of the relationship between the problem and existing political 
values and ideologies. It is only after such a work of consecration has been carried out that 
a problem is recognized as a political problem. The politicization of the race issue which 
took place in American politics in the sixties can be cited as an example (see section 2.2)9. 
Thus, the acceptance of a problem as a political issue requires a specifically political 
definition. Such a definition will be different from other definitions and interpretations of 
the same problem, for example its definition in the scientific field. 
However, the shared beliefs about legitimate producers and legitimate products do not 
ensure that all positions in a field are equal and that all actors have the same appreciation 
of products. Bourdieu explains that there is always a continuous struggle in the field 
between those with established positions, the dominant, and those who try to establish their 
positions, the dominated. The dominant defend their positions in an orthodox discourse, 
the dominated criticize the position of the dominant in a heterodox discourse. So, Bourdieu 
analyzes the relationships between positions as relations of domination. One's position in a 
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field will determine what stance one will take on specific issues, for example whether one 
will take a leftist or rightist stance on a political issue. 
Bourdieu interprets the struggle in a field between the dominant and the dominated as a 
game. If one is to be able to play the game, and to be taken seriously by the other players, 
it is necessary to master the rules of the game. Bourdieu describes this mastery as a 'feel 
for the game'. Accordingly, if one is to produce political opinions that are recognized as 
such and that can influence the course of political affairs, it is necessary that one has this 
'feel for the game'. In other words, a person has to be equipped with the mental structures 
that enable him to do the right things within a field. The way one enters a field, via the 
'sciences-po' for example, is the way in which one acquires these mental structures. 
In the political field, as in any other field, there is a struggle between dominant and 
dominated members. Within each field, however, there is consensus about who the 
legitimate producers of products are, and what the legitimate products are. Actors in a 
field also agree on the rules of the game. This consensus is based on a shared belief within 
each field that the field is important, and that it is important to maintain its existence and 
autonomy. Bourdieu says that, from a point of view outside the field, there is always 
something arbitrary about the consensus on legitimate producers, products, and rules of 
the game. For this reason, Bourdieu (1992) terms this consensus or shared belief an 
'illusio'. 
In sum, it can be concluded that legitimate political opinions in the political field are 
produced by legitimate producers. Legitimate political opinions are formulated in a 
specifically political language, which refers to political values and ideologies. 
Technical competence and the attitude-nonattitude continuum 
Since the products of each field are produced according to the rules of the game that is 
played in that field, they have certain specific characteristics. People in the mass public can 
only make sense of cultural products if they have acquired the mental structures which 
enable them to recognize these specific characteristics. In the political domain, for 
example, a person can only make sense of political goods if he is able to recognize the 
specific political properties of the goods. Bourdieu defines the means to make sense of 
political products in their specific political aspect in terms of technical competence. 
Technical competence is a continuum ranging from the inability to recognize opinions in 
their political aspect to the ability to produce political opinions. Similarly, each field is 
connected to mental structures, which can be defined as the technical competence, or 
capacity, to recognize products as belonging to the field and to produce judgements about 
them. Technical competence on the political field will also be referred to as political 
competence. 
Bourdieu identifies some characteristics of political opinions, which are quite similar to 
the concomitants of cognitive centrality that were described in the previous chapter. This 
means that technical competence is related to the nonattitude-attitude continuum described 
in the previous chapter. In the first place, Bourdieu says that political opinions are 
produced on the basis of specific political principles. The previous chapter mentioned the 
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standards that were apparently used by people in order to arrive at attitudes in more or 
less complex ways. These standards can be equated with Bourdieu's specific political 
principles, since all the standards mentioned are of a political nature: a political ideology 
yardstick (liberal-conservative), political values (such as freedom, equality) and politically 
significant groups (parties, social class, race). Secondly, Bourdieu asserts that political 
opinions are coherent, since people who have the competence to produce political opinions 
will be sensitive to inconsistencies in their opinions. In this respect, Bourdieu's analysis is 
similar to the analysis of attitude constraint by social psychologists. As was explained in 
the previous chapter, psychological theories on attitude constraint also emphasize the role 
of inconsistencies in arriving at constrained attitudes. Thirdly, political opinions are often 
presented as 'personal' opinions. People who are competent to produce political opinions 
often seek to develop a personal view on a political issue. This aspect of political opinions 
is related to the idiosyncratic way of reasoning described in the previous chapter. And in 
the fourth place, people who often express political opinions, will arrive at them more or 
less automatically. They do not have to reflect before they give their opinions. In Fazio's 
terms, their attitudes will be easily accessible and automatically activated. 
Bourdieu says that producing automatically coherent personal opinions on the basis of 
specifically political principles is only a very specific way of producing opinions as such. 
In addition to the characteristics of political opinions already mentioned, Bourdieu 
mentions the characteristic that political opinions are formulated in a specific language 
which is rather distant and abstracted from experience. The way in which political 
opinions, with all the attributes that were mentioned, are produced is called logos by 
Bourdieu: "The symbolic mastery of experience which is expressed in discourse socially 
recognized as political and which presupposes the bracketing of all direct, exclusive 
reference to the concrete particularity of a situation" (1984b, p.461). Bourdieu asserts that 
the production of opinions does not always result from an intention to express a coherent, 
personal opinion. Nor are the opinions always deduced from specifically political 
standards. The opinions may also remain closer to personal experience. In this respect 
Bourdieu is like Converse, who also said that other kinds of opinions exist. Bourdieu's 
views on other ways of producing opinions will be discussed in the 'epilogue'. 
Technical competence to produce opinions on other fields can be described in more or 
less the same way. Evidently, the standards that are used are not political; each cultural 
field has its own standards. 
In sum, the technical competence to recognize and produce political opinions is related 
to the attitudc-nonattitude continuum, but Bourdieu argues that expressing coherent, 
personal, opinions based on specific political standards in an automatic way is only one 
highly specific way of expressing opinions. 
Technical competence and the relation to the political field 
Social psychologists focused exclusively on cognitive concomitants of centrality, such as 
accessibility, crystallization and constraint. In Bourdieu's view, however, the differences 
in technical competence also reflect a more general relationship with the political field that 
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is visible in patterns of consumption, participation and delegation to representatives. Since 
consumption, participation and delegation also indicate the amount of mental time spent on 
political issues, they will also be related to cognitive centrality. 
Bourdieu asserts that people differ in their consumption of the political opinions as they 
are disseminated by the mass media. Not only do people differ in the amount of time they 
spend reading about politics in papers and watching political television programs. Reading 
a newspaper or magazine and watching television has a different meaning for the readers 
and viewers. Only some people see these as activities that satisfy a need to be permanently 
informed about politics, the state of the political debate and the political problems of the 
day. Only some people see this permanent effort to be informed as related to the formation 
of a 'personal opinion' about the political problems under discussion. So, as Bourdieu 
(1984b) states: "a newspaper is a 'viewspaper' (journal d'opinion) for only a minority" 
(p.441). 
In addition to these differences in political consumption, Bourdieu analyzes differences 
in political participation. People who are capable of producing their own political opinions 
participate more often in political debate, for instance by sending letters to representatives 
or to newspapers. Furthermore, if people differ in their competence to produce political 
opinions, they also differ in how they delegate their 'political voice' to their 
representatives. People, who are more competent to produce political opinions are less 
dependent on their representatives and delegate their political voice only reluctantly. 
People who are less capable of producing political opinions depend more on their 
representatives to formulate their needs and wishes in order to make them politically 
legitimate. Without their representatives they have no chance of being listened to. They 
need organizations that can provide them with a political program. Their delegation is thus 
much more radical: they give parties or unions a kind of open credit or 'carte blanche' to 
participate in the political field.10 
Whereas differences in consumption will also exist on other fields, participation and 
delegation may be more specific for the political field. Actors on other fields are usually 
not assumed to represent any mass public. Furthermore, the barriers for members of the 
mass public to participate in other fields may be more difficult to surmount than in the 
political field. For example, in general it is only scientists who can produce legitimate 
scientific works. Whereas the participation of the mass public in the political field is highly 
valued, it is less so in other cultural fields. 
In sum, differences in political consumption, political participation and delegation are 
related to differences in political competence11. 
Social position and the competence to produce political opinions 
Unlike the social psychologists who described differences in attitude structures, Bourdieu 
focuses on the social significance of these differences. Competence in the sense of a 
technical capacity is related to competence in the sense of being socially recognized as a 
legitimate producer of cultural products. In Bourdieu's theory, this social counterpart of 
technical competence is called social competence. Both will be related, for if people have 
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the social right to speak and to voice their opinions about cultural products such as 
political issues, they will develop their technical competence further. Social competence is 
socially ascribed to some people by others, but it also has a subjective counterpart: people 
also have a feeling in a certain situation whether they are competent to express an opinion 
or not. On the political field, unlike on other fields, everybody is ascribed the competence 
de jure to express political opinions (for example in elections or referenda); as was already 
mentioned above, political participation is valued more in the political field than in other 
fields. However, not everybody feels de facto competent to express political opinions. 
Political participation depends on the degree in which one feels socially competent to 
express one's opinions. Therefore, the relationship between social competence as ascribed 
by others and social competence as ascribed by oneself is not perfect. On the political field 
at least, the degree in which one feels competent will, therefore, be more strongly related 
to one's technical competence than to ascribed social competence. 
As was explained above, Bourdieu says that all cultural products are socially valued. 
Political opinions on the basis of specific political principles are seen as the only legitimate 
opinions about politics. Only these opinions can have an influence in the political field. 
Bourdieu also refers to the production of these kinds of opinions based on the logos as the 
dominant way of producing political opinions. As mentioned before, people who are not 
competent to produce political opinions may be able to produce other kinds of opinions, 
but these opinions do not weigh as heavily as the dominant, legitimate opinions: they are 
dominated. If one talks about politics, the legitimate, dominant way of doing so is by 
expressing specifically political opinions.12 This social valuation of opinions might explain 
why some people who are de jure socially competent would refrain from expressing their 
opinions. If people are not capable of producing politically valid opinions, they might 
rather remain silent than express opinions which are not legitimate in the field. 
In addition to this valuation of the expression of opinions, there is another, related, 
social significance of the competence to recognize and produce political opinions. Since not 
everyone is technically competent, this competence acquires a certain scarcity value. In 
view of its valuation and uneven distribution, this competence can be seen as a specific 
capital. Bourdieu terms it a form of cultural capital, embodied in individuals. It is 
comparable to other cultural competences, which are also forms of embodied cultural 
capital, like being able to read in a world of illiterates, or being able to produce legitimate 
judgements on art. In general, certain mental structures can function as a form of capital 
in a specific social constellation. 
As a form of cultural capital, each cultural competence can yield a profit. The main 
profit Bourdieu conceived is distinction, i.e. to be socially distinguished from other 
people, and to be credited with status and authority because of one's mastery of a dominant 
cultural competence. In other words, there is a symbolic interest in being able to recognize 
and produce political opinions in the dominant way. 
As they are all distinctive in this double sense, all forms of cultural capital are constitutive 
of social classes (Bourdieu, 1979). In his analysis of the social space of class positions, 
Bourdieu distinguishes between two important axes. Apart from an economical axis, which 
comprises the volume of economic capital at one's disposal, there is a cultural axis, which 
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comprises the volume of one's cultural capital. Bourdieu often uses educational 
qualifications as overall measures of cultural capital. In his view, political competence 
especially is closely related to the level of education. One's position in the space of class 
positions will be determined by the overall volume of capital, and by the relative weight of 
economic and cultural capital. 
A person's technical competence to recognize and produce political opinions will 
therefore be related to his social position. Indeed, Bourdieu (1979) showed that 
consumption patterns, participation in politics and differences in delegation are all related 
to one's social position, and especially to the volume of one's cultural capital. Such 
relationships with social class are hardly ever taken into consideration by (social) 
psychologists, especially since they carry out their studies mainly on college students 
(Jahoda, 1986; Sears, 1986). 
In sum, the technical competence to recognize and produce political opinions has a social 
counterpart, which can be described as the right to express opinions. In the political field, 
opinions that are produced according to specifically political principles will have a higher 
social value and will have more impact than opinions that are produced otherwise. 
Socially, this is the dominant way of producing political opinions. Technical competence 
functions as a form of cultural capital which is unevenly distributed in the mass public. 
3.2 Tacit assumptions in survey research 
On the basis of this general theory on political opinions, Bourdieu developed a critical 
view on the political opinion survey13. This critical view is inspired by the question of 
what makes it possible for people to give a politically meaningful answer to questions 
about political issues. Bourdieu identified three assumptions on which such surveys are 
based, but which stand in the way if one wants to answer this question. These assumptions 
must be challenged if one is to arrive at a rigorous and solid analysis of the answers given 
by the respondents. 
Consensus on the questions 
In the first place, asking everyone the same question implies that there is a consensus that 
the question is worth asking. Instead, Bourdieu argues, this consensus is only relative. 
Often, it is only the political elite who considers the questions posed in surveys, and 
especially in opinion polls, worth asking. The political issues about which questions are 
asked are most often the kind of issues that are accepted in the political field as legitimate 
political goods. Whenever a problem is seen as important by political elites, however, this 
concern need not match the concerns of the mass public. 
Everyone is competent to produce answers 
In the second place, since everyone is equally liable to be asked to participate in a survey, 
it is assumed that everyone will have an opinion. However, as was explained above, not 
everyone is socially and technically competent to produce political opinions. Bourdieu 
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claims that both the unit nonresponse and the item nonresponsc provide important 
information on social and technical competence. To illustrate that participation in a survey 
can be seen as a result of social competence, Bourdieu (1979) mentions a survey on 
educational reform in which respondents were recruited by advertisements in newspapers. 
The sample consisted disproportionately of teachers and professors or, in other words, of 
people who were especially (professionally) interested in educational problems. Such a 
sample is a good indication, according to Bourdieu, of the spontaneous mobilization of a 
group of those who feel competent to give their opinion on a specific issue, in Converse's 
terms an issue public. 
As regards item nonresponse, Bourdieu argues that even if "no opinion" answers are 
provided in a survey, they are not often taken seriously. But, Bourdieu goes on, the 
information given by a survey is first and foremost, whether people have opinions. The 
distribution of agree/disagree or yes/no answers is only of secondary interest. The number 
of people who give "no opinion" answers are a good measure of the social competence to 
produce an opinion. As can be expected from his findings on political competence, 
Bourdieu concludes from a series of analyses that the proportion of "no opinion" answers 
is related both to the social position of the respondents and to characteristics of the 
questions. In his own words, the probability that respondents express an opinion is 
"greater for men than for women, greater for the young than the old; greater in large 
towns (especially Paris); and rises with educational capital (measured by qualifications) 
end economic capital (measured by income) and with social position. The variations linked 
to these variables are that much more marked when the questions are more remote from 
experience, more abstract and detached from ordinary realities in their content and 
phrasing (and also, but secondarily, when they have only recently appeared in the field of 
ideological production) and when they require more insistently a response produced on the 
basis of specifically political principles (a demand that is perceived in the very syntax and 
vocabulary of the question)." (1984b, p. 400). This conclusion matches the evidence from 
the studies on "no opinion" answers that were described in section 2.2. Hence, "no 
opinion" answers constitute a good indicator of political competence. 
All answers reflect valid political opinions 
In the third place, it is assumed that all answers are political opinions. Bourdieu, however, 
holds that the competence to produce a "yes" or "no", "agree" or "disagree" answer is only 
a minimal requirement, a base-line competence to recognize and produce political 
opinions. 
Survey researchers often formulate their questions in a highly simplified way so as to 
avoid the highly complex and abstract language of politics (see also chapter 1) and get 
more respondents who are able to give answers. However, it is forgotten that respondents 
can then give answers even if they do not grasp their political significance. Thus, answers 
can be given either on the basis of specific political standards or in other ways. 
Furthermore, it is forgotten that the political significance and valuation of the items is 
changed when they are translated into a language which is not the dominant language of 
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politics. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the questions are not formulated 
in everyday language, but in a specific survey dialect, as T. Smith (1987) demonstrated. 
Bourdieu asserts that answers can only be legitimate political opinions if they are 
produced by respondents who are competent to recognize the political properties of the 
question. Of course, this is not always the case. Not unlike Converse, Bourdieu concludes: 
"In fact not all answers are opinions, and the probability that a given group's responses are 
only disguised nonresponses, polite concessions to the imposed problematic or ethical 
discourses naively received as 'personal opinions', no doubt varies in the same way as the 
probability of nonresponse which characterizes that group. The propensity and ability to 
raise interests and experiences to the order of political discourse, to seek coherence in 
opinions and to integrate one's whole set of attitudes around explicit political principles, in 
fact depends very closely on educational capital and, secondarily, on overall capital 
composition, increasing with the relative weight of cultural capital as against economic 
capital" (1984b, p.417-418). 
It becomes clear that the different ways in which respondents arrive at answers on 
political survey questions, which were described in the previous chapter, are subject to 
different social valuations. Giving random answers, giving answers based only on an 
evaluation that is not backed up by knowledge, giving answers in idiosyncratic ways etc. 
will all have a different social value. From a sociological point of view, it is functional and 
necessary to distinguish between these different ways of arriving at answers, just as it is 
found useful and necessary to distinguish between more and less cognitively central 
attitudes from a psychological point of view. 
A 'science' without scientists 
Bourdieu concludes that opinion surveys are logocentric: the political opinion survey 
mirrors the dominant way of producing political opinions in the modality of the logos. If 
survey researchers do not realize that their opinion surveys are logocentric they fail to 
raise the most pertinent scientific questions. Similarly, survey researchers who do not 
provide "no opinion" answers, do not take them seriously and take every answer for a 
valid political opinion, project the dominant way of producing opinions on their 
respondents, while in fact not all respondents have the competence to produce this kind of 
opinions. In Bourdieu's terms, they construct a 'public opinion' where no such opinion 
existed before, based on the 'illusio' that public opinion already exists in reality and need 
only be objectified in a measure like an opinion poll. Whenever researchers fail to raise 
the most pertinent questions about the way answers are produced, their work can hardly be 
called scientific. Therefore, Bourdieu (1987b) calls opinion polls a "science without 
scientists". Bourdieu thus questions the scientific legitimation of survey practice 
(section l.l).14 
Of course, as has become clear in the first two chapters, there are survey researchers 
who do recognize the problems of "no opinion" and of the different meanings of answers. 
This applies especially to those researchers who took the answering processes in opinion 
surveys as a subject of study. They often tried to outline procedures for dealing with the 
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problem that respondents may not all have opinions on the questions asked. For the most 
part, however, "no opinion" answers are not taken seriously in current survey practice. In 
fact, frequency distributions are often calculated with "no opinion" answers excluded. 
Furthermore, in survey practice the quality of the answers is often not assessed. This 
problem becomes especially acute where no pretests on the interpretability of the questions 
are conducted. Reliability estimates are often not specified (Alwin, 1991). Calculating 
reliability estimates for different subsamples, a method that was advocated in the second 
chapter, is even more rarely applied, as is the method of measuring some form of 
cognitive centrality. 
In sum, the practice of opinion surveys can be characterized as logocentric. If it is not 
realized that the questions asked are about specifically political problems, and if it is not 
realized that not everyone is competent to produce politically legitimate opinions on these 
questions, survey practice can hardly be called scientific, because it unjustifiably projects a 
specific form of opinion production on all respondents. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The differences in political competence in the technical sense as analyzed by Bourdieu, 
although stemming from a very different theoretical point of view, parallel the cognitive 
differences between attitudes and nonattitudes analyzed by social psychologists. 
Competence and centrality will be used further on as a kind of twin concept with two 
different theoretical flavors. Bourdieu showed that the competence to produce opinions in 
the modality of the logos is only a highly specific way of giving opinions, characterized by 
the ability to give automatically elicited and coherent personal opinions, based on political 
principles and relatively independently from personal experience. Indicators of 
competence not only include these predominantly cognitive aspects attributed to opinions, 
but also a number of behavioral concomitants of cognitive centrality such as consumption, 
participation and delegation. 
Bourdieu emphasizes the social processes that are related to political competence. The 
dominant way of expressing opinions is produced initially by the political elite in the 
political field. Members of the mass public vary in their abilities to recognize these 
opinions and to express their own opinions in this dominant way. This technical 
competence is related to social competence: the right to express one's opinions. It can be 
conceived of as a form of embodied cultural capital, which is unevenly distributed in the 
mass public. Technical competence appears to be especially related to the overall volume 
of cultural capital and to educational qualifications. There is a social interest and symbolic 
profit in the ability to recognize and produce legitimate political opinions. 
Bourdieu asserts that the survey is logocentric, i.e. it mirrors the dominant way of 
producing opinions in the modality of the logos. If the differences in technical competence 
are taken seriously, however, some interesting phenomena can be observed in the survey 
answers. Some respondents will not cooperate in a survey, or will not express any opinions 
on some questions, because they feel incompetent to do so. Other respondents will give 
answers that do not reflect a legitimate political opinion. After all, respondents arrive at 
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answers in different ways, which have different social valuations. Only legitimate political 
opinions can be counted as the 'true' values that survey researchers are looking for. Since 
political competence is related to the attitude-nonattitude continuum, the different ways of 
assessing aspects of this continuum ("no opinion" answers, crystallization, accessibility and 
constraint) can be used to assess political competence. The findings of Bourdieu on the 
social distribution of "no opinion" answers and on the use of political standards of 
judgement match the findings discussed in section 2.2. 
As was outlined in this chapter, Bourdieu holds that the production of political opinions 
is only one specific manifestation of the production of cultural products. Both in the elitist 
fields of production and in the consumption of cultural products in the mass public there 
are some general social processes. However, each field is also characterized by a relative 
autonomy and by some differences in comparison with other fields. A particularity of the 
political field is, for example, that de jure everybody is attributed the right to participate 
in the field and to try to modify the course of political processes. Furthermore, unlike 
actors in other fields, actors on the political field are assumed to represent the mass public. 
In the next chapter, we will discuss another cultural field, in which the production and 
consumption of opinions may well differ from those in the political field: the field of 
medicine. 
4 TOWARDS RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The conceptual tools discussed in the preceding chapters will be summarized in this 
chapter. Hypotheses will be formulated on the research questions asked in the introduction. 
Before doing so, it is argued in the first section that it is necessary to broaden the study to 
another cultural field than politics to gain a better understanding of the social processes 
related to attitude centrality and competence. In the current research project, the domain of 
health and illness was chosen as a second domain. In the second section this domain will be 
described briefly so that hypotheses can be formulated with regard to the social 
distribution of attitude competence and centrality on this domain. The theoretical 
perspective of the present study is explained in section 4.3, using the conceptual tools 
discussed in the previous chapters. Research hypotheses based on this perspective are 
formulated in the fourth section. 
4.1 The specificity of the political field 
The opinion survey and the political field 
The first chapter described how in the course of this century the survey developed into a 
widely accepted and very often used social technology. Apart from other uses, such as 
population statistics or marketing research, the survey is often employed in the political 
field. In fact, opinion surveys play an important role in the political field (Champagne, 
1990): nowadays, 'public opinion' is defined in terms of the results of opinion polls. In 
these polls, questions are asked on issues that are important in the political field. 
As was explained in the first chapter, the use of surveys was legitimated on the basis of 
democratic principles. The implicit assumptions in survey research, which were discussed 
in the previous chapter, are very similar to the principles of democracy: every citizen is 
considered competent to produce political opinions and all answers are attributed the same 
political value. Such assumptions can also be found in elections and referenda, for example. 
Both Converse and Bourdieu demonstrated, however, that not everyone has political 
opinions and that not all answers on survey questions are produced in the same way. The 
different ways of generating answers were found to be functionally different both from a 
psychological and a sociological point of view. The critical remarks on the opinion survey 
that were made by Converse and Bourdieu were easily mistaken, however, for a criticism 
of democracy as such. Many critics of Converse and Bourdieu aimed at restoring the faith 
in the democratic value of the opinion survey, public opinion and the competent rational 
citizen. They carried out new studies, the results of which were presented as being 
falsifications of the studies of Converse and Bourdieu. However, it was explained in 
Chapter 2, that instead of falsifying Converse's theory, these studies did little more than 
specify certain conditions for finding stable and constrained answers. 
As Champagne (1990) explains, these critics confuse a political interpretation of survey 
answers with a scientific interpretation. From a political point of view, it may be legitimate 
to assume that all answers on opinion questions count, no matter how they have been 
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arrived at1. However, from a scientific point of view, be it psychological or sociological, 
the answers given in opinion surveys should be interpreted in connection with the very 
different ways they have been arrived at. The dominant, taken-for-granted political 
interpretation should be put aside. Both Champagne (1990) and Bourdieu (1992) assert that 
it is necessary to break with the taken-for-granted assumption in politics - the assumption 
that all answers on survey questions have the same meaning and impact - if one is to arrive 
at a more rigorous scientific interpretation, which does not attribute the dominant but very 
peculiar way of producing political opinions in the political field to all the respondents who 
cooperate in a survey. 
If opinion surveys are studied from this scientific point of view, it becomes clear that the 
opinion survey may not be democratic enough. As Champagne (1990) concludes in his 
study on the functioning of opinion polls in the political field, such surveys only give a 
voice to the people, in much the same way a ventriloquist gives a voice to his puppets. As 
most of the questions deal with accepted, legitimate, political issues, opinion surveys do not 
give citizens a chance to talk about their own problems and have these problems accepted 
as political problems.2 
Since the conflicting political and scientific interpretations of survey answers are all too 
easily confused, and since nearby all studies on attitudes and nonattitudes in the opinion 
survey were restricted to the political domain, it is necessary to introduce another cultural 
domain to the present study. Introducing a different domain makes it easier to break with 
the taken-for-granted political meaning of answers on the opinion survey. 
The social distribution of political competence 
It is also important to study another cultural domain to gain a better understanding of the 
social process involved in the formation of attitude structures. The lack of competence to 
produce political opinions is often attributed to a lack of cognitive capacity inherent in the 
individual, especially when such competence is strongly related to educational level. 
However, as both Converse and Bourdieu argued, the development of the competence to 
produce legitimate opinions on the political field depends on social conditions. As Converse 
showed, respondents with less education, but who are nevertheless deeply involved in the 
political field are very well able to express stable and constraint opinions about political 
issues. 
By simultaneously studying the competence to produce legitimate opinions in the 
political and a different domain, it becomes much easier to see how the particularities of 
the relationship between the citizen and the political field result in a specific distribution of 
political competence. Naturally, a respondent who is competent to produce politically 
legitimate opinions is not necessarily competent to produce legitimate opinions in another 
domain, and a respondent who is less competent in the political domain is not necessarily 
less competent in every other cultural domain. By studying both the political and another 
domain simultaneously from the same perspective, the social processes related to attitude 
centrality and competence can be studied more precisely. 
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4.2 The Held of medicine 
Bourdieu sees the production and consumption of political opinions as only a specific 
example of the production and consumption of cultural products in general. His theory 
should lend itself, therefore, for a study of the competence to produce opinions in another 
cultural domain.3 From a psychological point of view, the differences in attitude structures 
described in Chapter 2 are not bound to a specific domain. It seems likely that they will 
also be found in other domains (Tesser and Shaffer, 1990). 
Bourdieu (1977d, 1979, 1993b) made an extensive study of the production and 
consumption of art products. In his writings on the production of political opinions he 
often compares the competence to produce political opinions to the competence to produce 
judgments on art. Each functions as a different form of cultural capital. Although both 
competences are related to educational capital, the distribution of these competences is not 
exactly identical. For example: women who occupy more dominated positions in the social 
space of class positions tend to be more competent in art than men in these positions, 
whereas the political competence for these women is lower than for men (Bourdieu, 1979). 
In the present study the domain of health and illness was chosen as a second domain of 
research for two reasons. Firstly, the prevailing ideological currents in this domain are 
rather different and independent from the liberal-conservative principle in politics. 
Furthermore, the competence to produce opinions about health and illness is likely to be 
distributed in a different way than the competence to produce political opinions. 
The ideological division of the field of medicine 
Just like politics, there is a relatively autonomous and specialized field of production of 
cultural products which is connected to health and illness. This specialized field of 
professionals will be referred to as the medical field or field of medicine. In the medical 
field, specific problems with regard to health and illness become legitimate medical 
problems, which are defined in specific medical terms. Just as there is a process of 
politicization of social problems, there is a medicalization of health problems. 
On the medical field a struggle can be found between a strongly dominant 'orthodox' 
medicine, which can be conceived of by and large as the medical science taught at 
universities, and all kinds of dominated, 'heterodox' medicine, such as acupuncture, 
homeopathy or spiritual healing, to mention only a few. The ideological principle which 
plays an important role in the struggle between orthodox and heterodox medicine has little 
in common with the liberal-conservative principle prevailing in politics4. On the one side, 
the dominant medicine is based on a scientific legitimization, applying rational means to 
assess the quality of medical practices. This is especially true for prestigious medical 
specialisms such as cardiology and surgery. Although of course not everything in this 
dominant medicine is rational3, the legitimization of its practices at least is based on 
rational, scientific procedures. 
It is difficult to characterize in a few words the broad range of alternative health care 
strategies opposing this dominant medicine6. However, alternative healers and their 
partisans, who employ a wide range of healing methods, have united themselves and 
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formulated a heterodox ideology, which is an expression of a common interest in the 
criticism of university medicine. These partisans criticize dominant medicine for being too 
rational, and for reducing illness to objective bodily processes and states. Alternative 
healers claim to be holistic, i.e. to include relationships with psychological and often also 
cosmological aspects in their belief systems about health and illness. This has led scientific 
doctors, in turn, to criticize alternative medicine for being unscientific. In their 
counterattack on alternative medicine they denounce them as superstition, magic or 
religion (e.g. Van der Smagt, 1988). Although alternative healers are thus portrayed as 
irrational, the belief systems in alternative medicine might better be named here with the 
less pejorative term "non-rational" (Shweder, 1984b). Shweder employs this term to 
describe belief systems which are based on presuppositions that are not subject to rational 
logic. Like the political belief systems analyzed by Converse, these 'non-rational' belief 
systems are tied together, not so much by logic as by certain general postulates which serve 
as a glue to paste together belief elements. 
Although the field of medical services is relatively autonomous, it is not completely 
independent from the political field. The field of medicine and the field of politics both 
touch on the domain of 'public health'. For example: politics intervenes in the field of 
medicine by providing a legal basis for certain health services and by regulating the 
provision and distribution of such services by means of legislation on health insurance. 
The social processes of recognition and development of alternative medicine are clearly 
subject to political interventions7. On the other hand, medical practice and the 
medicalization of problems relating to health and illness also have political and social 
consequences8. 
The social distribution of medical competence 
Since the ideological divisions in the medical field are rather different from those in the 
political field, it is to be expected that there is a special competence on each field to 
produce legitimate opinions. Political competence will not be related to the competence to 
produce opinions on the medical field, or medical competence. Since the relationship 
between consumers and producers of cultural goods is quite different on both fields, it is 
likely that either competence has a different distribution in the public. Unlike politicians, 
the specialists in the medical field, both orthodox and alternative, are not assumed to 
represent the public at large. Apart from the number of patients who patronize different 
medical practitioners, which is a significant factor in the power relations between the 
currents of medicine, the dynamics in the medical field are less dependent on the opinions 
of the public. Discussions on patients' rights notwithstanding, the social competence to 
judge medical practices is generally not attributed to the public at large in a similar way as 
citizens are supposed to be competent to judge political practices. The relationship between 
the medical field and the public can be characterized much more as one-directional or 'top-
down': it is defined especially in terms of giving health advice to the public and of 
educating the public. Consequently, the opinions of patients are not expected to follow the 
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ideological divisions in the medical field like the opinions of citizens are expected to follow 
the ideological divisions in the political field.9 
The competence to produce opinions about the field of medicine will be less connected to 
a socially produced interest than political competence. Although a relationship has been 
found between the occurrence of specific diseases and the frequency of visits to doctors and 
to alternative healers on the one side and social class and sex on the other side10, it can be 
expected that the interest in medicine will be less associated to people's social position than 
the interest in politics. Everyone is liable to get ill and to have undesired personal 
experience with medicine. In developing the competence to produce opinions which are 
constrained by the ideological standard prevailing in the medical field, personal 
experiences with doctors and healers will play a major role. It can be expected that patients 
with extensive personal experience of doctors and healers will develop more central 
attitudes, which are constrained by the ideological standard prevailing in the medical 
field». 
In sum, one might expect that there is a different spread in the public of the competence 
to produce opinions about medicine than there is of the competence to produce political 
opinions. A person's personal experience will play an especially important role in the 
development of central attitudes which are constrained by the ideological standard 
prevailing on the field of medicine. 
4.3 The theoretical perspective of the present study 
The following research questions were asked in the introduction: are differences in attitude 
structures found in both the political and the medical domain, and if such differences in 
attitude structures are found, does their social distribution in the political domain differ 
from that in the medical domain? It has become clear in the preceding chapters that these 
questions touch directly on the implicit assumptions underlying survey research, viz. that 
everyone is competent to produce opinions and that all answers reflect preexisting 
attitudes. The present study should therefore be seen as an empirical test of the implicit 
assumptions of the survey. 
Discussion of the theoretical tools 
In Chapter 2, some important psychological differences in attitude structures were 
discussed. Whereas the widespread definition of an attitude as an evaluation of an object 
closely follows the dominant practice of posing closed agree-disagree questions in surveys, 
social psychologists have identified some other attributes of attitudes, which were seen as 
independent of this evaluative continuum. In accordance with the dominant paradigm in 
current psychology, attitudes are predominantly conceptualized by social psychologists as 
cognitive representational structures in long-term memory. An important dimension of 
attitudes, seen in this perspective, is cognitive centrality, which is functional in the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior, in biased perception and judgment, and in 
attitude change. On the one extreme of the continuum of cognitive centrality no attitude 
exists at all. This is also referred to as a nonattitude. The crystallization, accessibility, and 
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constraint of attitudes were found to be important concomitants of cognitive centrality, 
which are directly related to the different ways answers are produced by respondents on 
closed questions in opinion surveys. Another important attribute of cognitive centrality is 
knowledge, which can also be readily measured in a survey. 
Be it within a very different theoretical perspective, Bourdieu also described some 
important attributes of opinions which closely match the description of the concomitants of 
cognitive centrality. Political opinions which count as such are based on specific political 
principles; they are constrained, personal, and easily activated. Bourdieu added, however, 
that political opinions are detached from everyday experience. Furthermore, Bourdieu 
shows that the competence to produce these kinds of opinions is socially valued and 
functions as a form of cultural capital. In the previous section, it was explained that a form 
of competence similar to political competence exists on the medical field. 
Whereas social psychologists have little attention for the social processes involved in 
attitude centrality, they are central to Bourdieu's theory. On the other hand, the social 
psychology of attitudes has supplied some measurement procedures that can be used to 
assess the different aspects of the attitude-nonattitude continuum with more precision than 
an assessment of "no opinion" answers, which was Bourdieu's main empirical tool. 
Design of the present study 
In the present study, differences in attitude structures and their social distribution will be 
studied on the basis of the dominant paradigm of survey research as presented in 
Chapter 1. After all, it became clear in Chapter 2, that some important differences in 
cognitive centrality can be studied by means of an opinion survey. Furthermore, a survey 
was opted for because its scope enables us to study the social distribution of differences in 
attitude structures. As was explained in the introduction, the laboratory studies prevailing 
in social psychology are too restricted for this, because they predominantly use college 
students. 
The survey on political and medical attitudes, which will be described in detail in 
Chapter 5, was constructed in accordance with the guidelines for survey quality discussed 
in Chapter 1. For this reason, the survey questions were designed in keeping with the 
dominant paradigm in survey research, in order to measure the private, personal opinions 
of the respondents. 
However, the present study differs from most opinion surveys in its perspective. 
Whereas in most opinion surveys the implicit assumptions - that everyone is competent to 
produce opinions and that all answers are arrived at in the same way - are taken for 
granted and go unchallenged, they are subject to empirical assessment in the present study. 
Although the implicit postulates are taken for granted in most surveys, survey researchers 
have not been ignorant of these assumptions. They have dealt with them in three ways. 
In the first place, survey researchers did recognize the possibility that not all 
respondents have opinions on the questions asked. Their advice was, therefore, to provide 
"no opinion" alternatives, to formulate questions in an easy language, and to run pretests 
on the interpretability of the questions. Of course, this advice is not always followed in 
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practice, and even less often in public opinion polling, where time constraints often result 
in questions that are formulated more directly in the legitimate political language 
(Bourdieu, 1985). In the present study these guidelines are observed so as to construct a 
good survey from this point of view. 
In the second place, survey researchers have also been aware of the problems in the 
interpretation of survey answers, as is illustrated by the abundance of studies in the 
Converse debate. Posing the question of the interpretation of survey answers appears to be 
restricted to those researchers who are interested in the fundamental question of how 
respondents arrive at the answers they give. In most studies using opinion surveys these 
problems are not discussed. Furthermore, most of the studies, in which these problems are 
recognized, explicitly aimed at improving the survey. However, if not all respondents have 
attitudes on the questions asked, and if those respondents who do have attitudes differ in 
their competence to express them in legitimate ways, the survey can only be improved to a 
limited extent. As was explained in section 2.2, it is impossible to formulate answers that 
are easily interpretable for all respondents and which are interpreted by all respondents in 
the same way. Therefore, instead of taking the improvement of the survey as a 
measurement instrument as the object of study, it is necessary to take the relationship 
between instrument and respondent as the object of study. Only from this perspective can 
the implicit assumptions of surveys be studied rigorously. 
Thirdly, survey researchers have developed some methods to assess the quality of the 
answers that are given. However, it became clear in Chapter 2 that the methods to assess 
the quality of survey answers as described in Chapter 1 should be used in a different way 
than is normally done. As was explained in Chapter 1, the quality of survey measurements 
is treated in analogy to the quality of psychological tests. However, unlike in psychological 
tests, it cannot be assumed that there is always a 'true score' preexisting its measurement. 
In opinion measurement there is no accepted way to state whether an answer is 'true' or 
not as in psychological tests. The conceptual and analytical tools of classical test theory 
described in Chapter 1 should therefore be used in a different way. In accordance with the 
arguments given in Chapter 2, the reliability coefficients should not be interpreted as an 
attribute of the measurement instrument, but as an attribute of the answers themselves, 
which in turn result from the relationship between the respondents and the instrument. 
If it is recognized that answers are arrived at in different ways, and if the reliability is 
interpreted as an attribute of the relationship between an instrument and the respondents, it 
becomes possible to assess the assumptions implicit in the dominant paradigm of opinion 
surveys. This is not to say that opinion surveys are worthless if the implicit assumptions 
are not verified. The analysis of the different ways of producing answers on opinion 
questions reveals important characteristics of the production principles and their social 
distribution. If the implicit assumptions are taken as the object of study it becomes possible 
to develop a more rigorous scientific interpretation of survey responses, which does not 
take the logocentric way of formulating opinions for granted projecting this on all the 
respondents who answer survey questions. 
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4.4 Research hypotheses 
On the basis of the studies discussed in the previous chapters it becomes possible to 
formulate the following hypotheses on the research questions asked in the introduction: 
1. Respondents will have attitude structures which differ in cognitive centrality. In the 
extreme case, where attitudes are not central, some respondents will not have any attitudes 
preexisting the measurement. Some of the respondents with nonattitudes, who do not feel 
competent to express opinions about a field or about an issue, will either refuse to 
participate in the study at all, or answer "no opinion". Respondents who do give agree-
disagree answers will employ different ways of producing these answers. In order to assess 
the reliability of the answers as an attribute of the relationship between respondent and 
questionnaire, this study will make use of a measurement procedure which enables us to 
calculate reliability coefficients on the individual level. This measurement procedure, 
called magnitude scaling, will be described in detail in section 5.2. The reliability of the 
answers calculated at the individual level can be taken as a measure of the crystallization of 
attitudes, the response latency as a measure of accessibility, and the interrelatedness of the 
answers as a measure of constraint. These hypotheses about competence, crystallization, 
accessibility, and constraint apply both to the political and the medical field. 
2. Since the differences in crystallization, accessibility, and constraint are all aspects of 
cognitive centrality, they will be interrelated. They will also be related to the level of 
knowledge associated with the attitudes, which is a concomitant of cognitive centrality, too. 
Furthermore, they will be related to attitude competence as measured by "no opinion" 
answers. It is expected on theoretical grounds that cognitive centrality and competence will 
be independent from evaluative extremity. These hypotheses apply to both fields. 
3. The differences in attitude competence and the cognitive centrality of attitude structures 
will be related to the degree of involvement in a field. The level of involvement in the 
political field is indicated mainly by the participation in the field. In the medical field, the 
level of involvement is indicated mainly by personal experience with medicine. Groups 
will be constructed according to their level of involvement in both fields. This 
classification in groups will be validated on each field by comparing the level of self-
declared interest and the consumption of information through mass media in each group. 
On each field it is expected that more involved respondents will have more central 
attitudes, as indicated by the level of knowledge, competence, crystallization, accessibility 
and constraint. 
4a. On the political field it can be hypothesized that respondents with lower positions in the 
social space of class positions (as indicated by educational and occupational level) and 
female respondents will be less competent to produce political opinions. These respondents 
will be less interested in politics, they will participate in politics less often and they will 
consume political opinions through the mass media less often. Consequently, they will have 
less political knowledge, and they will indicate they have an opinion about political 
questions less often. Their attitudes will be less crystallized, less easily accessible and less 
constrained. 
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4b. Assuming that the relationship between consumers and producers of medical practices 
is different from the parallel relationship on the political domain, it can be hypothesized 
that the level of interest, personal experience and consumption will not be related to the 
social position or sex of the respondents. Consequently, differences in cognitive centrality 
(as measured by knowledge, "no opinion" answers, crystallization, accessibility and 
constraint) will not be related to the social position and sex of the respondents either. 
In order to test these hypotheses, a survey questionnaire was constructed, asking 
questions on political and medical issues. The construction of this questionnaire, which 
closely follows the dominant paradigm of questionnaire construction, will be discussed in 
the next chapter. The recruitment of respondents will also be described in this chapter. In 
Chapter 6, the results which apply to the hypotheses will be discussed. 

5 DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
AND MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES 
In the first section of this chapter, the questionnaire that was used to assess the tenability of 
the research hypotheses of this study will be described in detail. The questionnaire consists 
of attitude items, knowledge tests, questions on involvement in each field and on social 
characteristics of the respondents. The attitude items on each field were constructed in 
accordance with the paradigm of survey research and can be used to assess the competence 
and different attributes of cognitive centrality (crystallization, accessibility, and 
constraint). 
The specific measurement procedure used in this study, magnitude scaling, will be 
presented in the second section. In this procedure respondents have to judge the same 
attitude items twice in slightly different ways in one session: once the respondents are asked 
to express the evaluative strength of their opinions by putting a number to it, once they are 
asked to express it in terms of the length of a line drawn. This procedure makes it possible 
to assess the reliability at the individual level. As the two judgements were made in one 
session, it was not necessary to obtain reliability coefficients from repeated measurements 
at different points in time as Converse did. Instead of a test-retest reliability, a coefficient 
of parallel-test reliability can be calculated at the individual level by comparing the 
individual's number scores and lines scores. 
In order to facilitate measurement of response times as an indicator of attitude 
accessibility, administration of the questionnaire was computerized. This computerization 
will be discussed in the third section. Since respondents had to learn how to use the 
computer and how to express their opinions using numbers and lines, two instruction tasks 
were used. Section 6.1 will discuss whether these instruction tasks were effective in 
showing respondents how to use the computer and to express their judgments in keeping 
with the requirements of the magnitude scaling theory. If respondents use the measurement 
instrument correctly, it can be concluded that possible differences in their judgments on the 
attitude items are not caused by problems in the use of the instrument. 
In the fourth section of this chapter the field work will be described, including the 
recruitment of the respondents and the administration of the questionnaires. Respondents 
between 40 and 55 years old were recruited, because this age group was expected to show a 
particularly high degree of variance in their personal experience with health care and in 
their involvement in the political field. College students, who are predominantly used as 
subjects in social psychological research, cannot be expected to show as much variance in 
personal experience with health and illness. 
The respondents who participated in the study will be described in the fifth section, as 
well as the reasons why people refused to cooperate in the study. It will be discussed how 
the recruitment procedure and the nonresponse might influence the level of competence 
and centrality found in this study. 
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Pilot studies 
Before the survey described in this book was carried out, the questionnaire and 
measurement methods were tested in three pilot studies. The main objective of pilot study 1 
(Westerhof, 1989a) was to check whether any problems were likely to occur in the 
magnitude scaling procedure. The study also provided information on the interpretability 
of the attitude items and some indications of the social distribution of competence and 
centrality on both fields. In pilot study 2 (Westerhof, 1989b) the effects of the 
computerization of the attitude questionnaire were assessed. Furthermore, study 2 was 
carried out to fine-tune the instruction task for the magnitude scaling procedure (see also 
appendix 4). Pilot study 3 (Westerhof, 1990) was carried out in order to obtain 
information on the psychometric qualities of the attitude and the knowledge questions. The 
conclusions of these pilot studies will be reported in this chapter, in as much as they relate 
to the specific methods used. 
S.l The construction of the attitude items 
The paradigm of survey research prescribes that the attitude questions should meet three 
sets of requirements: 
1. the attitude items on each field should deal with issues that are important on that field; 
2. the items should be easy to interpret for the respondents; 
3. the items should meet certain psychometric requirements. 
The selection of the items on both fields 
On the political field, the items used by Converse (1964) were translated from English into 
Dutch. In order to select those issues that are relevant to the political field, the 
parliamentary election programs of the three major Dutch parties (PvdA, CDA and VVD; 
the programs can be found in Lipschits, 1986) were examined. An item was only included 
if there was disagreement between the programs on that issue. Some items were included in 
their original formulation, other items were reformulated to fit the Dutch situation, and 
items which had no relevance in the Dutch situation were left out. Eventually, five of 
Converse's items were adopted. Five additional items were formulated on the basis of the 
election programs. As in the case of the five items adopted from Converse, issues that had 
given rise to protracted political controversy were preferred to issues that had only 
emerged relatively recently or were restricted to a certain time period. 
On the field of medicine, ready-made items were not available1. Items were taken from 
the public debate about the differences between alternative and orthodox medicine which 
was prompted by the publication of a report by a political committee on alternative 
medicine (Muntendam, 1981) and also from publications by alternative healers. Initially, 
14 items were constructed. The exact procedure of formulation of the items is described in 
Westerhof (1990). 
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Formulation of the items 
The items were formulated according to the "enduring counsel for simplicity" (J.Converse 
and Schuman, 1987) to be found in textbooks on survey research, so that they would be as 
easy to interpret as possible2. Technical and abstract terms were avoided. Precautions were 
taken to avoid ambiguities, and to present the items as neutrally as possible, in compliance 
with the rules to avoid response effects (section 1.2). The interpretability of the items for 
the respondents was checked in pilot study 1 by asking respondents to comment freely on 
the questions that were asked. 
Psychometric properties of the items 
Pilot study 3 was designed to provide information on the psychometric quality of the items. 
In accordance with the prevailing paradigm of survey research the psychometric 
coefficients were not interpreted in this pilot study as characteristics of the relationship 
between questions and respondents, but as characteristics of the items. The idea was to 
construct reliable and valid items which would form a rather homogeneous scale. Ten 
items on each field were presented to a rather heterogeneous group of students of a school 
for adult education in pilot study 3. In the end, 7 items on each field were selected to be 
used in the final study on the basis of the following criteria: the number of "no opinion" 
answers should be low; the variance in responses should be high; the mean scores of the 
items should vary considerably across the items; factor loading in a factor analysis with a 
1-factor solution should be high; validity, as measured by the relationship with party 
preference or visits to alternative healers, should be high (Westerhof, 1990). On both 
fields, the 7 items that were selected form a rather homogeneous scale in pilot study 3.3 
The attitude items 
The items that resulted from this construction process were used in the present study (see 
table S.l (page 64); the Dutch formulations can be found in appendix 2). On each field the 
items deal with important issues which are widely debated in the field. By limiting the 
selection to items with the smallest proportion of "no opinion" answers, however, the 
issues in this study are more widely known in the public at large than other issues which 
may be equally important in the field. 
Furthermore, the items were translated into a more simple and neutral language, which 
is not the dominant language in the field. This makes it easier for respondents to answer 
the questions, even if they are less competent to recognize the specific ideological aspect of 
the issue or to produce opinions in the legitimate language of the field. It will therefore 
make it easier for respondents to give reliable answers. They will also need less time to 
respond. Since the items that were used form a rather homogeneous one-dimensional scale, 
it seems likely that more constrained answers will be found. 
In sum, the construction process of the attitude items minimizes the differences in 
attitude competence and cognitive centrality: the study has a conservative design. 
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Table 5.1 Altitude items1 
nr. Item short description2 
Items on the field of politics 
1 The unemployed usually have themselves to blame for not 
having a job . 3 
2 If cities and towns do not have enough money to pay for 
social security, the government in The Hague ought to give 
them the money they need.3 
3 The government should leave things like health care and 
housing for private companies and institutions to handle.3 
4 The Netherlands should give more economic help to the 
countries of the Third World even if those countries cannot 
pay it back.3 
5 South Africa should resolve the problem of apartheid by itself. 
The Netherlands had better not become Involved in this.3 
6 The income differences between the employed and unemployed 
should become greater. 
7 The government should get a firmer grasp on banks and 
multinationals. 
unemployment 
social security 
privatization 
development aid 
apartheid 
income differences 
multinationals 
Items on the field of medicines 
11 Some people have the gift to cure other people's complaints 
without knowing it themselves. 
12 Every disease contains a message about ourselves and the way 
we live; you can only be cured if someone helps you 
understand this message. 
13 One can only learn to cure people by a thorough study at a 
university. 
14 Health and Illness always concern things which accepted 
science will never understand. 
15 Alternative medical care is only recommended if the normal 
medical science cannot accomplish anything. 
16 Therapies may only be used if they have been scientifically 
tested. 
17 Illness and diseases can be related to unsolved problems 
from previous lives. 
gift of healing 
message of illness 
study at university 
science negative 
visit alternative healer 
scientific proof 
reincarnation 
1
 note: The original Dutch formulations can be found in appendix 2. 
2
 note: The short description in the third column is used in other tables lo refer to the items. 
3
 noie: Items adopted from Convene (1964). 
5.2 Magnitude scaling 
The method used in this study to measure the attitudes of the respondents will be referred 
to as 'magnitude scaling' (Lodge, 1981a, 1981b). This method was chosen because 
respondents judge the same items twice in somewhat different ways in only one session. 
This procedure makes it possible to calculate parallel-test reliability coefficients on an 
individual level for the seven items on each field. Furthermore, the instruction tasks that 
are used are a means of checking whether all the respondents have made judgements in an 
accurate way. 
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The theory of magnitude scaling 
Magnitude scaling is only one of the many different measurement techniques that have been 
used to measure attitudes (for a review see Dawes, 1972; Dawes and Smith 1985). The 
magnitude scaling approach is characterized by Dawes as one of the magnitude techniques 
(like Thurstone's technique of comparative judgment). In these techniques respondents are 
asked to judge stimuli or items on a crucial property specified by the researcher. They 
would, for instance, have to judge the seriousness of different crimes or the acceptability 
of attitude items. The resulting measurement scale is meant to represent the order and 
magnitude of the stimuli with respect to that property. Other measurement techniques (like 
proximity techniques) do not use a specific property to be judged, but can be used to assess 
the attributes of an attitude which are important for the respondents. 
Among the magnitude techniques, the magnitude scaling procedure can be further 
characterized as a direct estimation technique. Dawes (1972, p.20) mentions the following 
steps of direct estimation techniques: "the investigator decides which property of a 
particular set of stimuli he is interested in studying; he specifies this property to his 
subjects and then he presents them with the stimuli; on the basis of this property, subjects 
assign numbers to the stimuli. The location of the stimuli on the measurement scale is 
determined directly from these numbers." (Dawes, 1972, p.20). The direct estimation 
techniques differ from other magnitude techniques in that respondents are assumed to be 
capable of giving direct numerical ratings of the stimuli. In the magnitude scaling 
procedure people are asked to give ratio judgements. Ratio judgements should result in a 
scale with ratio consistency. 
The magnitude scaling approach originated in psychophysics. Stevens has been an 
advocate of this technique, not only in psychophysics (1975), but also in the field of 
attitude measurement (1972). As a psychophysicist, he was interested in the relationship 
between physical stimuli and their subjective impression. He tried to measure subjective 
impressions using the magnitude scaling approach. In the original psychophysical 
procedure, Stevens asked his respondents to estimate the magnitude of different sensory 
modalities (like loudness of sounds, brightness of light). He first showed his subjects a 
standard stimulus (e.g. a light of a certain brightness) and asked them to give a number to 
it. For the other stimuli to be judged Stevens instructed his subjects to give ratio scores: if 
a stimulus looks twice as bright (as long, as loud, etc.) as a standard, a figure twice as high 
as the figure given to the standard should be given to the stimulus; if a stimulus looks 10 
times as bright a figure 10 times as high should be given. 
Proceeding from this direct ratio estimation procedure, he formulated the 
psychophysical power law. In this power law the subjective magnitude (as expressed in the 
response) and the magnitude of the stimulus are expressed as 
R = kS» (5.1) 
where R is the response magnitude, S is the stimulus magnitude, η is the exponent of the 
power function and к is a constant. In words, this function can be expressed as: equal 
stimulus ratios produce equal subjective ratios. 
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Taking logarithms produces a linear relationship: 
log R = log к + η log S (5.2) 
This power law, which is seen as the base of Stevens' New Psychophysics, differs from the 
law of Fechner which was commonly accepted before Stevens' work using direct ratio 
estimations. Fechner's law, formulated on the basis of indirect measurement procedures on 
'just noticeable differences' in magnitude, describes the relationship between the magnitude 
of the stimulus and the subjectively experienced magnitude (or response) as a logarithmic 
function: 
R = klogS (5.3) 
The method of just noticeable differences and other indirect methods like category scaling 
did not produce linear relationships on log-log axes and are typically related to direct ratio 
estimation by concave or S-shaped relationships. Stevens took the direct estimation of 
ratios for the superior measurement technique. He asserted that the exponent η for 
different sensory modalities like loudness, brightness and handgrip is found to be rather 
constant in different experiments and can thus be taken as a characteristic of the modality 
that is being judged. The judgements of the respondents are assumed to be more precise if 
they are made on a continuous scale instead of a categorical scale. 
A so-called cross-modality match is presented by Stevens as a validation of this method. 
It is found that whenever the responses to a certain modality, e.g. loudness are not given in 
numbers, but in another modality, e.g. handgrip pressure, response and stimulus are once 
again related according to the power law. The exponent η that characterizes the 
relationship can be predicted as the ratio of the characteristic exponents щ and n2 of the 
modality 1 and 2 used: n,.>2 = П)/п2. In fact, this prediction was verified in experiments. 
Although the power law, the characteristic exponents, and the cross-modality match 
were first introduced in the domain of psychophysics, they soon came to be used in the 
domain of social constructs. For example, number estimates and other response modalities 
came to be used to measure the prestige of occupations, the social status according to 
income level, or the seriousness of offenses (Lodge, 1981a; Wegener, 1982). 
Lodge (1981a, 1981b) provides a detailed description of how to carry out research on 
social items using the magnitude scaling approach. He advises to instruct respondents how 
to give magnitude judgements in an instruction task. Furthermore, since the actual values 
that can be assigned to physical stimuli like brightness, handgrip, or loudness, are unknown 
for social items. Lodge advises to use two response modalities. The responses given in both 
modalities should be related according to the cross-modality paradigm. The power law 
should hold with an exponent that equals the ratio of the exponents of both modalities used: 
log Olmodaiity i) = log (k)+ (n,/n2) log (R f^auty 2) (5.4) 
Lodge (1981a) describes how this relationship is actually found for a variety of attitudes, 
including opinions on policy issues. Stevens (1972) and Dawson (1982) describe that very 
similar results are found both in attitude and sensory measurement. Saris et al. (1977) have 
successfully used the procedure in large-scale survey research. 
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Some criticisms of magnitude scaling 
Magnitude scaling has not gone uncriticized. Stevens tends to regard all inconsistency in the 
ratio judgements as random error (Dawes, 1972), except for the regression effect, where 
extremely large stimuli are underestimated and extremely small stimuli are overestimated. 
However, Poulton (1989) argues that there are systematic biases in quantifying judgements, 
especially in the ratio judgements required in Stevens' method, when applied to modalities 
that cannot be expressed by familiar physical units such as centimeters for length. Poulton 
argues that the power law, the exponent of the predicted size and the crossmodal matches 
consistent with numerical magnitude judgements are a specific product of the measurement 
technique used by Stevens. 
Others have also argued that the power function and the cross-modality match are not a 
sufficient validity check (e.g. N. Anderson, 1981). It has been found that the exponents of 
the modalities are not as invariant as Stevens claimed. They fluctuate, for example, with 
so-called contextual effects like the range of stimuli presented, or the standard used 
(Marks, 1982; Saris et al., 1987). Furthermore, they show many differences between 
individual respondents (Saris, 1988). 
The non-linear relationship between direct ratio estimation judgements and category 
judgements cannot be taken as evidence that the former are intrinsically better, as Stevens 
did (Bimbaum, 1982). Instead, Parducci (1982, p.89) argues that category ratings are 
better since they correspond to the way value judgements are expressed in everyday life: 
"we describe a book or movie as 'extremely enjoyable' or perhaps as 'not very good'. Even 
the most devoted advocate of magnitude estimation would hesitate to advise a friend, except 
perhaps in jest, that one movie is four times as enjoyable as another"4. 
In sum, the major problems in the debate on magnitude scaling are whether respondents 
give ratio scores as expected, whether the judgements represent the 'actual' subjective 
impression of subjects and whether they represent these 'actual' subjective impressions 
better than category ratings or other scaling methods. However, no conclusive evidence has 
been produced to solve these problems. In view of the advantage that the reliability can be 
calculated on an individual level for responses obtained in only one session the magnitude 
scaling procedure was used here, in spite of the problems mentioned above. 
Since the responses obtained by direct ratio estimation should follow the power law 
provided the right instructions are given, the instructions used in this study will be 
described in detail in the remainder of this section and the correspondence between the 
responses obtained and the power law will be checked in section 6.1. Appendix 4 addresses 
the problem of whether respondents actually give ratio responses. It is concluded that not 
all respondents give ratio scores and that this may affect the regression coefficient in the 
power law. 
Magnitude scaling instructions of the present study 
Many different procedures can be found in different studies on magnitude scaling. For 
example, sometimes a number is assigned to the standard stimulus, and sometimes the 
standard is presented together with each stimulus to be judged. The differences in 
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procedure are found to be related to specific biases in the judgements (Poulton, 1989) and 
to the magnitude of the exponent of the power function (Marks, 1974). The procedure used 
in this study is exactly the same as the one described by Lodge (1981a) and follows 
Hamblin's rules of thumb (1974). This procedure tries to optimize the results of magnitude 
scaling. Furthermore, some evidence from the pilot studies 1 and 2 was used in the 
construction of the exact procedure presented here (see Westerhof, 1989a, 1989b, and 
appendix 4 on some differences in the instructions used in the pilot studies). 
Two instruction tasks are used to show respondents how to give ratio judgments. In the 
first exercise, the metric task, respondents had to give numbers to line-lengths (number 
estimation modality) and to draw lines to numbers (line drawing modality): as many times 
longer the line as compared with a reference line, as many times higher the number as 
compared with the number that was given to the reference number (and vice versa for line 
drawing). In the second exercise, the sound task5, respondents had to give lines and 
numbers to descriptions of sounds, like "whispering", "a heavy truck", or "a jet plane 
flying low" to be compared to "a crowded pub": as many times louder the sound compared 
to a "crowded pub", as many times longer the line (or higher the number) compared to the 
line (or number) given to "a crowded pub". The exact instructions for these tasks can be 
found in appendix 1. The original Dutch formulations can be found in appendix 2. 
Having done the two exercises in the metric and sound task, respondents were asked to 
give lines and numbers to the attitude items in the attitude task. The procedure of 
expressing judgements in the attitude task is exactly the same as that for the sound task. The 
order of line drawing and number estimation was random. The instructions for the number 
estimation modality on the attitude task are presented below. The instructions for the line 
drawing modality on the attitude task are identical, only 'lines' should be substituted for 
'numbers' and vice versa. The following instructions are read to the respondent by the 
interviewer: 
"You are finished with the exercises now. Some statements on politics and on health and Illness 
will be presented to you. These statements are mixed. You will see one statement at a time. Of 
course, not everyone has thought about all statements. It Is possible that you do not have an 
opinion about a statement. You can indicate that. If you do have an opinion, then we would like 
you to give it. Again, numbers and lines will be used. We do not compare opinions to "a crowded 
pub", but to an "in between" opinion. By this, I mean an opinion such as: "I do not agree with the 
statement, but I do not disagree with it either". First, you give a number to "in between". That is 
the reference number. Then you give your own opinion. First, you indicate whether you agree or 
disagree with the statement Then you give a larger number to indicate how strongly you feel about 
this issue. As many times stronger your opinion, as many times larger the number you give. 
Whether you agree or disagree, the number you give for your own opinion is always larger than 
the one you gave to "in between"." 
The attitude items are presented in a random order to minimize question order effects. The 
items on politics and on medicine are not presented separately. Respondents are presented 
one statement at a time. They are first asked to give a number or line for an opinion "in 
between": 
"Give a number to the opinion "in between"." 
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Then they are asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the statement or 
whether they have not thought much about it: 
"Do you Agree, or Disagree with this statement, or Haven't you thought much about it?" 
According to the studies of Schuman and Presser (1981) and Bishop et al. (1983), adding 
the clause "or haven't you thought much about it" is an effective means of filtering out 
respondents who do not have an opinion. This is especially true when it is stressed that not 
having an opinion is a legitimate option. The initial instructions reproduced above show 
that this was done in the present study. Furthermore, compared to "no opinion", or "don't 
know" this clause seems to represent nicely what is meant by cognitive centrality as the 
amount of 'mental time' spent thinking about an object (Converse, 1970). 
If respondents indicate that they haven't thought much about the statement, the next item 
is presented. If respondents indicate that they "agree" with the statement they are asked: 
"Give a larger number to Indicate how strongly you agree with the statement" 
If respondents indicate to "disagree" with the statement they are asked6: 
"Give a larger number to indicate how strongly you disagree with the statement" 
After the respondents indicated the evaluative strength of their own opinion, the next 
statement was presented. Respondents were asked to give a new line or number to the 
opinion "in between" for each statement. After all the statements were judged using one 
modality, the same statements had to be judged again in the other modality. 
5.3 Computerized magnitude scaling 
The administration of the questionnaire was computerized for two reasons. First, 
computerization enabled us to measure the response time to each single item. The response 
time can be used to measure attitude accessibility (Fazio, 1990b). In the present study the 
response time was calculated as the time between the moment a new attitude item appeared 
on the screen and the moment the next item appeared on the screen after a respondent had 
entered his own judgement. Therefore, the response time is attenuated both by the time 
necessary to read the item and the time necessary to operate the computer in order to give 
the answer7. In section 6.2 the interpretation of the response time as a measure of attitude 
accessibility will be discussed further. 
Second, computerization makes it possible to check immediately whether a respondent's 
answers on the instruction tasks follow the power law. If the correlation between line and 
number scores on the metric or sound task was below 0.70 (explained variance less than 
50%), the same task was presented again. All respondents obtained correlations of over 
0.70 after a second trial, so that it can be safely assumed that all respondents were able to 
use the instrument in an appropriate way before they went on to judge the attitude items. 
In addition to the consistency check in the instruction tasks and the measurement of 
response times, computerization has certain advantages over a paper-and-pencil version 
which heighten the quality of the data obtained (see also Saris, 1991): 
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1. there are no mistakes in data entry (provided the program is correct!), which is 
particularly advantageous for line drawing responses; 
2. computerization saves the researcher time (especially for line drawing responses), 
because data entry is carried out automatically; 
3. randomization of items and response modalities can be easily achieved; 
4. the correctness of responses can be checked by the program, so that incorrect responses 
cannot enter the data file; 
5. respondents cannot skip a question by mistake. 
To simplify the use of the computer all the keys on the keyboard that could be used were 
marked. Typing any other key had no effect. All mistakes could be corrected. Subjects 
could return to previous items if they wanted to. A line could be drawn by pushing a 
button. Each push on the button produced a line of 3 pixels (approximately 1 mm.). To 
save time, subjects could also use a button to produce a line one third of the screen width. 
A line could be shortened by the same lengths (3 pixels or one third of the screen, 
respectively). 
Since computerized and paper-and-pencil versions of questionnaires may produce 
differences in responses8, pilot study 2 (Westerhof, 1989b) was especially designed to 
assess the effects of computerization on the way people give their answers. Comparable 
groups of respondents, who were recruited in a lower-class neighborhood, were presented 
either a paper-and-pencil version or an equivalent computerized version of the same 
questionnaire. It was found that, although some uneasiness with computers was encountered 
especially among older respondents and among women, this was short-lived. After the 
instruction tasks, respondents accurately used the computer to give answers to the attitude 
items. The same proportions in both groups found the tasks difficult, or unpleasant. Both 
versions appeared to match the power law well. While all respondents within the computer 
group gave adequate answers, those who had had some prior experience with computers 
performed slightly better. Since the differences were found to be so slight and 
performance on the computerized version was adequate, it was concluded that the 
computerized version could be used without problems. 
5.4 The items on social position, involvement and knowledge 
Next to the attitude questions some questions were asked about the social characteristics of 
respondents, their involvement in the two fields, and their knowledge about both fields. 
The interviewers made some observations on the respondent's performance in dealing with 
the questionnaire. An English translation of the items can be found in appendix 3. 
Information on the social characteristics was obtained using the standard questions 
employed in survey research. These were sex, age, education, occupation, place of 
residence and civil status. 
Different indicators of involvement in the field were used. Respondents were asked 
whether they were interested in the issues addressed in the questionnaire. Respondents were 
also asked about their consumption habits (reading or watching TV about these issues). To 
assess their participation on each field, respondents were asked whether they took part in 
design of the study and measurement procedures 71 
discussions about the domain with acquaintances. Furthermore, on the political field, they 
were asked whether they had a preference for a party and if so, for which party; whether 
they had voted in the last elections; whether they were an (active) member of a party or a 
union; and whether they participated in political demonstrations. On the medical field 
respondents were asked if they were an (active) member of a union of patients. They were 
asked a further question about their personal experience of serious illness. This last 
question was open-ended, with a view to giving the respondents the chance to tell as much 
as they wanted, and to do justice to their experiences. 
On the political field as well as on the field of medicine, there were knowledge tests. On 
both fields questions were asked as to who (which party or which healer) had made certain 
statements, the ideology test. This test is meant to measure whether respondents have 
knowledge about the ideological positions taken in the field9. There were also tests on the 
knowledge of participants in the field. On the political field there was a test on the 
knowledge of political parties, the party test (taken from De Bruyn and Foppen (1974)), 
and a test on the knowledge of the name, party and political function of 5 politicians, the 
politician test (a revised version of Irwin, Verhoef and Wiebrens (1977)). On the field of 
medicine there was a multiple choice test on the names of regular specialists and alternative 
healers, the name test (the definitions were taken from P. Van Dijk (1984) and Rens and 
Van Aken (1984) and reformulated to be used in a multiple choice format). On the field of 
medicine there was a test on knowledge of concepts, the concept test (the definitions were 
taken from P. Van Dijk (1984), Elseviers Medische Termen Gids (1981), and Van Dale 
(1984)). All knowledge test were pretested in pilot studies 1 and 3. 
Some observations (taken from Irwin et al., 1977) were made by the interviewers: on 
the presence of disturbing influences; on the way respondents filled out the questionnaire; 
and on previous computer experience. 
5.5 Field work 
Recruitment 
Three procedures were used to recruit respondents. First, a letter was sent to 219 
inhabitants of Nijmegen, between 40 and 55 years of age, who were randomly chosen from 
the population register of the city. The letter announced that the researcher was coming by 
to ask for their participation in an opinion poll. 104 respondents participated in the survey 
(47%). In two cases the administration of the questionnaire was not complete, so that 102 
respondents are incorporated in the study. These respondents will be referred to as the city 
sample below. 
To find some respondents who hold a position in the political field, a letter was sent to 
the secretaries of the three major parties (PvdA, CDA, VVD) and of the two major trade 
unions (FNV, CNV) in Nijmegen. They were asked to contact people in their organization 
who were actively involved in it. In order to protect the privacy of their members, the 
secretaries of the PvdA and the CDA sent letters to active party members. They were asked 
to volunteer to participate by sending in a reply letter with their name and address. The 
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secretaries of the other organizations asked active members during meetings if they wanted 
to participate in the study. The sample of 33 respondents thus recruited is called the 
politically sophisticated sample. 
To find respondents who were sophisticated in the field of medicine was more 
difficult10. Two alternative healers were asked to contact patients who might like to 
volunteer in this study. Some paranormal healers who were contacted refused to ask their 
patients to cooperate. An acupuncturist supplied the names and addresses of eight of his 
patients who would be willing to cooperate in the study. One of the patients of the 
acupuncturist brought on two more respondents. The same respondent also asked a 
paranormal healer to provide two more addresses. Thus, only 12 sophisticated respondents 
were recruited: the sophisticated sample in medicine11. 
Recruitment strategy 
After the respondents from the city sample had received the letter the researcher went by 
to present himself as a researcher working at the University of Nijmegen12. If respondents 
were not at home, two return visits were made. Initially, people were told little about the 
questionnaire and the way the questions were presented. More information was given on 
request. If people refused to cooperate, the researcher tried to persuade them that it was 
necessary to talk to as many people as possible. If they said they did not have the time, it 
was argued that the interview could be held at some other time. If they said they were not 
interested or did not know anything about the subject, it was replied that "it should not 
always be the people who are interested or know everything, who cooperate in surveys". 
Thus, an attempt was made to ascribe as much competence as possible to the respondents. 
To avoid negative reactions to the use of the computer (see also the section on nonresponse 
below), "a new method to ask people about their experience" was mentioned. 
Administration of the questionnaire 
Appointments were made with those respondents who were willing to cooperate in the 
study. Almost all interviews took place at the home of the respondents. A few interviews 
took place at the respondent's place of work. By using a portable computer (Olivetti MIS) 
the computerized survey interviews could be conducted at the homes of the respondents. 
One male and two female research assistants helped the researcher in conducting the 
interviews. The interviewers were about 25 years old. They had followed an intensive 
interview training course. They were instructed carefully about what was expected of them 
and of the respondents. All interviewers filled out the questionnaire themselves before 
conducting any interviews. The interviewers were also acquainted with the computer 
programme used. 
The interviewers read the magnitude scaling instructions to the respondents. The 
respondents typed their answers themselves, on the keyboard of the computer. If any 
problems occurred, the interviewers assisted the respondents in the interpretation of the 
instructions and the operation of the computer. Respondents also filled out the multiple 
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choice knowledge tests themselves, using paper and pencil. The other questions were read 
to the respondents by the interviewer. 
5.6 Respondents 
Nonresponse 
In this section some differences in response rate corresponding to social characteristics of 
the respondents will be discussed. Since no characteristics of the sample and the population 
from which it was drawn were known except for sex, two indirect indicators were 
constructed on the basis of the characteristics of different neighborhoods as they could be 
found in official statistics of the city of Nijmegen13. 
Firstly, neighborhoods were classified according to the level of education. Those 
neighborhoods where over 50% of the labour force (employed and unemployed) had fewer 
than 12 years of formal education are considered neighborhoods with lower educational 
level. Those where less than half had fewer than 12 years of formal education are 
considered neighborhoods with higher educational level. 
Secondly, the neighborhoods were classified according to the mean annual income for 
the employed between 25 and 65 years old: less than 20,000 guilders (lower income), 
between 20,000 and 25,000 guilders (middle income) and higher than 25,000 guilders 
(higher income). 
The response rates according to the respondents' sex and to the educational and income 
level of neighborhoods in which they lived can be found in table 5.2. Unlike in other 
studies (see chapter 1, Bourdieu, 1979) there is no difference in response rate according to 
sex of the respondents or educational level of the neighborhoods. The response rate does 
rise with the mean annual income in the neighborhoods, a finding which is in conformity 
with other studies. 
Nonresponse and competence 
The reasons for nonresponse can enhance our understanding of the dynamics leading to 
cooperation or refusal. In table 5.3 these reasons are classified in 6 categories. The first 
two categories show the reasons why respondents could not be contacted: either the address 
was not right or the respondents were not found at home three times. The other reasons 
were those given by the individuals themselves. Some of the persons we spoke to said they 
had "no time". Others said "no interest" or just "no!" without offering any reasons. Still 
others said they had participated in surveys before; some of them complained that they had 
never received any feedback about the results of the survey ('other survey')14. 
As can be seen in table 5.3, men and respondents living in neighborhoods with higher 
income levels were not at home more often than others. This may be related to the fact that 
men have jobs outside their own house more often than women. As there is a higher degree 
of unemployment in the lower income levels (Gemeente Nijmegen, 1989) this may have 
caused the difference according to income level of the neighborhood. 
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Table 5.2 Response rates according to sex 
and to sodai characteristics of the neighborhoods (city sample) 
column % 
N 
response 
nonresponse 
male 
103 
47 
53 
sex 
female 
116 
48 
52 
Table 5.3 Reasons nonresponse according 
educational level 
of neighborhood 
low 
105 
46 
54 
to sex 
high 
114 
49 
51 
and to social characteristics of the neighborhoods (city sample) 
column % 
N 
not at home 
address unknown 
no! 
no time 
other survey 
no Interest 
male 
55 
15 
9 
26 
24 
17 
9 
sex 
female 
60 
6 
10 
37 
23 
11 
13 
educational level 
of neighborhood 
low 
57 
10 
5 
34 
29 
11 
11 
high 
58 
12 
14 
29 
17 
17 
10 
Income level 
of neighborhood 
low 
39 
41 
59 
middle 
113 
47 
53 
income level 
high 
67 
52 
48 
of neighborhood 
low 
23 
8 
17 
29 
13 
17 
17 
middle 
60 
10 
8 
34 
26 
13 
10 
high 
32 
14 
6 
29 
26 
14 
11 
total 
219 
47 
53 
total 
115 
11 
9 
32 
23 
14 
10 
The address is unknown a little more often in both neighborhoods with a lower educational 
level and neighborhoods with a higher average income15. This is probably caused by the 
fact that recruitment was carried out one neighborhood after the other. Since the field 
work took about one year, it is likely that there was a higher number of people who had 
moved to another address in neighborhoods where respondents were recruited later on. 
The reasons people gave for not participating can give an indication of self-ascribed 
social competence. The statement that one is not interested is taken by Bourdieu (1979) as 
an important indicator of a lack of self-ascribed social competence. If individuals say they 
have cooperated in a survey before or have no time, it is clear that they do not 
acknowledge to feel incompetent. Moreover, by saying he has cooperated in a survey 
before, a person indicates that he may have felt competent to cooperate in a survey before. 
By just saying "no!" a person neither admits nor denies that he is incompetent. 
Women say "no interest" or "no!" more often than men, whereas more men than women 
say they have cooperated in a survey before. These findings indicate that men feel more 
competent than women. 
Respondents from neighborhoods with a lower educational level say "no!" somewhat 
more often than respondents living in neighborhoods with higher educational levels. If a 
reason is specified, respondents from lower education neighborhoods say they have "no 
time" more often, but respondents from higher education neighborhoods say they 
cooperated in another survey more often. Since the second reason is a stronger claim to 
competence than the first, these findings indicate that respondents living in neighborhoods 
with lower educational levels feel somewhat less competent, although the differences are 
not so clear as those between men and women. 
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Respondents living in the neighborhoods with the lower income level acknowledge they are 
not interested more often. Furthermore, they specify a reason less often than the other 
respondents. However, somewhat contradictorily, they also say they have cooperated in a 
survey before more often. Thus, respondents living in lower income neighborhoods seem 
to feel somewhat less competent, which is also expressed by their higher level of 
nonresponse. 
Some observations made during recruitment both in the pilot studies and in the present 
study complete the sketch of nonresponse. In pilot study 1 a home-to-home canvass was 
carried out in lower class neighborhoods. People were asked to participate in a survey on 
politics. They often refused categorically, claiming that they were not competent to judge 
politics. They said things like "I don't know anything about it", "it's too complicated", "go 
to someone else who knows more about it" and "just leave it to the politicians in The 
Hague". This lack of competence is also found among the women who said that their 
husbands should be interviewed, since they knew more about politics. No men referred to 
their wives as being more competent. 
In pilot study 1 a group of five people, three women and two men, was asked on the 
street to participate in the study survey. They looked at each other, laughed and shrugged 
their shoulders. They looked rather startled and uneasy. They reacted to the word politics 
in particular, claiming that they did not know anything about it and that we should ask 
someone else. They kept saying that it was none of their business. They told us that it was 
no use trying in that street, as none of their neighbors would cooperate. There was only 
one house - a man pointed it out - in which a student lived who would certainly cooperate 
(and, indeed, he did!), as he was interested in politics.16 
These findings on self-ascribed competence correspond to those among the respondents 
who were active in the political field. While it is not known how people reacted when they 
were asked to participate, due to the way in which active members of parties and unions 
were recruited, it can be seen that those who volunteered to participate in the study are 
more often men than women and more often better educated (see table 5.2). 
A lack of self-ascribed competence was not encountered on the field of medicine. Here, 
people seemed to be more confident about their opinions. However, when personal 
experience with serious illness was too intimate and emotionally charged, people sometimes 
refused to discuss it with a stranger. The recruitment of sophisticated respondents in the 
field of medicine shows that those who volunteered are more often women than men (table 
S.4). Whether women feel in general more competent than men when talking about health 
and illness is not certain. 
A lack of competence was also found when people were told that the survey was to be 
conducted by means of a computer. Many people in the working-class neighborhoods in 
pilot study 2 said that they did not know how to use a computer. A second group of five 
people (three men and two women) were asked on the street if they wanted to fill out the 
questionnaire by computer. They all said that a computer was "nothing for them" and that 
they did not want to learn how to use it. They gave two addresses of men who enjoyed 
working with computers and were very good at it. For this reason the written introduction 
did not mention the fact that the survey would eventually be carried out with a computer. 
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Apart from the lack of competence in politics and computers, which was especially 
encountered in the working-class neighborhoods in pilot studies 1 and 2, and more often 
among women than among men, and the reactions to the field of medicine, in which a lack 
of self-ascribed competence was less apparent, there were also different reactions with 
regard to the fact that the researcher comes from the university. Some distrust and 
unfamiliarity was observed especially in the lower-class neighborhoods: some people said 
they were not interested or just closed the door. Most people thought that the interviewer 
was a student. As it is difficult to explain the ambivalent position of a research assistant, a 
graduate student at the Dutch universities, this was usually not corrected. In fact, people 
seemed more willing to cooperate when they had children who were students themselves. 
In sum, although the findings and observations made should be interpreted with caution, 
it is found that the respondents who participated in the survey are not exactly 
representative of the population in Nijmegen between 40 and 55 years of age. Especially 
people living in lower income neighborhoods refused to cooperate. They are also the 
people who feel somewhat less competent to cooperate in a survey, as is indicated by the 
reasons for their refusal. Respondents from lower education neighborhoods also appeared 
to be somewhat less competent to cooperate. Respondents from lower class neighborhoods 
(with both a lower educational and a lower income level) also feel less competent in 
politics and in using computers, and distrust universities. Furthermore, women feel less 
competent, especially on the field of politics. On the field of medicine a first indication was 
found that self-ascribed competence is indeed more widespread than on the field of politics, 
as was argued in chapter 4. 
It can be concluded that the respondents who were willing to participate in the survey 
are likely to be closer in social position to the researcher. Furthermore, they will be 
somewhat more interested in politics than the total population. Therefore, they will most 
likely be more competent and politics will be more central for them. On the political field 
at least, this will reduce the probability of finding differences in competence and centrality 
between respondents. 
Characteristics of the samples 
Some relevant social characteristics of the respondents who agreed to cooperate can be 
found in table 5.4. Almost all respondents live in Nijmegen, a city of 150,000 inhabitants. 
The sophisticated respondents on the medical field were recruited in villages near 
Nijmegen. Except for a few respondents in the sophisticated samples, all respondents were 
between 40 and 55 years of age. Most respondents were married. The sex distribution is 
about even in the city sample. More men than women are found in the politically 
sophisticated sample, whereas in the sophisticated sample on the medical field almost all 
respondents are women. Respondents in the politically sophisticated sample have a 
somewhat higher educational and occupational level than the city sample. In the medical 
sample the lower general secondary educational level, the intermediate vocational level, 
and the middle-level employees are somewhat overrepresented in comparison with the city 
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Table 5.4 Characteristics of the samples 
column % 
time period of interviewing 
N 
education 2 
primary school 
lower general secondary 
pre-university 
lower vocational 
intermediate vocational 
higher vocational 
university 
occupation 
unskilled labour 
skilled labour 
lower employees 
small tradesmen 
middle employees 
higher occupations 
not classifiable3 
sex 
male 
female 
civil status 
married 
unmarried 
age 
mean 
range 
residence 
Nijmegen 
elsewhere 
city 
sample 
1021 
16 
20 
9 
20 
7 
8 
21 
8 
19 
28 
2 
14 
25 
4 
48 
52 
87 
13 
48 
40-55 
100 
0 
sophisticated samples 
politics medicine 
October 1991 - October 1992 
33 
9 
21 
6 
18 
3 
27 
15 
6 
18 
9 
6 
30 
30 
0 
70 
30 
80 
20 
49 
36-62 
94 
6 
12 
8 
33 
0 
25 
17 
17 
0 
8 
17 
33 
8 
25 
8 
0 
8 
92 
90 
10 
43 
32-61 
0 
100 
' note: 2 of the 104 respondents who cooperated could not fill out the entire questionnaire. They were left out of account in the 
analyses. 
2
 noie: educational levels according to Dutch school system: primary school (lagere school, VGLO/LAVO); lower secondary 
(ULO, MULO, MAVO, HAVO); pre-university (HBS, MMS, atheneum, gymnasium, VWO); lower vocational (LBO); 
intermediale vocational (MBO); higher vocational (HBO); university (universiteit) 
3
 note: Respondents who had never had a job 
sample. As was observed in the previous section these uneven distributions according to 
sex, education and occupation correspond to self-ascribed competence on each field. 
Since it has been observed that political competence and centrality is greater among 
younger people and among respondents living in larger cities, it is to be expected that more 
or less intermediate levels of political competence and centrality will be found among the 
respondents in the present study, who are between 40 and 55 years old and live in a 
medium-sized city. On the medical field it was expected that personal experience in 
particular will lead to greater competence and centrality. Respondents between 40 and 55 
years old were chosen especially because their experience with illness was expected to show 
more variance. In view of the age of the respondents it can be expected, again, that more 
or less intermediate levels of competence and centrality will be found in the present study. 

6 THE ASSESSMENT OF ATTITUDE STRUCTURES 
In this chapter, the findings of the study will be discussed. Before turning to the analyses 
that apply to the hypotheses formulated in chapter 4, the results of the instruction tasks will 
be described in the first section to check whether the respondents carried out the 
magnitude scaling tasks well. If the respondents use the instrument in the proper way, it 
can be concluded that any differences in attitude structures cannot be attributed to different 
capacities to express magnitude judgments. In the second section the different indicators of 
attitude competence and centrality will be presented. In the third section the validity of 
these measures is assessed, while the rest of the chapter will deal with the relations between 
attitude competence and centrality on the one hand and involvement in the field, social 
position and sex on the other hand. 
6.1 The use of the instrument 
In this section it will be analyzed whether the results of the instruction tasks are similar to 
the results of other magnitude scaling experiments. This is to say that the results should 
follow the power law, as was explained in section 3.2. It is known from psychophysical 
and social scaling that the regression coefficient of the power function on log-log axes 
should be 1.0 for the cross-modality match between line-drawing and number estimation 
(Lodge, 1981a). It is also known that the power law holds rather well on the individual 
level. If correlation coefficients between the responses in one modality and the responses in 
the other modality are calculated at the individual level, these have a frequency distribution 
with a mean close to 1.0 and a low standard deviation. The individual regression 
coefficients are close to the regression coefficient at the group level, but they usually vary 
more than the correlation coefficients. If the data of the present study can be described in a 
similar way, it can be concluded that the instrument was used properly by the respondents 
and that differences found in the attitude task are not related to differences in the use of the 
instrument. 
The analyses of the responses closely follow Lodge's guidelines (1981a) on how to treat 
magnitude scaling data. For each item a number and a line score were calculated: 
number scoTC(item x ) = In (number given to Item χ / number given to reference) (6.1) 
line score(item ,) = In (line length given to item χ / line length given to reference) (6.2) 
In words: the score on an item is computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
number (or line length) given to an item to the number (or line length) given to the 
reference. On the sound task a minus sign was added to the number and line scores of the 
items that a respondent judged to be less loud than the reference, so that items judged 
louder were distinguished from items judged less loud on the sound task. 
The cross-modality match is plotted in figure 6.1 for the metric task, and in figure 6.2 
for the sound task. On the Y-axis are the mean line scores, on the X-axis are the mean 
number scores. The solid line represents the ideal regression coefficient of 1.0; 
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Figuie 6.1 Cross-modality match 
for the metric task 
Figure 6.2 Cross-modality match 
for the sound task 
3-r 
number 
score 
number 
score 
Table 6.1 Cross-modality match for the instruction tasks (city sample; N=102) 
group level 
individual level 
mean 
standard deviation 
metric task 
correlation 
.998 
.95 
.05 
regression 
.94 
.97 
.22 
sound task 
correlation 
.997 
.90 
.14 
regression 
.74 
.91 
.56 
the dotted line represents the regression line as calculated from the data. The 
corresponding statistics can be found in table 6.1. The cross-modality match is plotted in 
figure 6.1 for the metric task, and in figure 6.2 for the sound task. On the Y-axis are the 
mean line scores, on the X-axis are the mean number scores. The solid line represents the 
ideal regression coefficient of 1.0; the dotted line represents the regression line as 
calculated from the data. The corresponding statistics can be found in table 6.1. 
It can be seen that on log-log coordinates, the relationship is clearly linear. On both 
tasks, but especially on the sound task, the regression coefficient1 is slightly below 1.0. 
This is to say that the lines drawn for large items were slightly too short and that those 
drawn for the small items were slightly too long. A regression bias for line drawing is not 
uncommon in magnitude scaling experiments (Lodge, 1981a) and it was also found in the 
pilot studies (Westerhof, 1989a, 1989b). The fact that the regression bias is greater for the 
sound task than for the metric task can be explained as follows. On the metric task the 
largest number could be adequately represented by a line that is exactly the width of the 
screen. On the sound task however, respondents sometimes could not give a line as long as 
they would have liked to give, because the maximum length of the line was restricted to the 
width of the computer screen. 
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At the individual level the frequency distributions of the individual coefficients are much 
like those found in other experiments (Lodge, 1981a; see table 6.1). On both tasks the 
mean correlation is close to 1.0, and the standard deviation is low. The mean regression 
coefficient is rather close to the coefficient at the group level and the standard deviation is 
higher than for the correlation coefficients. On the sound task, the mean and standard 
deviation of the correlation and regression coefficients are somewhat further away from 
the ideal than on the metric task. This was to be expected because the descriptions of 
sounds are less precise items than numbers and lines. An analysis of variance showed that 
there are no significant differences in the responses of respondents differing in social 
position or sex (see appendix 4). 
In sum, it can be concluded that the respondents used the questionnaire appropriately. 
Thus, if differences are found in the attitude task, they can not be attributed to differences 
in the capacity to use the measurement instrument. Instead, such differences will have to be 
interpreted as relating to the attitude-nonattitude continuum. These differences will be 
reported in the rest of this chapter. 
6.2 The empirical indicators of attributes of attitude structures 
In chapter 4, it was hypothesized that not all respondents have attitudes about all questions: 
they differ in attitude competence. It was hypothesized that not all answers on attitude 
questions in an opinion survey are given in the same way. In the extreme case respondents 
who do not have an attitude (a nonattitude) may randomly pick a response alternative. On 
the basis of psychological theories, the nonattitude-attitude continuum was described in 
chapter 2 as a continuum of cognitive centrality. Knowledge, accessibility, crystallization, 
and constraint are different concomitants of cognitive centrality. It was argued that 
evaluative extremity is an attitude dimension independent of cognitive centrality. In this 
section the different measures that were used to assess these attributes of attitude structures 
are described. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide an overview of the different empirical indicators 
used on the political and medical field, respectively. The means and standard deviations of 
these measures are also presented in tables 6.2 and 6.3. For those measures that are 
composites computed from different items, the reliability (Cronbach's alpha) is also 
reported. 
The line and number scores on each item are calculated in the same way as on the metric 
and sound task as the natural logarithm of the ratio between the item score and the 
reference score (see formula's 6.1 and 6.2). However, the scores on the attitude task were 
only computed for respondents who did not answer that they had not thought about the 
issue that was presented them. The scores on items with which a respondent disagreed were 
given a minus sign in order to distinguish between agree and disagree responses. 
Furthermore, the average of the line and number scores was computed. This average score 
is called the item score. 
To measure knowledge, three knowledge tests were used on each field. On the political 
field questions were asked about political parties in parliament, names, parties and 
functions of politicians and about ideological statements of the three major parties (WD, 
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Table 6.2 Empirical Indicators of attributes of attitude structures; field of politics 
measure mean sd alpha 
knowledge 
parties 
politicians 
name 
party 
function 
ideology 
number of parties in parliament known 
number of names of politicians known 
number of parties of politicians known 
number of functions of politicians known 
number of statements attributed to the right party 
5.4 2.4 0.79 
3.6 
3.0 
2.6 
6.2 
6.2 
38 
0.79 
0.7 
1.7 
1.9 
1.9 
3.0 
1.5 
16 
0.31 
0.4 
0.82 
0.83 
0.83 
0.84 
0.78 
0.76 
.1 
.1 
1.1 0.7 0.89 
competence number of items a respondent claimed to have thought about (both 
In the line drawing and in the number estimation modality) 
accessibility mean response time of number score and line score (in seconds) 
crystallization2 parallel-test reliability between line scores and number scores (r) 
constraint3 standard deviation of z-transformation of Item scores, after receding 
leftist' items 
extremity mean of absolute values of item score 
noie: The values indicated ate calculated for Ine city sample and the politically sophisticated; №135 
' note: no Cronbacb's alpha could be calculated 
2
 note: the comparable figures for the sound task are: mean = .90°, sd = .14 
3
 note: constraint is calculated only for respondents who claimed to have thought about all items (№77) 
Table 6.3 Empirical Indicators of attributes of attitude structures; field of medicine 
name measure mean sd alpha 
knowledge 
concepts 
names 
ideology 
number of concepts used by alternative healers and doctors known 4.9 2.6 0.76 
number of names of alternative healers and doctors known 5.5 2.3 0.71 
number of statements attributed to the right healer/doctor 6.2 2.1 0.57 
42 
0.78 
0.9 
17 
0.37 
0.6 
0.73 
.1 
.1 
competence number of items a respondent claimed to have thought about (both 6.0 1.6 0.76 
in the line drawing and in the number estimation modality) 
accessibility mean response time of number score and line score (in seconds) 
crystallization2 parallel-test reliability between line scores and number scores (r) 
constraint3 standard déviation of z-transformation of Item scores, after receding 
'alternative' Items 
extremity mean of absolute values of item score 1.1 0.7 0.93 
note: The values indicated are calculated for the city sample and the sophisticated in medicine; N=114 
1 note: no Cronbacb's alpha could be calculated 
2
 note: the comparable figures for the sound task are: mean = .90; sd - .14 
3
 note: constraint is calculated only for respondents who claimed to have thought about all items (№63) 
CDA and PvdA). On each test, the number of correct answers is computed as a measure of 
political knowledge. Cronbacb's alpha is rather high for all political knowledge tests. 
To measure knowledge, three knowledge tests were used on each field. On the political 
field questions were asked about political parties in parliament, names, parties and 
functions of politicians and about ideological statements of the three major parties (WD, 
CDA and PvdA). On each test, the number of correct answers is computed as a measure of 
political knowledge. Cronbach's alpha is rather high for all political knowledge tests. 
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The knowledge tests on the field of medicine dealt with concepts used by doctors and 
alternative healers, with names of physicians and healers, and with ideological statements 
underlying orthodox medicine, acupuncture and paranormal healing. For each test the 
number of correct answers was computed as a measure of knowledge (see table 6.3). The 
reliability coefficients for these tests are lower than on the political field. Cronbach's alpha 
of the ideology test is rather low. In all knowledge tests higher scores indicate more 
knowledge. It can be seen in tables 6.2 and 6.3 that there is considerable variance in all 
tests, indicating that the knowledge base of the attitudes of some respondents is broader 
than that of others. 
To measure attitude competence respondents were explicitly asked if they had thought 
enough about the item presented. This filter question proved to be effective in other studies 
(see section S.2). If respondents answered they had not thought much about an item, either 
in the line drawing or in the number estimation modality, they were classified as having no 
attitude on the item. The number of items on which a respondent claimed to have an 
attitude is computed as a measure of attitude competence. Thus, the higher the score, the 
more competent the respondents. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that the summated measure is 
reliable on both fields. It can be seen that not all respondents feel competent to express an 
opinion on all issues asked about, either on the political or on the medical field. This 
finding confirms the hypothesis that not all respondents have attitudes about all items, even 
though the items were translated from the legitimate specialized language of each field into 
more everyday language. All other measures are computed only for those respondents who 
claimed to have an opinion on the question. 
For each item that a respondent claimed to have thought about, the mean of the response 
time in the line drawing modality and the response time in the number estimation modality 
was calculated in seconds. The average response time for the items respondents claimed to 
have thought about is used as a measure of attitude accessibility. The shorter the response 
time, the more accessible the attitude. The mean response time per item is not found to be 
related to the reading difficulty per item, as measured by Flesch' readability yardstick (see 
also chapter 5, note 2; r=.09). The response time is, however, attenuated by the time 
necessary to operate the computer: both on the political field and on the medical field the 
response times were highly associated with the mean response time on the sound task 
(resp.: r=.66 and r=.68). Thus, the response time is strongly determined by the time that 
people need to type the answer on the computer. The measure of accessibility is rather 
reliable on both fields (tables 6.2 and 6.3). In the next section, however, it will become 
clear that, although the measure is reliable, it is not valid. 
The individual Pearson's correlation coefficient between line and number scores on a 
field is used as an indicator of attitude crystallization. This coefficient can be interpreted as 
a measure of parallel-test reliability. Since this measure is not a composite of different 
items no reliability measure could be calculated. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that the mean of 
the individual correlations is lower than in the sound task and that the standard deviation is 
higher. It follows that there are differences in the crystallization of attitudes which cannot 
be attributed to the capacity to carry out the computerized magnitude scaling task. This 
finding indicates that not all answers are derived from equally crystallized attitudes. 
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To measure the level of constraint among the answers, the measure of 'relative' constraint 
used by Barton and Parsons (1977) was employed (see section 2.2). The item scores of the 
'leftist' and 'alternative' items were recoded so that a higher score on a political item 
always indicates a more 'rightist' preference and a higher score on a medical item always 
indicates a more Orthodox' preference2. The item scores were transformed into z-scores. 
The standard deviation of the z-scores is used as a measure of constraint. The constraint 
measure is only reported for those respondents who claimed to have thought about all 
items3. Of course, the number of respondents is reduced and the constraint measure deals 
with a specific subset of respondents, who are more competent than the average in the 
sample. The differences found between respondents in this subset will apply a fortiori for 
those respondents who are less competent and indicated they had not thought about one or 
more items. As in the case of the indicator of crystallization, no reliability coefficient 
could be calculated for this measure of constraint. The findings reported in tables 6.2 and 
6.3 indicate that not all respondents gave equally constrained answers. 
The extremity of the answers was calculated in terms of the absolute value of the item 
scores. The mean of these scores is used as a measure of attitude extremity4. Of course, 
one might argue that this measure does not indicate attitude extremity, but is more 
determined by response sets. Some respondents use more extreme scores than others, as is 
indeed found in appendix 4. The measure of extremity is highly reliable on both fields 
(tables 6.2 and 6.3). 
In sum, sufficiently reliable measures have been constructed and can be used to assess 
knowledge, competence, accessibility, crystallization, constraint, and extremity. Only the 
ideology test on the medical field has a rather low reliability. The findings on attitude 
competence indicate that not all respondents feel competent to express attitudes on the 
items. Furthermore, the findings on the other measures indicate that not all answers refer 
to central attitudes so that some answers are disguised nonattitudes. However, before 
stating this conclusion with certainty the measures also have to be validated. This will be 
done in the next section. 
6.3 The relationships between the attributes of attitude structures 
The existing evidence about attitude structures led us to hypothesize in chapter 4 that the 
different indicators of attitude competence and centrality will be interrelated. It was 
argued that they are independent of the evaluative extremity of the attitudes. Therefore, 
the correlations between the measures of knowledge, competence, accessibility, 
crystallization, constraint and extremity were calculated. The results are reported in table 
6.4 for the political field and in table 6.5 for the field of medicine. All measures were 
recoded so that higher values always indicate more central attitudes. It is expected, then, 
that all correlations (except for extremity) will be positive. 
The upper triangles of the tables show that the knowledge tests are highly related on 
both fields. This finding proves that the knowledge tests are valid. Consequently, there is 
one knowledge factor on the political field, comprising parties, politicians and ideological 
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Table 6.4 Correlations of Individual measures of attitude structure on (he field of politics 
(city sample and politically sophisticated; N=135) 
correlation 
parties 
name politicians 
party politician 
function politician 
ideology 
competence 
accessibility1 
crystallization 
constraint2 
extremity 
constraint4 
knowledge 
parties 
.70** 
.76** 
.73** 
.68** 
.39** 
.16* 
.28** 
.26* 
.14 
.36** 
name party funcLideology 
.89** -
.85** .90** -
.66** .68** .69** -
.40** .32** .30** .38** 
.07 .09 .11 .12 
.21* .25** .26** .27** 
.32** .26* .27* .27* 
.10 .13 .09 .10 
.38** .34** .33** .38** 
attitudes 
comp. ace. 
.00 
.11 -.10 
-
3
 .08 
.10 -.11 
.11 
cryst. constr. extr. 
.13 
.23**-.56** -
.31** -
note: all measures were receded so that higher scores indicate more central attitudes; * p<05; ** p<.01 
' note: partial correlation with other measures, controlling for response time on sound task 
2
 note: constraint is calculated only for respondents who claimed to have thought about all items (N=77) 
' note: the respondents for whom constraint is calculated answered all items. Since they are therefore all equally competent, it is 
not possible to calculate the correlation coefficient with competence. 
4
 note: partial correlation between constraint and other measures, controlling for extremity 
Table 6.5 Correlations of individual measures of attitude structure on the field of medicine 
(city sample and sophisticated in medicine; N=114) 
knowledge attitudes 
concepts names ideology competence access, cryst. constraint extr. 
correlation 
concepts 
names .73** 
Ideology .64** .62** 
competence 
accessibility1 
crystallization 
constraint2 
extremity 
.45** 
.02 
.31** 
.10 
.11 
.50** 
.07 
.24* 
.08 
.14 
.50** 
.03 
.34** 
.06 
.15 
-
.00 
.17 
J 
.12 
-
.08 
.12 
-.05 
-.13 
.18 -.88** 
constraint4 .31** .33** .40** .08 .06 
note: all measures were receded so that higher scores indicate more central attitudes; * rx.OS; ' * ρ <.01 
1 note: partial correlation with other measures, controlling for response time on sound task 
2
 note: constraint is calculated only for respondents who claimed to have thought about all items (N=63) 
' note: the respondents for whom constraint is calculated answered all items. Since they are therefore all equally competent, it is 
not possible to calculate the correlation coefficient with competence. 
4
 noter, partial correlation between constraint and other measures, controlling for extremity 
statements. On the medical field there is one knowledge factor which relates to medical 
concepts, names and ideological statements. 
Attitude competence, as measured by the number of items respondents say they have 
thought about, is highly correlated to the knowledge tests on both fields. It can therefore 
be concluded that answering "not to have thought about it much" does indeed measure 
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attitude competence, and does not indicate that respondents are not sure about their opinion 
or are not willing to give an opinion because they disagree with the way the question has 
been formulated (see section 2.2). Competence is not related to the other measures of the 
attitude-nonattitude continuum, because the other measures were calculated only for those 
respondents who claimed they had thought about the item. Since some of their answers are 
more similar to nonattitudes and others more similar to central attitudes no relationship 
between these measures and competence can be expected. 
Because the measure of attitude accessibility is determined for a large part by the time 
necessary to operate the computer, the correlations for this measure are calculated while 
controlling for the mean response time on the sound task, which is taken as a measure of 
the time necessary to operate the computer. Only one partial correlation with the other 
measures appears to be significant: the one with the party test. But this coefficient is still 
rather low (.16). It should therefore be concluded that the measured response time is not a 
valid indicator of attitude accessibility. It is therefore not incorporated in any further 
analysis. 
Before turning to the findings on crystallization and constraint, the findings on 
evaluative extremity are discussed, because they provide some difficulties in the 
interpretation of the crystallization and constraint measures. As expected, there are no 
significant correlations between extremity and knowledge. This finding supports the line of 
reasoning followed in section 2.2, that respondents may give extreme answers without 
having much knowledge of the issues asked about. There are no significant correlations 
with competence and accessibility, as was described above. On the political field however, 
there is a significant positive correlation between extremity and crystallization. However, 
this correlation should be interpreted as a result of the way the measures are calculated, 
since more extreme answers will lead to higher correlations between line and number 
scores. The significant negative correlations between extremity and constraint on both 
fields also result from the way the measures are calculated. As was to be expected, 
respondents who give more extreme answers will have higher standard deviations. It 
follows that the measure of constraint, adopted from Barton and Parsons (1977) is highly 
attenuated by the extremity of the answers. Since all correlations with extremity may thus 
be artifacts of the way the indicators are computed, it can be concluded that the hypothesis 
that evaluative extremity is a dimension of attitudes that is independent of cognitive 
centrality is supported by the data. 
The correlations between attitude crystallization and knowledge are significant and 
positive, as expected. The strength of the correlations with competence, crystallization and 
extremity were already accounted for. Except for the lack of a significant correlation 
between crystallization and constraint, which will be explained below, the measurement of 
crystallization is valid and confirms the hypotheses. 
On the political field the measure of attitude constraint is related significantly to the 
knowledge tests. On the medical field these correlations are not significant. Furthermore, 
no correlations with the other measures of cognitive centrality were found to be 
significant, but a highly significant correlation was found with extremity. Since the 
measure of constraint is contaminated by the extremity of the answers, partial correlations 
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were calculated between the measure of constraint and the other measures, while 
controlling for extremity. These partial correlations can be found in the last row of tables 
6.4 and 6.S. It can be seen that the correlations with knowledge rise on both fields. If 
controlled for extremity, the correlations between constraint and knowledge are also 
significant. A significant positive correlation with crystallization appears on the political 
field, but not on the medical field. This lack of correlation will be explained in the next 
section. Apart from this lack of correlation between constraint and crystallization on the 
medical field, it can be concluded that the measure of constraint is associated to the other 
measures as expected and therefore valid. 
In sum, the measures of different attributes of attitude structures are related as 
hypothesized, except for the measure of accessibility. As expected, attitude extremity is a 
dimension of attitude structure independent from centrality. Accessibility proved not valid. 
These measures of accessibility and extremity will not be included in further analysis. The 
measures of knowledge, crystallization and constraint proved valid and their relation to 
involvement, social position and sex will be discussed in the following. 
6.4 Attitude structures and involvement in the field 
In chapter 4 it was hypothesized that differences in attitude structures will be related to 
involvement in the field, both on the field of politics and the field of medicine. More 
involved respondents will be more competent and will have more central attitudes. 
Consequently, they will have more knowledge about the field, they will more often express 
an opinion on the questions asked, and their answers will be more crystallized and more 
constrained. Since attitude extremity was found to be an independent dimension of 
cognitive centrality, the results on this variable are not discussed. Findings on attitude 
accessibility will not be included either, because this measure did not prove to be valid. To 
test the hypotheses we constructed three groups according to the respondent's level of 
involvement on each field. 
The field of politics 
The construction of groups 
The 33 respondents of the politically sophisticated sample are classified as more involved. 
Six respondents from the city sample who are active members of a trade union and/or 
active members of a political party and/or participate regularly in political actions are also 
classified as more involved. One respondent who studied political sciences and one who 
holds a governmental position were also added to this group. There are thus 41 
respondents (33 + 6 + 1 + 1) in this group. 
In the city sample (minus the 8 more involved respondents), those respondents who are a 
party member or a union member, but not active, and those who participate only 
occasionally in political actions are classified as moderately involved (N=34). All others 
are classified as less involved (N=60). 
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The relationship between political involvement on the one hand and social position and sex 
on the other is reported in table 6.6 (See section 6.3 for the classification according to 
social position). More involved respondents have significantly higher social positions and 
are more often male. 
Interest, participation and consumption 
To validate the construction of these groups, political interest, participation, and 
consumption were assessed (table 6.7). Except for watching TV, the more involved groups 
are more interested, participate more often and consume more often. Of course, the 
relationship with membership of political parties or unions, and with participation in 
political actions is a result of the way the groups were constructed. Of the other variables, 
only having a party affiliation and reading the papers are significantly associated with 
involvement. The less and moderately involved group are alike as for voting and talking. 
The more involved group watches TV-programs about politics slightly less often. 
In sum, while the classification in involvement groups has thus been validated, it should 
be kept in mind that the differences in involvement are differences in the degree of 
involvement (some respondents are more involved and others less) and not discrete 
differences (some respondents are involved while others are not). 
Competence and centrality 
It was hypothesized that attitude competence and centrality rise with the level of 
involvement in the field. The measures of knowledge, competence, crystallization and 
constraint relevant to this hypothesis are reported in tables 6.8 and 6.9. 
The mean scores on all tests on political knowledge rise with involvement (table 6.8). If 
more specific knowledge about the party and function of politicians is asked for, the 
differences between the groups become greater. 
Attitude competence, as indicated by the mean number of items to which respondents did 
not respond they had not thought much about, rises with involvement in the field, but not 
significantly. A second indication of attitude competence is whether respondents answered 
all 7 items on politics. Again, competence rises with involvement, and significantly, this 
time. An analysis per item showed that this relationship is found on almost all items. All 
other findings apply to those respondents who claimed to have an opinion on the items. 
The mean correlation coefficient between line and number scores, a measure of attitude 
crystallization, rises with involvement in the field, but not significantly. The standard 
deviation declines with involvement. It can be seen that the more and moderately involved 
have correlation coefficients that are rather close to the sound task (mean=.90; sd=.14). In 
the less involved group, there is a clear drop in explained variance, indicating that their 
answers are given from less crystallized attitudes and are more like nonattitudes. 
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Table 6.6 Political Involvement by social position and sex 
row% 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
60 
34 
41 
135 
lower 
24 
26 
18 
23 
sodai position* 
middle 
54 
47 
31 
45 
higher 
22 
27 
51 
32 
male 
30 
73 
71 
53 
sex** 
female 
70 
27 
29 
47 
* chl2(4d.f.) with rx.05; ** chi2 (2d.f.) with p<.01 
Table 6.7 Political interest, participation and consumption by involvement 
% v« 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
60 
34 
41 
135 
interest 
70 
77 
83 
76 
participation 
party party party union 
affiliation voting member member 
** 
72 
71 
95 
79 
81 
82 
95 
86 
** 
0 
12 
49 
18 
** 
0 
65 
73 
39 
action 
** 
0 
41 
88 
37 
talks 
77 
74 
93 
81 
consumption 
paper TV 
* 
67 79 
68 79 
88 68 
74 76 
* chi2 (2 dX) with p<.05; · · chi2 (2 d.f.) with p<.01 
Table 6.8 Political knowledge by involvement 
means 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
60 
34 
41 
135 
parties 
known 
** 
4.3 
5.5 
6.8 
5.4 
politicians 
name 
** 
3.1 
3.3 
4.5 
3.6 
party 
** 
2.2 
2.6 
4.2 
3.0 
function 
** 
1.9 
2.2 
4.0 
2.6 
ideology 
right 
** 
5.3 
6.3 
7.5 
6.2 
** F-ratk) in analysis of variance with pcOl 
Table 6.9 Attitude structure on the field of politics by involvement 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
60 
34 
41 
135 
competence 
mean % all 
* 
5.9 50 
6.1 56 
6.6 76 
6.2 59 
crystallization 
mean 
.72 
.84 
.86 
.79 
sd 
.40 
.20 
.19 
.31 
constraint! 
mean 
* Φ 
.76 
.89 
.56 
.71 
• еЫ2 (2 d.f.) with p<0S; · · F-ratio with (X.01 
1 note: analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total №77); higher values 
indicate less constraint 
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Table 6.10 Attitude constraint on the field of politics by involvement 
standard deviation 
less and middle 
more involved 
pearson τ 
1 unemployment 
2 social security 
3 privatization 
4 development aid 
5 apaitlieid 
6 income differences 
7 multi-nationals 
1 
unem­
ployment 
1.2 
0.7 
-
.45** 
.50** 
.33** 
.50** 
.56** 
.18 
2 
social 
security 
1.2 
1.0 
.50** 
-
.43** 
.07 
.33* 
.43** 
.39** 
3 
privati­
zation 
1.3 
0.7 
.68** 
.62** 
-
-.05 
.43** 
.57** 
.11 
4 
develop­
ment aid 
1.1 
0.9 
.33 
.33 
.35 
-
.30* 
.17 
-.05 
5 
apartheid 
1.2 
1.2 
.31 
.07 
.27 
.19 
-
.51** 
.20 
6 
income 
differences 
1.3 
0.9 
.60* 
.63** 
.69** 
.34 
.18 
-
.44** 
10 
multi­
nationals 
1.4 
1.2 
.23 
.45* 
.27 
.31 
.55** 
.25 
-
note: * p<.05; **p<.01 
less and middle involved respondents (N=46) below the diagonal; mean г = ЗА 
more involved respondents (N=31) above the diagonal; mean r = .41 
The findings on attitude constraint only concern those respondents who answered all 7 
questions on politics. Since the measure is highly associated with attitude extremity (see 
section 6.2.), the analysis of variance was carried out with extremity as a covariate. Even 
for the more competent respondents, who answered all questions, the relation between 
involvement and constraint is significant in this analysis: more involved respondents have 
lower standard deviations indicating that they have more constrained attitudes. 
In sum, it can be concluded that more involved respondents have more knowledge about 
politics. They have attitudes about politics more often. Their attitudes are more 
crystallized and more constrained. All findings support the hypotheses. 
Relationships between items 
The correlations between the answers on the political items were computed as a more 
specific measure of constraint than the Barton and Parsons measure. Only those 
respondents who answered all questions are incorporated in the analysis, just as in the 
analysis of constraint at the individual level. Respondents from the less and moderately 
involved groups were combined in one group (N=46), which corresponds to the group of 
respondents in the city sample who answered all political items. These respondents were 
compared with the political 'elite' of the more involved group (N=31). All 'leftist' items 
were recoded so that higher scores on all items indicate agreement with the right. 
The findings are presented in table 6.10. As correlation coefficients depend on the 
variance of the items, the standard deviation in each group on each item is given in the 
first two rows of table 6.10. It can be seen in the table that the correlation coefficients are 
somewhat higher for the more involved group than for the less involved group, but not 
much. On item S (apartheid) the more involved have even lower correlations than the less 
involved. The mean correlation for the more involved is .41, for the less involved the 
mean is slightly lower: .34. This difference is not significant (t=1.20; p>.05). The fact that 
the differences are only slight and not significant might be attributed to the higher standard 
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deviations in the less involved group. Indeed, the individual measure of constraint reported 
above, which was shown above to be independent from the variance on the items, shows 
that in fact there are significant differences according to involvement. 
In sum, since the findings apply only to the specific subsample of respondents who feel 
competent to answer all questions, it can be concluded that the hypothesis that more 
involved respondents give more constrained answers is supported by the data, especially 
when the differences in variance are taken into account. 
The field of medicine 
The construction of groups 
To test the hypothesis on the medical field, respondents were classified in three groups 
according to their involvement in the field of medicine. The sophisticated sample on the 
medical field (N=12) is classified as more involved. Those respondents from the city 
sample who have a medical occupation (physician, dentist, nurse) are also classified as 
more involved (N=7). Hence, the more involved group comprises only 19 respondents, and 
is rather small. Respondents who mentioned they had had experience with serious illness 
(cancer, heart and vascular diseases, rheumatism, stroke, polio, diabetes) either personally 
or in their close family (father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, husband, wife) are 
classified as moderately involved (N=43). Those respondents who had no experience with 
serious illness, either themselves or in their close family, are classified as less involved 
(N=52). The groups thus constructed are very heterogeneous, especially the more involved 
group, which consists of both professionals and 'expertized' patients in alternative 
medicine. 
As can be seen in table 6.11, the groups do not differ significantly in social position or 
sex. However, three quarters of the rather small more involved group are female and only 
one quarter are male, due to the fact that 11 of the 12 sophisticated respondents recruited 
in the practice of alternative healers were female. As was also argued in section 5.3, this is 
related to the greater medical consumption on the part of women. The findings of table 
6.11 support the assumption that involvement in the medical field has a social distribution 
which is different from the social distribution of involvement in the political field (see 
section 4.2). 
Interest, participation and consumption 
To validate the construction of the groups, the relationship between involvement on the 
one hand and interest, participation, and consumption on the other was analyzed (table 
6.12). Having a medical profession, and having experience with serious illness are of 
course related significantly to the level of involvement, because both were used as criteria 
to construct the groups. Respondents from the more involved group have more often 
visited an alternative healer. This also results from the classification procedure: 12 
respondents of the more involved group were recruited because of their experience with 
alternative healing. In the other groups about one third of the respondents visited an 
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alternative healer. Although the exact number of their visits and their satisfaction with the 
healer's treatment are unknown, the answers on the question about personal experience 
with illness show that most respondents in the less and moderately involved group have not 
had any extensive experience with alternative healing. Most of them went to a healer only 
occasionally, to try something different. 
A significant relationship is found between reading about medicine and involvement in 
the field. Members of a union of patients are more often found in the more involved 
group. Although not significantly, more involved respondents are more interested in the 
issues asked about in the questionnaire. They also talk slightly more often about health and 
illness and watch more TV programs about these issues. 
In sum, it can be concluded that the categorization in three groups is valid. Even the less 
involved, however, are interested in the field, even though they did not have any 
experience with serious illness. Most of them read about it and watch TV-programs about 
it. A lot of them have had at least some experience with illness as their answers on the 
question about experience with illness showed. 
Competence and centrality 
It was hypothesized that respondents who are more involved in the medical field will have 
more knowledge about it. They will more often give answers on the items about medicine. 
If they give answers, they will be more reliable and constrained. Table 6.13 and 6.14 show 
the findings on these hypotheses. 
The knowledge of names of physicians and healers, and the knowledge of concepts and 
ideological statements in the medical field rise significantly with the level of involvement 
(table 6.13). It is especially the more involved who have a great deal of knowledge. 
The average number of items that respondents said they had thought much about rises 
with the level of involvement in the field of medicine. The difference in attitude 
competence thus measured is not significant. The percentage of respondents who answered 
all questions also rises slightly with involvement, but not significantly. The proportion of 
respondents answering all questions is especially high in the more involved group. An 
analysis of the individual items showed that respondents from the moderately and more 
involved groups answer the questions dealing with science and university (items 13,14 and 
16) more often, whereas only the respondents from the more involved group answer three 
alternative healing items (items 11, IS and 17) more often. The differences in competence 
are, consequently, closely connected to experience with orthodox and alternative medicine 
in each of the groups. All other findings relate to those respondents who claimed they had 
an opinion on the items. 
The average correlation between line and number scores, which is used as a measure of 
attitude crystallization, rises with involvement, while the standard deviation declines. The 
differences are not significant, but this can be explained by the fact that the groups are 
rather small. The coefficients of the more involved are rather much like those on the 
sound task (mean=.90; sd=.14). The coefficients of the less involved are rather close to 
those of the less involved on the political field (mean=.72; sd=.40). 
the assessment of attitude structures 93 
Table 6.11 Involvement in the field of medicine by social position and sex 
row% 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
52 
43 
19 
114 
lower 
20 
32 
17 
24 
social position 
middle 
53 
46 
44 
49 
higher 
27 
22 
39 
27 
male 
42 
52 
26 
43 
sex 
female 
58 
48 
74 
57 
noie: no significant differences 
Table 6.12 Interest, participation and consumption on (he field of medicine by involvement 
% yes 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
52 
43 
19 
114 
interest 
71 
81 
95 
79 
participation 
medical 
profession 
** 
0 
0 
37 
6 
serious 
illness 
** 
0 
100 
89 
61 
alLmed. 
39 
35 
63 
41 
union 
member 
»* 
2 
5 
26 
7 
talks 
69 
77 
95 
77 
consumption 
reads TV 
** 
78 53 
63 56 
100 68 
76 57 
••chi2(2d.f.)withp<.01 
Table 6.13 Knowledge of medicine by involvement 
means 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
52 
43 
19 
114 
names 
known 
** 
4.9 
5.6 
7.1 
5.5 
concepts 
known 
*+ 
4.3 
4.7 
7.0 
4.9 
Ideology 
known 
· · 
5.7 
6.2 
7.7 
6.2 
** F-ratk) in analysis of variance with fK.01 
Table 6.14 Attitude structure on the field of medicine by Involvement 
involvement 
less 
middle 
more 
total 
N 
52 
43 
19 
114 
competence 
mean 
5.7 
6.1 
6.6 
6.0 
%all 
52 
54 
68 
55 
crystallization 
mean 
.71 
.80 
.93 
.78 
sd 
.48 
.23 
.09 
.37 
constraint1 
mean 
.91 
.81 
.93 
.88 
noie: no significant differences 
1 note: analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total №63); higher values 
indicate less constraint 
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The individual standard deviation across z-scores, a measure of attitude constraint, is 
unrelated to involvement in the field for those respondents who answered all questions. 
The analysis of variance, in which attitude extremity is specified as a covariate, shows that 
the relationship between constraint and involvement is not significant. 
In sum, knowledge rises, as expected, with the involvement in the field. It can be 
concluded that attitude competence and crystallization rise with the level of involvement, 
but not significantly. No support was found for the hypothesis that the more involved 
respondents have more constrained attitudes, but the analysis of the interrelations between 
items to be reported in the next section will provide some more detailed information about 
this lack of support for the hypothesis. 
Relationships between items 
In table 6.15 the correlations between the items can be found for the less involved group 
and for the combined moderately and more involved group. Only those respondents who 
answered all seven questions on the medical field have been included in the analysis. All 
scores on 'alternative' items were recoded, so that higher scores always indicate agreement 
with orthodox medicine. The first two rows represent the standard deviation of the items. 
The first striking finding of table 6.IS is that not all correlations are positive. Negative 
correlations are found especially among the more involved. Among the more involved, 
items indicative of alternative healing (items 11, 12, 14, and 17) are found to be positively 
interrelated. Items indicative of orthodox healing (items 13, IS and 16) are also positively 
intercorrelated. However, alternative and orthodox items are associated negatively, except 
for two correlations on item 11 (gift of healing), which are almost equal to zero. Since the 
scores were recoded so that higher scores always indicate agreement with orthodox 
medicine, it follows that if the moderately and more involved agree with an 'alternative' 
item, they also agree with an 'orthodox' item. For example, the more these respondents 
agree with the 'alternative' item that states "health and illness always concern things which 
accepted science will never understand" (item 14), the more they agree with the 'orthodox' 
item "one can only learn to cure people by a thorough study at a university" (item 13). 
Hence, for this group alternative and orthodox medicine are not opposed or contradictory. 
Instead, they complement each other well. For the less involved the pattern of positive and 
negative correlations is somewhat different. Alternative items are related positively to 
alternative items, and orthodox items are related positively to orthodox items, like in the 
more involved group. However, most alternative items are also positively related to 
orthodox items. For example, if respondents in this group agree more with the 
'alternative' item 13 mentioned above, they agree less with the 'orthodox' item 14. The 
only item deviating from this pattern (item IS on the visit of alternative healers) is also the 
only item which has a practical connotation for patients: "Alternative medicine can only be 
recommended if regular medical science cannot accomplish anything." The other items 
apply more to the ideology of healing; if they have a practical connotation it applies more 
to the doctor or healer than to the patients. Thus, on an ideological level this group sees 
alternative healing and orthodox medicine as opposed to each other, whereas ideological 
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Table 6.15 Attitude constraint on the field of medicine by involvement 
standard deviation 
less involved 
middle and more 
pearsonr 
11 gift of healing 
12 message illness 
17 reincarnation 
14 science negative 
IS visit alt healer 
16 scientific proof 
13 study university 
11 
gift of 
healing 
2.0 
1.3 
-
.56** 
.38 
.09 
-.44* 
.47* 
.52** 
12 
message 
illness 
1.5 
1.3 
.26 
-
.58** 
.53·* 
-.19 
.61** 
.50** 
17 
reincar-
nation 
1.7 
1.5 
.41* 
.32 
-
.61** 
-.23 
.41* 
.47* 
14 
science 
negative 
1.3 
1.1 
.19 
.68** 
.46** 
-
-.33 
.25 
.39* 
15 
visit 
alLhealer 
1.6 
1.1 
-.11 
-.48** 
-.19 
-.61** 
-
.06 
.09 
16 
scientific 
proof 
1.6 
1.2 
.06 
-.21 
-.07 
-.38* 
.03 
-
.78** 
13 
study at 
university 
1.7 
1.5 
.01 
-.58** 
-.05 
-.55** 
.52** 
.39* 
-
noie: · pe.05; · · p<.01 
less involved respondents (N=27) below the diagonal; mean r = .32; mean absolute values r = .42 
middle and more involved (N=36) above the diagonal; mean r = .01 ; mean absolute values r = .33 
reasons do not appear to prevent people from supporting the advice to visit healers. 
So, on the practical level everybody seems to agree that visiting an alternative healer is 
related positively to alternative ideology, but it is not contradicted by the orthodox 
ideology. This finding is supported by other studies, which showed that most patients 
visited alternative healers to try something different: 'it doesn't hurt to try' (Visser, 1988). 
On the ideological level, however, respondents who have had more personal experience 
with serious illness see alternative and orthodox ideology as complementary, whereas 
respondents who are less experienced see alternative and orthodox medicine as 
contradictory. The finding that orthodox and alternative medicine are seen as 
complementary rather than as contradictory is also found in other studies on the ideology 
of alternative medicine (Berliner and Salmon, 1980; Hufford, 1988)5, and on patients of 
alternative healers (Vosmeer, 1992). Furthermore, the complementary function of 
alternative medicine is illustrated by the fact that doctors with university education also use 
alternative therapies (Chateauraynaud, 1986; Post, 1990)6, even in increasing numbers 
(Maassen van den Brink, 1986), and also by reports by political committees on alternative 
medicine (Muntendam, 1981; Gezondheidsraad, 1993). 
Personal experience with health and illness may play a major role in coming to see the 
complementary functions of different approaches to medicine. The more involved group 
may have experienced themselves that orthodox medicine, and especially a scientific 
legitimation, might be useful, but cannot cover everything that can be said about health and 
illness. The professionals on the medical field in this study, who all work as general 
practitioners or nurses, also appear to acknowledge the limits of scientific medicine. 
Personal experience with illness also appears to play a major role in becoming a doctor 
using alternative therapies (Goldstein et al., 1985, 1987), and most of the professionals 
have indeed had personal experience with serious illness. Respondents with less experience 
with illness may be more or less aware of the fact that a struggle exists between the 
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alternative and orthodox schools in medicine and may give answers according to this 
perceived ideological division. 
Furthermore, the findings may be related to the fact that the field of medicine has been 
changing rather rapidly in the last few decades. Alternative medicine is increasingly 
recognized as legitimate, despite the opposition of many scientific doctors (which is found 
more often among medical specialists than among general practitioners). In this sense the 
medical field differs from the political field, where the balance of power between 
right-wing and left-wing parties is more equal and has become firmly settled in the course 
of this century. Furthermore, the questions that were asked on the political field referred 
to issues that have given rise to profound and long-lasting rifts between left and right. The 
different structure of the medical field, which results in a more important role of personal 
experience, is seemingly related to opinions that are less well-ordered than those on the 
political field. 
As regards the height of the correlations the mean of the less involved is significantly 
higher than that of the more involved (.32 and .01, resp.). However, since the sign of the 
correlations varies more in the more involved group, the mean of the absolute values of 
the coefficients was also computed. The mean for the less involved is still somewhat higher 
(.42) than for the more involved (.33), but not significantly. Since the standard deviations 
are somewhat higher for the less involved, this might explain part of the difference. 
Furthermore, it should be realized that the differences are found between those 
respondents who answered all questions. 
In sum, the height of the intercorrelations does not differ much between the less and 
more involved, much like the individual measure of constraint. For the more involved 
alternative and orthodox ideology are complementary whereas they are contradictory for 
the less involved, except in the case of the more practically oriented item 15 (visit 
alternative healing). 
Conclusion 
To test the hypotheses that more involved respondents on both fields answer the attitude 
questions more often and that, if they give answers, their answers will represent more 
central attitudes and fewer nonattitudes, three groups with different levels of involvement 
were constructed on each field. The groups were found to differ in interest, participation 
and consumption on the field, so that the classification in levels of involvement is valid. 
On each field, more involved respondents were found to have more knowledge. On the 
political field it was also found that more involved respondents answered the questions 
more often and that their attitudes were more crystallized and constrained. On the field of 
medicine, attitude competence and crystallization also rise slightly with involvement. On 
the medical field no differences were found in constraint. However, the last finding might 
be caused by the fact that the organization of attitudes is rather different for more and less 
involved respondents: for the former alternative and orthodox medicine are 
complementary, whereas for the latter they are contradictory on the ideological level, and 
complementary on the practical level. This finding was explained by the fact that the 
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structure of the medical field is changing, so that less agreement can be expected on what 
issues go with what other issues. Furthermore, the differences were interpreted in terms of 
personal experience with alternative medicine. Personal experience seems to account well 
for the differences in ideological organization between the groups. 
Confirming the line of reasoning of chapter 4, no significant relationship existed 
between involvement in the medical field on the one hand and the social position and sex of 
respondents on the other, although the more involved were more often women. On the 
field of politics however, more involved respondents also had higher social positions and 
were more often men. Since both social position and sex were expected to be related to 
attitude competence and centrality on the political field, the differences might be attributed 
to differences in social position and sex. After the presentation of the findings relating to 
social position and sex in the next two sections this will be discussed in detail in section 6.7. 
6.5 Attitude structures and social position 
In chapter 4 it was hypothesized that differences in attitude structure are related to the 
positions of the respondents in the social space of class positions. The educational and 
occupational level of respondents will be used to specify their social position. Respondents 
with lower social positions will less often have attitudes about politics. They will 
consequently answer not to have thought about the questions on politics more often. If they 
do give answers, they will be more like nonattitudes, i.e. they will be less crystallized and 
constrained. On the field of medicine, however, it was hypothesized that the differences in 
attitude structure will not be related to the social position of the respondents, because 
interest in the field is assumed to be less tied to the educational and occupational level. In 
this section, the results applying to these hypotheses will be described. In order to more 
fully understand the differences in attitude structures, the differences in interest, 
participation and consumption on each field will also be discussed. 
The construction of groups 
To test these hypotheses, three groups were constructed according to their educational and 
occupational level. Since the two are of course highly associated, they were combined to 
construct groups (see table 5.2 for a description of the educational and occupational 
classifications). Respondents who have had primary, lower secondary or lower vocational 
education are classified as having a 'lower'1 social position (N=23) if they carry out, or 
have carried out unskilled or skilled labour. Respondents who have had higher vocational 
or university education were classified as having a 'higher' social position (N=27) if they 
work or have worked as middle-level employees or in higher occupations. All others were 
classified as occupying a 'middle' social position (N=47). In the following analyses only 
respondents from the city sample were included. The sophisticated samples were recruited 
only to provide a sufficient number of more involved respondents to carry out the analyses 
reported in section 6.4. These 'elite' samples are not included here. 
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The field of politics 
Interest, participation and consumption 
To more fully grasp the differences in attitude structure, we will describe the relationship 
to the political field of respondents from different social positions. As has often been 
shown before (see chapter 3), respondents from different positions differ in interest, 
participation and consumption. Table 6.16 shows that interest, voting and talking about 
politics rise significantly with social position. Non-significant relationships are found on 
party affiliation, party membership and on reading about politics in the papers. Of course, 
the lower groups are not totally uninterested: little over half the respondents in the lower 
groups claim to be interested, have a specific party affiliation, vote, talk and read papers. 
Union membership is evenly spread across the groups. Participation in political actions 
is less frequent in the middle group in comparison with the lower and higher groups. The 
higher group watches TV less often than the other groups. 
In sum, it can be concluded that respondents with higher social positions are generally 
more interested in the field, especially when it comes to participation through political 
parties. They are also more talkative and read about politics more often. This is not to say 
that the other groups are uninterested. The lower groups have their own means of 
participation and consumption: through unions, actions and TV. 
Competence and centrality 
The findings relating to attitude competence and centrality can be found in tables 6.17 and 
6.18. Table 6.17 shows that respondents with lower positions have less knowledge about 
politics. The differences are greater when respondents are asked for more specific 
information about the politicians: party and function. The differences are greatest on the 
ideology test. Here, the lowest group is just above chance level. 
There are no significant differences as to attitude competence, neither in the average 
number of items that respondents said they had thought about, nor in the percentage of 
respondents who claimed they had opinions on all items. This finding might be attributed 
to the fact that the questions referred to long-lasting ideological divisions, of which most 
respondents will have been at least dimly aware. Furthermore, the inherent pressure to 
answer survey questions (see also section 2.2) may be especially strong for this kind of 
questions. An analysis of the individual items showed that there are differences only for 
item 10 (multi-nationals): the respondents from lower positions answered that they had not 
thought about this item more often. 
The average correlation coefficient between line and number scores, which is used as a 
measure of attitude crystallization, is significantly lower for respondents with lower social 
positions, while the standard deviation declines. The higher group is close to the value on 
the sound task (mean=.90; sd=.14). 
The individual standard deviation around the z-scores declines significantly with social 
position, even for those more competent respondents who answered all questions about 
politics. Since the extremity of the answers attenuates the constraint measure, the analysis 
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Table 6.16 Political interest, participation and consumption by social position 
%yes N 
social position 
lower 23 
middle 47 
higher 27 
total 97 
interest 
• 
52 
81 
85 
75 
participation 
party 
affiliation 
61 
72 
89 
74 
party 
voting 
* 
65 
83 
96 
82 
party union 
member member 
0 
4 
12 
5 
26 
28 
23 
26 
action 
* 
26 
11 
35 
21 
talks 
·* 
61 
78 
96 
79 
consumption 
paper TV 
57 83 
68 85 
85 62 
70 78 
• chi2 (2 d.f.) with jx.05; ** ch!2 (2 d.f.) with p<.01 
Table 6.17 Political knowledge by social position 
means 
social position 
lower 
middle 
higher 
total 
N 
23 
47 
27 
97 
parties 
known 
** 
4.0 
5.0 
5.9 
5.0 
politicians 
name 
** 
2.7 
3.2 
4.1 
3.3 
party 
** 
1.9 
2.4 
3.4 
2.6 
function 
· · 
1.3 
2.0 
3.4 
2.2 
ideology 
right 
*· 
3.9 
5.8 
8.1 
6.0 
** F-ratio in analysis of variance with p<.01 
Table 6.18 Attitude structure on the field of politics by social position 
social position 
lower 
middle 
higher 
total 
N 
23 
47 
27 
97 
competence 
mean 
6.2 
6.1 
6.3 
6.2 
%all 
56 
47 
67 
55 
crystallization 
mean sd 
* 
.63 .43 
.77 .35 
.88 .11 
.77 .34 
constraint1 
mean 
* Φ 
0.90 
0.80 
0.68 
0.78 
» F-ratio with [X.05; ** F-ratkt with jK.01 
1 note: analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total N=50); higher values 
Indicate less constraint 
Table 6.19 Attitude constraint on the field of politics by social position 
standard deviation 
less and middle 
more Involved 
pearsonr 
1 unemployment 
2 social security 
3 privatization 
4 development aid 
5 apartheid 
6 Income differences 
7 multi-nationals 
1 
unem­
ployment 
1.2 
0.9 
-
.20 
.27 
.37* 
.35* 
.40* 
.06 
2 
social 
security 
1.0 
1.2 
.78** 
-
.13 
.02 
.21 
.17 
.47** 
3 
privati­
zation 
1.1 
1.3 
.81** 
.66** 
-
-.10 
.28 
.33 
-.23 
4 
develop­
ment aid 
1.2 
0.8 
-.24 
-.32 
-.40 
-
.43* 
.24 
.05 
5 
apartheid 
1.1 
1.3 
.57* 
.21 
.46 
-.01 
-
.47** 
.13 
6 
income 
differences 
1.2 
1.2 
.80** 
.62** 
.84** 
-.30 
.49* 
. 
.29 
10 
multi­
nationals 
1.3 
1.4 
.47 
.32 
.64* 
-.13 
.38 
.71** 
-
note: * гк.05; »*p<.01 
respondents with lower and middle social position (N=32) below the diagonal; mean г = .22; mean absolute values r = .26 
respondents with higher social posilion (N=18) above the diagonal; mean r = .42; mean absolute values r = S3 
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of variance is carried out with attitude extremity as a covariate. This finding indicates that 
constraint among attitudes is lower for respondents with lower social positions. 
In sum, respondents with lower social positions have less knowledge about politics. 
Knowledge of the political field rises with social position. The answers of respondents with 
lower social positions are less reliable and constrained, as was expected. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, there is no relationship between attitude competence and social position. These 
findings support the idea that there is a great deal of pressure to answer the questions, even 
if respondents do not have a clear opinion about them. 
Relationships between items 
Table 6.19 shows the correlations between the items for those respondents who answered 
all seven items. The lower and middle group are combined (N=32) and compared with the 
higher group (N=18). Most correlations between the items are stronger for the higher 
group. The mean of the coefficients is higher for the respondents with more education and 
higher occupational levels (.42) than for the other respondents (.22), although not 
significantly. The means of the absolute values of the coefficients differ significantly 
between the higher and the lower group (resp. .53 and .26; t=3.92; p<.05). 
An unexpected finding is the fact that item 4 (development aid) is negatively associated 
with the other items in the higher group. Since all items were recoded so that a high score 
means a preference for right-wing politics, this finding indicates that item 4 is not seen by 
this group as following the left-right distinction. However, these negative correlations are 
largely determined by two respondents who gave rather extreme negative item scores to all 
items except item 4. If these two respondents are left out, the correlations with item 14 are 
all positive (between .28 and .56). 
Since the standard deviations are not systematically higher in the group with higher 
social positions, it can be assumed that the differences that were found are not caused by 
differences in variance. This is also the case with the individual measure for attitude 
constraint, which is independent of variance. 
In sum, constraint between answers is found to be higher for the group with higher 
positions, even if only respondents are taken into account who answered all items. 
The field of medicine 
Interest, participation and consumption 
It was hypothesized that there is no relationship between attitude competence and centrality 
on the one hand and social position on the other. This hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that, unlike on the field of politics, people's interest in the field of medicine is 
not related to their social position. To verify this assumption, respondents were asked 
about their involvement in the field (see table 6.20). 
Unlike on the field of politics, a significant relationship is only found for watching TV 
programs about health and illness. Respondents with lower positions are more engaged in 
this activity. Respondents from lower positions are slightly more interested in the field and 
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have more personal experience with serious illness. Having a medical profession (nurse, 
doctor, dentist), of course, rises with educational level and thus with social position. 
Talking and reading about medical problems is found slightly more often among the 
higher groups. 
In sum, it can be concluded that interest, participation and consumption are not so 
strongly related to social position on the medical field as they are on the political field. Not 
unlike the political field, respondents with higher positions talk and read some more, while 
the respondents with lower positions watch TV more often. 
Competence and centrality 
Although the social position of the respondents does not seem to be strongly related to the 
involvement in the field, respondents with lower social positions have significantly less 
knowledge about medicine (table 6.21). Those with lower positions have especially little 
knowledge about concepts used in the field: they are even below chance level here. Their 
knowledge of ideological viewpoints in the field is a little better. Those with a higher 
position give correct answers to about two-thirds of all questions on all tests. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, there also appears to be a significant relationship between 
attitude competence and social position: the lower one's position, the less competent one 
feels. This is true for both the mean number of items people have thought about and the 
percentage of respondents who claimed to have thought about all items. An analysis 
showed that this relationship between competence and position exists on all items, except 
14 (study at university), which was answered by almost all respondents. The differences 
are somewhat greater for the items indicative of the ideology of alternative medicine 
(items 12, 13, 15 and 20). 
There is no significant difference in attitude crystallization as measured by the mean 
individual correlation between line and number responses. The higher group has a slightly 
higher mean, which is closer to the mean on the sound task (mean r was .90). Attitude 
constraint is not related significantly to social position either if attitude extremity is 
specified as a covariate in the analysis of variance. 
This pattern of attitude competence and centrality is more or less the reverse of the 
pattern on the political field. On the political field there were no differences in 
competence, but marked differences in crystallization and constraint. This finding was 
interpreted as resulting from the high pressure to give answers, even if people have no 
opinion about the questions. Competence on the medical field rises with social position, but 
no differences are found in crystallization and constraint. This finding might indicate that 
respondents answered questions only if they had rather clear opinions about them. The 
pressure to give answers is possibly less great than on the political field, which might 
reflect the differences in attributed social competence on the two fields. 
In sum, it can be concluded that knowledge and attitude competence rise with social 
position, contrary to the hypothesis. However, for those respondents who answered the 
questions, the reliability and constraint of these answers are not related to social position, 
confirming the hypothesis. 
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Table 6.20 Interest, participation and consumption on the field of medicine by social position 
%yes 
social position 
lower 
middle 
higher 
total 
N 
23 
47 
27 
97 
Interest 
83 
77 
77 
78 
participation 
medical serious 
profession illness 
0 78 
15 64 
22 57 
14 65 
alLmed. 
22 
40 
30 
33 
union 
member 
9 
0 
8 
4 
talks 
65 
75 
81 
74 
consumption 
reads TV 
* 
61 70 
77 55 
73 35 
72 53 
* chi2 (2 d.f.) with fK.05 
Table 6.21 Knowledge of medicine by social position 
means 
social position 
lower 
middle 
higher 
total 
N 
23 
47 
27 
97 
names 
known 
** 
4.0 
5.6 
6.9 
5.6 
concepts 
known 
** 
2.8 
4.8 
6.7 
4.9 
ideology 
known 
** 
5.2 
6.3 
6.9 
6.2 
** F-ratio in analysis of variance with pcOl 
Table 6.22 Attitude structure on the field of medicine by social position 
social position 
lower 
middle 
higher 
total 
N 
23 
47 
27 
97 
competence 
mean % all 
* ** 
5.5 35 
6.2 57 
6.5 78 
6.1 58 
crystallization 
mean 
.76 
.74 
.86 
.78 
sd 
.31 
.42 
.19 
.34 
constraint 1 
mean 
0.69 
0.91 
0.94 
0.89 
* F-ratio with [K.05; ·• chi2 (2 d.f.) with [X.01 
1 note: analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total N=56); higher values 
indicate less constraint 
Table 6.23 Attitude constraint on the field of medicine by social position 
standard deviation 
lower and middle 
higher position 
pearson r 
11 gift of healing 
12 message illness 
17 reincarnation 
14 science negative 
15 visit alt healer 
16 scientific proof 
13 study university 
11 
gift of 
healing 
1.7 
1.7 
-
.44** 
.35* 
.15 
-.58** 
.36* 
.35* 
12 
message 
Illness 
1.4 
1.6 
.52* 
• 
.46** 
.77** 
-.51** 
.23 
.08 
17 
reincar­
nation 
1.5 
1.6 
.39 
.58** 
-
.48** 
-.10 
.41 
.53** 
14 
science 
negative 
1.2 
1.3 
.12 
.44* 
.59** 
. 
-.36* 
.27 
.23 
15 
visit 
alLhealer 
1.4 
1.2 
.23 
-.25 
-.28 
-.54* 
. 
-.07 
.09 
16 
scientific 
proof 
1.4 
1.2 
.19 
.29 
-.01 
-.26 
.26 
-
.69** 
13 
study at 
university 
1.5 
1.3 
.21 
-.27 
-.16 
-.21 
.77** 
.38 
-
note: · p<.05; · · rx.01 
respondents with lower and middle social position (N=33) below the diagonal; mean г = .23; mean absolute values r • 
respondents with higher social position (N=21) above the diagonal; mean r = .17; mean absolute values r = 36 
.40 
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Relationships between items 
Table 6.23 presents the correlations between the items for the combined groups with lower 
and middle positions (N=35) and for the group with higher positions (N=21), but only for 
those respondents who answered all questions. All 'alternative' items were recoded so that 
higher scores always indicate more agreement with orthodox medicine. 
The pattern of positive and negative correlations is somewhat different for the two 
groups. For the respondents with lower positions, only item 15 (visits to an alternative 
healer) is negatively associated with other items. Besides, if respondents agree with an item 
on alternative medicine, they disagree with items on orthodox medicine. For those with 
higher positions, alternative and orthodox medicine are more or less complementary. Only 
item 12 (gift of healing) is associated positively with all other items, indicating that it is 
seen as a concomitant of alternative and a negative attribute of orthodox medicine. These 
different patterns are caused, however, by the fact that some respondents in the more 
involved group have medical occupations. If they are left out of account, only the 
correlations of item 15 (visit healer) are negative (except for one small coefficient of -.07 
between items 23 and 27), as in the case of the respondents with lower positions. 
As regards the size of the coefficients, they are sometimes higher for the lower group, 
sometimes for the higher group. The mean correlation coefficients do not differ much 
(lower group .23, higher group .17), even if the mean is calculated for the absolute values 
of the coefficients (lower .40; higher .36). Since differences in standard deviations do not 
follow the pattern of higher and lower coefficients, the differences in correlational 
coefficients cannot be attributed easily to differences in variance. 
In sum, constraint is about equal for respondents in different social positions, as was 
expected. 
Conclusion 
In this section, the hypotheses were tested that respondents with lower social positions are 
less competent to answer items on politics, and that their attitudes on politics are less 
central. Furthermore, the hypothesis was tested that on the field of medicine no differences 
in attitude competence and centrality exist for respondents with different social positions. 
In support of the assumptions, interest, participation and consumption on the political 
field rise with social position, although the lower groups have their own means of 
consuming and participating (TV, unions, actions). On the medical field, there are no clear 
differences in involvement. 
No differences in competence were found on the political field, contrary to the 
hypothesis. Differences in the expected direction do exist with regard to knowledge, 
crystallization and constraint. On the medical field knowledge and attitude competence rise 
with social position. Crystallization and constraint on the medical field were not related to 
the social position, as was expected. It was hypothesized that on the political field the 
pressure to give answers, even if one does not have a central attitude about the question, 
was rather high, whereas on the medical field it was lower. This finding supports the line 
of reasoning developed in chapter 4, that the competence to judge political issues is 
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attributed to all citizens on the political field, so that they all feel obliged to answer 
questions, whereas on the medical field patients are not attributed the competence to judge 
medical practices and feel free to leave items unanswered if they do not have an opinion 
about them. 
6.6 Attitude structures and sex 
On the political field men were expected to be more competent and to have more central 
attitudes than women, since they are assumed to be more interested and involved in the 
field. On the field of medicine however, it was asserted that interest and involvement in the 
field will not show such contrast according to sex. Therefore, men and women are not 
expected to differ in the characteristics of their attitude structures with regard to medicine. 
The field of politics 
Interest, participation and consumption 
To assess whether the assumption is correct that men are more involved in politics, the 
answers on the questions about interest, participation and consumption are reported in 
table 6.24. Men say they are interested in the political issues they were asked about more 
often than women. Furthermore, they are more often members of a union and they 
participate more often in political actions. They also read about politics in the papers more 
often. All these differences are significant. Furthermore, there are some non-significant 
differences on the items about political parties: men have a specific preference for a 
political party slightly more often and they vote slightly more often. They also talk about 
politics somewhat more often than women. Women only score a little higher on 
TV-watching. 
In sum, the assumption that men take a greater interest in politics is justified. 
Competence and centrality 
Men have significantly more knowledge about parties, politicians and ideologies than 
women (table 6.25). As regards attitude competence, it can be seen that men said they had 
not thought much about the items less often than women. An analysis showed that this is 
true for all items. About two-thirds of the men answered all questions and less than one 
half of the women did. 
There is a difference of 0.10 in the average correlation coefficient between line and 
number scores. Although not significant, the difference indicates that the attitudes of men 
are slightly more crystallized. Men are closer to the mean and standard deviation on the 
sound task (mean=.90; sd=.14) than women. 
The standard deviation across z-scores is equally high for men and women, indicating 
that they do not differ in attitude constraint, although the extremity of the answers, which 
was found to attenuate the constraint measure, is specified as a covariate in the analysis of 
variance. 
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Table 6.24 Political interest, participation and consumption by sex 
%yes 
sex 
male 
female 
total 
N 
48 
53 
101 
interest 
* 
83 
63 
72 
participation 
party party party union 
affiliation voting member member 
** 
77 85 6 40 
69 78 4 12 
72 82 5 26 
action 
* 
30 
10 
19 
talks 
81 
75 
78 
consumption 
paper TV 
* 
79 75 
61 80 
69 77 
* chi2 (1 d.f.) with [X.05; ** chi2 (1 d.f.) with jx.01 
Table 6.25 Political knowledge by sex 
means 
sex 
male 
female 
total 
N 
48 
53 
101 
parties 
known 
** 
5.6 
4.1 
4.8 
politicians 
name 
·* 
3.7 
2.8 
3.2 
party 
** 
3.0 
1.9 
2.4 
function 
** 
2.7 
1.6 
2.1 
ideology 
right 
* 
6.5 
5.1 
5.8 
• F-ratio with p<.05; ** F-ratio with fK.ul 
Table 6.26 Attitude structure on the field of politics by sex 
sex 
male 
female 
total 
N 
48 
53 
101 
competence 
mean 
* 
6.4 
5.7 
6.0 
%all 
*» 
67 
42 
53 
crystallization 
mean 
.82 
.72 
.77 
sd 
.26 
.39 
.34 
constraint l 
mean 
0.77 
0.79 
0.78 
• F-ratio with гк.05; · · chi2 (1 d.f.) with p<.01 
1 note: analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total N=51); higher values 
indicate less constraint 
Table 6.27 Attitude constraint on the field of politics by sex 
standard deviation 
men 
women 
pearsonr 
1 unemployment 
2 social security 
3 privatization 
4 development aid 
5 apartheid 
6 income differences 
7 multi-nationals 
1 
unem­
ployment 
1.1 
1.0 
-
.22 
.55·* 
.52* 
.35 
.33 
-.40 
2 
social 
security 
1.0 
1.1 
.46* 
-
.04 
.15 
-.17 
.11 
.39 
3 
privati­
zation 
1.3 
1.1 
.43* 
.62*· 
-
.24 
.29 
.73** 
-.23 
4 
develop­
ment aid 
1.1 
1.2 
.10 
-.19 
-.31 
-
.40 
.15 
-.20 
5 
apartheid 
1.3 
1.1 
.49** 
.47** 
.46* 
.30 
-
.21 
-.38 
6 
income 
differences 
1.2 
1.1 
.63* 
.52** 
.45* 
.12 
.62** 
-
-.14 
10 
multi­
nationals 
1.3 
1.4 
.48** 
.29 
.28 
.11 
.56** 
.78** 
-
note: * p<.05; **p<.01 
women (N=22) below toe diagonal; mean r = .17; mean absolute values r = 31 
men (N=29) above the diagonal; mean r » 39; mean absolute values r = .43 
106 Statements and stories 
In sum, the hypotheses were supported that men have more knowledge, are more 
competent, and have more crystallized attitudes. There were no differences between men 
and women on attitude constraint. 
Relationships between items 
Constraint between items is reported in table 6.27 for those men and women who answered 
all items. A larger proportion of women than men have been excluded from this analysis. 
The correlations are higher for men than for women. The mean correlation for men is 
significantly higher than for women (.39 and .17, resp.; t=2.38; p<.05), and this is also the 
case if the absolute values are taken into account (mean is .43 for men, and .31 for women; 
t=2.09; rx.05). Since the variances are more or less equal for the men and women who 
claimed to have an opinion on all items, the differences are not explained by differences in 
variance. 
In sum, it is found that men gave more constrained answers than women. 
The field of medicine 
Interest, participation and consumption 
In the domain of health and illness, men were assumed not to be more interested and 
involved in the field of medicine than women. Table 6.28 presents the findings, on the 
basis of which we can check whether this assumption is right. There is only one significant 
difference: women read about medical problems more often than men. Women also more 
often say they are interested in the field, talk about it and watch TV programs about it. 
They visited an alternative healer slightly more often and occupy a medical profession 
slightly more often, although the men are physicians and dentists, and women nurses. Men 
have had experience with serious illness in the near family slightly more often. 
In sum, the assumption is supported that there are no differences according to sex in 
interest, participation and consumption in the field of medicine as measured in this study. 
If there are differences, women are slightly more involved than men. 
Competence and centrality 
Since involvement in the field does not differ much, it can be expected that knowledge 
about the field does not differ much, either. Indeed, there are only very slight, 
insignificant differences between men and women (table 6.29). Men and women also 
appear not to differ in attitude competence, crystallization, and constraint. 
In sum, it can be concluded that the hypothesis that there are no differences in attitude 
structure according to sex is supported: there are no differences in knowledge, 
competence, crystallization or constraint between men and women. 
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Table 6.28 Interest, participation and consumption on the field of medicine by sex 
%yes 
sex 
male 
female 
total 
N 
48 
53 
101 
interest 
72 
82 
78 
participation 
medical serious 
profession illness 
11 69 
16 63 
13 66 
alLmed. 
33 
36 
34 
union 
member 
4 
4 
4 
talks 
68 
78 
74 
consumption 
reads TV 
** 
60 53 
84 57 
72 55 
** chi2 (1 dX) with rx.01 
Table 6.29 Knowledge of medicine by sex 
means 
sex 
male 
female 
total 
N 
48 
53 
101 
names 
known 
5.3 
5.5 
5.4 
concepts 
known 
4.5 
4.8 
4.7 
Ideology 
known 
6.0 
5.9 
6.0 
note, no significant differences 
Table 6.30 Attitude structure on the field of medicine by sex 
sex 
mate 
female 
total 
N 
48 
53 
101 
competence 
mean 
6.0 
5.9 
6.0 
%aU 
54 
57 
55 
crystallization 
mean 
.77 
.76 
.76 
sd 
.37 
.40 
.38 
constraint l 
mean 
0.92 
0.86 
0.89 
note: no significant differences 
1 note, analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total N=56); higher values 
indicate less constraint 
Table 6.31 Attitude constraint on (he field of medicine by sex 
standard deviation 
men 
women 
pearsonr 
11 gin of healing 
12 message Illness 
17 reincarnation 
14 science negative 
15 visitait healer 
16 scientific proof 
13 study university 
11 
gift of 
healing 
1.9 
1.5 
-
.10 
.08 
-.52** 
-.28 
.17 
.07 
12 
message 
Illness 
1.7 
1.2 
.70** 
-
.26 
.22 
-.13 
.17 
-.37* 
17 
reincar­
nation 
1.6 
1.3 
.57** 
.64** 
• 
.32 
.17 
.09 
.32 
14 
science 
negative 
1.4 
1.0 
.52** 
.80** 
.64** 
• 
-.08 
-.27 
-.17 
15 
visit 
althealer 
1.5 
1.3 
-.31 
-.56** 
-.42** 
-.67** 
. 
.23 
.60** 
16 
scientific 
proof 
1.5 
1.4 
.41* 
.33 
.30 
.19 
-.06 
-
.38* 
13 
study at 
university 
1.7 
1.4 
.48* 
.21 
.17 
.11 
.10 
.87** 
-
note: * ΓΚ.05; * · JK.01 
women (N=30) below the diagonal; mean r = .07; mean absolute values r = .25 
men (N=26) above the diagonal; mean r - .29; mean absolute values r = .47 
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Relationships between items 
Nearly all of the correlations between the items for the respondents who answered all 
items are larger for men than for women. If the mean of the absolute values is compared 
the correlations for men are significantly higher than for women (.47 and .25, resp.; 
t=3.14; p<.05), otherwise the difference is not significant. Since the variance is higher for 
men on all items, this finding might be explained by differences in variance. This 
interpretation is supported by the finding that the individual measure of constraint, which 
is not dependent on variance, does not differ between men and women. 
In sum, the finding that the inter-item correlations are higher for men can probably be 
explained by differences in variance. 
Conclusion 
It was hypothesized that men are more competent to express attitudes on politics, and that 
they have more central attitudes than women. On the field of medicine, it was assumed that 
men and women do not differ much in their involvement in the field and will therefore be 
equally competent and will have equally central attitudes. 
On the field of politics, it is found that men are more interested in the field, participate 
more and consume more than women. They also know more about it. Men were found to 
be more competent and to have slightly more crystallized attitudes than women. 
Furthermore, although there were no differences on the overall measure of attitude 
constraint, men appeared to be more coherent in their answers on the political questions. 
The hypotheses are thus supported on the political field. 
On the field of medicine, there are no differences in interest, participation and 
consumption according to sex, as assumed. Some minor differences indicated that women 
are slightly more involved than men. Men and women do not differ in their knowledge 
about the medical field. No differences were found on competence, crystallization and 
constraint. The inter-item correlations are slightly higher for men than for women, but 
these differences might be attributed to differences in variances. The hypotheses on the 
medical field are thus supported as well. 
6.7 Interrelationships between involvement, social position and sex 
The field of politics 
On the political field it was found that more involved respondents are more competent and 
have more central attitudes. Respondents with higher social positions and also men are 
more competent and have more central attitudes. Since on the political field involvement 
appeared to be related significantly to social position and sex, the differences in 
involvement might be ascribed to social position and sex. 
To assess the interrelationships between involvement, social position and sex an analysis 
of variance was carried out, in which these were specified as three independent variables*. 
The scores on the five knowledge tests, as well as the measures of competence. 
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Table 6.32 Three-way analyses of variance on the politica] field 
p-values 
social position 
sex 
Involvement 
social position, sex 
soc. position, Involvement 
sex, involvement 
parties 
known 
.00· 
.00* 
.00* 
.71 
.41 
.66 
politicians 
name party 
.00* .00* 
.00* .00* 
.00* .00* 
.05 .42 
.22 .06 
.96 .81 
function 
.00* 
.00* 
.00* 
.58 
.06 
.98 
ideology 
right 
.00* 
.02* 
.24* 
.98 
.39 
.97 
com-
petence 
.10 
.02* 
.13 
.71 
.00 
.02 
crystal-
lization 
.02* 
.03 
.22 
.52 
.52 
.25 
constraint! 
.04* 
.51 
.02* 
.57 
.29 
.57 
note: * also significant in one-way analysis (JK.05) 
1 note: analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total N=77) 
crystallization and constraint were specified as dependent variables in 8 separate three-way 
analyses (see table 6.32 for the results). It was found that 18 out of the 19 differences 
which were significant in the three one-factor designs are also significant in this 
three-factor design. The significant relationship between involvement and the knowledge 
of ideological statements found in the one-way analysis is not significant in the three-way 
analysis. Out of the remaining 5 differences which were not significant in the one-factor 
designs, 4 differences are not significant in the three-factor design, either. The relationship 
between sex and crystallization, which was not significant in the one-way analysis, is 
significant in the three-way analysis. 
Furthermore, except for the measure of competence no interaction effects occurred in 
the three-factor design. On the measure of competence, significant interactions occurred 
between involvement on the one hand and sex and social position on the other. This finding 
is caused by a low mean number of questions answered in the female group with middle 
involvement and middle social position. It is not clear why this group in particular often 
said they had not thought about the items. It can be concluded that, in general, the 
differences described in the previous sections are related independently to involvement, 
social position and sex. 
The interrelations between involvement, social position and sex were further assessed by 
analyzing the differences according to social position and sex in the politically sophisticated 
sample. The findings should be taken with some caution, because the groups constructed in 
this sample of 33 respondents are very small. The means of the centrality measures 
indicate that, on all indicators of attitude structures except for the ideology test, women 
and respondents with lower positions in this elite sample are always at least as high on the 
measures of attitude structure as the men and the respondents with higher positions in the 
city sample. Within the sophisticated sample, the differences according to social position 
and sex are rather slight, again with the exception of the ideology test. 
These findings indicate that the differences in attitude structures that were found are not 
caused by any limitations inherent in the cognitive apparatus of the lower-educated. 
Rather, the formation of central attitudes depends on the social processes related to the 
involvement and interest taken in the political field. 
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Table 6.33 Three-way analyses of variance on the field of medicine 
p-values 
social position 
sex 
Involvement 
social position, sex 
soc. position, involvement 
sex, involvement 
names 
.00* 
.48 
.14* 
.67 
.60 
.03 
concepts 
.00* 
.19 
.01* 
.19 
.78 
.47 
ideology 
.00* 
.17 
.04* 
.35 
.25 
.77 
com­
petence 
.00* 
.32 
.30 
.12 
.60 
.44 
crystal­
lization 
.72 
76 
.32 
.50 
.07 
.53 
constraint' 
.48 
.73 
.66 
.83 
.68 
.16 
note: * also significant in one-way analysis (jx.05) 
1 note: analysis of variance with extremity as covariate for respondents who answered all questions (total №63) 
In sum, except in the ideology test, involvement, social position, and sex all contribute to 
attitude competence and centrality on the political field. If people are more interested in 
the field, the differences according to social position and sex tend to wane. 
The field of medicine 
Although involvement, social position and sex were not related significantly on the medical 
field, a three-way analysis of variance was also carried out for each of the indicators of 
attitude centrality on this field9. As can be seen in table 6.33, the pattern of significant 
differences found in these analyses is about the same as that of the significant differences 
found in the one-way analyses. The relation with involvement disappears only on the 
knowledge of names of physicians and healers. 
An interaction effect between sex and involvement is found for knowledge of names of 
physicians and healers. This is caused especially by the much higher score of the more 
involved men in comparison to the score of the more involved women. However, most of 
these men are professionally involved in the medical field, whereas most of these women 
are patients of alternative healers. No further interaction effects are found. 
In sum, it can be concluded that in general involvement and social position are 
independently related to attitude competence and centrality, and especially to knowledge 
and competence. As was also found in the one-way analyses, there are no sex differences. 
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Using the conceptual tools presented in the chapters 1 to 3, research hypotheses were 
developed in chapter 4. It was argued that the opinion survey is logocentric, i.e. it is based 
on a specific way of producing opinions, called logos. In the modality of the logos a person 
has personal opinions that are easily activated. These opinions are consistent with 
yardsticks which are reflexively accessible and adjusted to a cultural field. It was argued 
that not everyone is competent, socially or technically, to produce this kind of opinions. 
Two basic postulates of the survey might, then, be false: firstly, the postulate that everyone 
has an opinion on the questions asked; secondly, that all answers are given in the same way. 
These postulates were subjected to an empirical study. With regard to the first postulate 
it was hypothesized that some respondents will answer they do not have an attitude. As for 
the second postulate it was hypothesized that other respondents will give agree/disagree 
answers in opinion surveys, but these answers will be given either at random (nonattitudes) 
or they will stem from structurally different attitudes (ranging from almost nonattitudes to 
highly central attitudes). Knowledge, accessibility, crystallization and constraint are the 
attributes of the cognitive centrality of attitudes, which were assessed in the present study. 
They were assumed to be independent of evaluative extremity, i.e. the degree in which 
people agree or disagree with an item. The second hypothesis stated that these different 
attributes of attitude structures will be interrelated. According to the third hypothesis 
differences in attitude structure were related to people's involvement in the field, and 
according to the fourth they were related to the social position and sex of the respondents. 
On the political field, having more central attitudes and feeling competent to express them 
were expected to be related to involvement, social position and sex, whereas on the medical 
field differences in this respect were only expected to be related to people's involvement in 
the field, but not to their social position or sex. 
7.1 The empirical assessment of attitude structures 
The questionnaire 
A questionnaire was constructed to test these hypotheses (see chapter 5). The questions 
asked in the questionnaire dealt with issues that are important in either of the fields. In 
accordance with the dominant survey practice described in chapter 1, the items were 
formulated in an easy and neutral way. In other words: the issues are formulated in a 
specific language, neither the technical language of the field nor everyday language, but a 
specific 'survey dialect'. In a pilot study the selected items on each field were found to 
constitute a reliable and valid, rather homogeneous, scale. 
As Bourdieu (1973b) asserted, the ability to give agree or disagree answers to closed 
questions is only minimal proof of the competence to produce legitimate opinions on a 
field. A person need not be able to recognize the specifically political relevance of an item 
to give an answer. If respondents were asked to formulate more elaborate responses, the 
differences in competence would become more apparent. Furthermore, people need not 
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have a reflexive grasp of the yardsticks they use before they can give constrained answers. 
As Converse (1964) explained, respondents may well give constrained answers because 
they know that issues belong together without having any contextual knowledge why this is 
so. 
This certainly applies to the present questionnaire, since the formulation of the questions 
makes them rather easy to understand. Had the questions been asked in the technical 
language of a field, greater differences in competence would have become apparent. 
Furthermore, since only those items were selected which proved to constitute a rather 
homogeneous scale in a pilot study, it is to be expected that constraint among the answers 
will be rather high. Had a more arbitrary set of issues been chosen, it would have been 
more difficult for respondents to give constrained answers. 
In sum, the questionnaire, which was designed in accordance with the paradigm of 
survey research, will minimize the chances of coming across respondents who feel they are 
not competent to express opinions from the logos about the questions asked them. 
Consequently, the findings will apply a fortiori to the more routinely constructed opinion 
polls. 
Computerized magnitude scaling 
The specific measurement procedure of magnitude scaling was used for two reasons. In the 
first place, the procedure incorporated two instruction tasks, the metric task and the sound 
task. These tasks were used to assess whether respondents were capable of using the 
instrument in a proper way. All respondents were indeed found to have this capacity, 
although some doubts arose as to whether respondents actually gave the ratio responses 
they were expected to give (appendix 4). The results of the instruction tasks closely 
followed the power function, which is known from magnitude scaling research. The 
regression bias for the line drawing modality and the variance in the regression 
coefficients of the power function on the individual level found in this study are not 
uncommon in magnitude scaling (Lodge, 1981a). Since other individual differences in the 
use of the instrument were very slight (appendix 4), the differences that were found in the 
measures of attitude structure cannot be attributed to differences in the competence to give 
magnitude judgments. 
A second advantage of the magnitude scaling procedure is that two responses are 
obtained in slightly different ways, one by drawing lines and the other by estimating 
numbers. The correlation between the two answers, a measure of parallel-test reliability, 
can be used to measure attitude crystallization. Some interpretational difficulties connected 
with the assessment of crystallization on the basis of the test-retest reliabilities of answers 
given at different points in time, like true attitude change, are avoided. 
The measurement procedure was computerized on the assumption that this facilitates 
measurement of attitude accessibility. Although the measure of attitude accessibility used in 
this study proved invalid, computerization had two more advantages. Firstly, respondents 
who did not carry out the instruction tasks correctly in an initial trial could repeat this 
task, so that every respondent was well practiced to give the magnitude responses they 
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were expected to give. Secondly, it was argued that computerization will enhance the 
quality of the data. A pilot study demonstrated that computerization of the magnitude 
scaling procedure had no negative consequences for the use of the instrument in 
comparison with a paper-and-pencil version. 
In sum, all respondents proved to be capable of using the measurement instrument 
appropriately. Differences in the measures of attitude structures can, therefore, not be 
attributed to differences in the capacity to give magnitude judgements. 
The empirical indicators 
Different attributes of attitude structures were assessed: knowledge, competence, 
accessibility, crystallization and constraint. All measures were computed across the items 
on a field and are therefore generalized measures of competence and centrality. As 
assumed, these attributes of attitude structure were independent of evaluative extremity, 
although it should be noted that the measure of extremity that was used might indicate a 
response set to give extreme answers rather than the extremity of the attitude itself. 
Knowledge, which is the most straightforward measure of cognitive centrality according 
to Converse (1970), was measured on each field by three knowledge tests. On the political 
field, these tests comprised knowledge about political parties, politicians and ideological 
statements. On the medical field questions were asked on knowledge of names of physicians 
and healers, the concepts they use and their ideological statements. Except for the ideology 
test on the medical field the knowledge tests proved to be reliable. On each field the tests 
were highly interrelated, indicating that there is one knowledge factor on each field. 
Attitude competence was measured reliably by asking respondents whether they "had not 
thought much about the issue". The interpretation of the answer "I have not thought much 
about the issue" as a self-confessed nonattitude is validated by the relationship between 
competence and knowledge. In general, the proportion of "no opinion" answers was rather 
low, especially when compared to studies in the United States, which generally report 
about 25% "no opinion" answers (Schuman and Presser, 1981). Different explanations are 
possible. The level of competence might in actual fact be higher in the Netherlands than in 
the United States. On the other hand, the fact that the questions, especially on the political 
field, dealt with long-lasting ideological controversies may have had a boosting effect on 
the level of competence that was found or it may have put the respondents under greater 
pressure to give answers, even if they did not have a clear opinion about the item. Lastly, 
the specific filter that was used may not be as strict as it was found in previous studies 
(Bishop et al., 1983; Schuman and Presser, 1981). 
The mean response time over items on a field did not prove to be a valid measure of 
accessibility, since it measured the time people needed to operate the computer rather than 
the accessibility of the attitudes1. No correlations were found between this measure and the 
other measures of cognitive centrality. Therefore, no further analyses were carried out on 
this measure. 
The parallel-test reliability between line and number scores was used as a measure of 
attitude crystallization. Since the items are presented within a short time interval in one 
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session, people's memory might play a role. Although it is unlikely that people will 
remember the specific ratio given to an item, they might well remember whether they 
agreed or disagreed with it. And, indeed, the mean of the individual correlation 
coefficients was found to be rather high (about .78 on both fields). The parallel-test 
reliability might be a somewhat high estimate of crystallization, but the value is 
nevertheless lower than on the metric and the sound task, indicating that there are indeed 
differences in the crystallization of attitudes. The finding that the differences between 
respondents are rather large on the attitude task, and that they are significantly related to 
their social characteristics supports the validity of the measure. Furthermore, the measure 
was validated by its relationship to knowledge on each field and to attitude constraint. 
Attitude constraint was measured in two different ways. On the individual level the 
measure developed by Barton and Parsons (1977) was used. This measure appeared to be 
attenuated by the extremity of the answers. For this reason, extremity was always specified 
as a covariate in the analyses of variance and it was partialed out in correlational analyses. 
When controlled for extremity, the measure proved valid on the political field because it 
related significantly to knowledge and crystallization. On the medical field the measure 
could not be interpreted in an equally straightforward manner, since there was less 
agreement about what issues go together: for some respondents alternative healing and 
orthodox medicine are complementary, whereas for others they are contradictory. 
Moreover, constraint was analyzed at the group level, on the basis of the correlations 
between the items. As explained in chapter 2, this measure is vulnerable to variance on the 
items. Since the measure of Barton and Parsons is independent of variance, these 
differences could be taken into account. The findings on both measures of constraint 
support each other well. 
It was argued in chapter 2 that in the cognitive paradigm in attitude research it is 
necessary to distinguish the cognitive centrality of attitudes as an independent dimension of 
attitude structures. The centrality of attitudes, for example, plays an important role in the 
the relationship between attitudes and behavior, since this relationship is stronger for more 
central attitudes. Similarly, the centrality of attitudes is important in attitude change and 
biased perception. Although these psychological processes were not the object of the 
present study, it can be concluded that the answers given to the questions in the opinion 
survey do not have the same value and meaning from a psychological point of view. 
In sum, except for accessibility, all attributes of attitude structures were successfully 
measured. Since all measures showed variance, it can safely be concluded, in support of the 
first hypothesis, that not all respondents have attitudes about the questions asked them and 
that answers stem from attitudes which differ in cognitive centrality, as was expected in the 
first hypothesis. The height of the means of the measures does not suggest, however, that 
many answers are completely random. As explained in chapter 2, the measures only reveal 
differences in degree of competence and centrality. It can also be concluded that the 
attributes of attitude structures are interrelated. They are independent of the evaluative 
extremity of the answers. Thus, the second hypothesis is also supported by the findings. 
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7.2 Attitude structures and socio-cultural structures 
Although psychologists treat the differences in attitude structures mainly as individual 
differences, it was argued that these differences are related to social characteristics of the 
respondents, notably involvement, social position and sex, and to the cultural field. In this 
project the fields of politics and medicine were compared. The work of Bourdieu, which 
deals explicitly with the link between mental structures on the one hand and social and 
cultural structures on the other, was used to develop hypotheses for these relations. 
The respondents 
The questionnaire was presented to respondents who had been recruited from a random 
sample of the city register of the middle-sized city of Nijmegen (150,000 inhabitants). In 
addition, some respondents were recruited who were sophisticated either on the political 
field (active members of unions and parties), or on the medical field (regular visitors of an 
alternative healer), in order to carry out analyses on involvement. Except for a few 
respondents in the sophisticated samples, the respondents were between 40 and 55 years 
old. 
Both the fact that respondents live in a middle-sized city and the fact that they are a 
middle-aged group is bound to have determined the levels of attitude competence and 
centrality that have been observed. On the political field, at least, the competence of 
younger people and of people living in larger cities is higher (Bourdieu, 1979). On both 
characteristics, the respondents in this survey will show more or less average levels of 
competence and strength. On the field of medicine, almost all respondents have had some 
experience of illness and doctors. Although not all experiences are equally intense, this is 
bound to influence the observed level of competence and strength. It was found in a pilot 
study that the attitudes on orthodox medicine were more central for a group of respondents 
with less education and more experience with illness (mean age 50 years) than for of a 
group of students, who had much less experience with illness and a mean age of 28 years 
(Westerhof, 1989a). 
Although the findings relating to the social processes of recruitment should be 
considered with some caution (see section 5.4), it was observed that respondents with more 
economic resources cooperated in the survey more often. It was found that persons with 
less education and less income, and women admitted more often that they were not 
competent to participate in the study, especially because of a lack of political knowledge 
and opinions and because of a fear of computers. These differences in competence were 
closely mirrored by the social composition of the sophisticated respondents on each 
domain. And lastly, respondents who were socially more distant from the researcher and 
the university refused to cooperate more often. These findings are a first indication that the 
relations of social position and sex with competence are as expected. 
It should, therefore, be stressed that the respondents constitute a specific subsample of 
the total number of persons asked to cooperate, one that is relatively high in competence 
and social position. As a result, the differences in attitude structures between the 
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respondents are bound to be less marked than they actually would have been if everyone 
had cooperated in the survey. 
This also applies to the assessment of attitude crystallization and all the more to the 
assessment of constraint. Attitude crystallization was calculated only for those items that 
respondents answered questions about. Since they had been given the chance to state that 
they did not have an opinion, the least competent respondents were not included in the 
analysis of crystallization. The analyses on constraint were carried out for an even more 
competent group of respondents, those who claimed to have an opinion on all items on a 
field. 
In sum, it can be assumed on the basis of the respondents' age and place of residence that 
their level of competence and centrality on the political field will be intermediate. Because 
of their age almost all of them have had some experience of illness, so competence and 
centrality will be rather high on the medical field. Furthermore, respondents from lower 
social positions refused to cooperate in the study more often than others. Since they also 
confessed not to be competent more often, as was the case with women, the differences in 
competence and centrality observed in this study will apply a fortiori to the population 
studied. 
77t£ field of politics 
On the political field, it was hypothesized that competence and centrality will be related to 
involvement in the field, to social position and to sex. Respondents were classified in three 
groups according to their social position, their educational and occupational level. 
Respondents were also classified into three groups according to their involvement in the 
political field. Respondents who took up an active position in the political field by means of 
party membership, union membership or participation in political actions were classified as 
more involved. This group can be seen as a political elite. However, it is only a local elite, 
which is likely to be more similar to the mass of the city sample than a national political 
elite (Converse, 1974). The remaining respondents, who correspond to the city sample 
(except for 8 respondents classified as more involved) were classified in two groups: 
respondents who are passive members of parties or unions, or who participate only 
occasionally in political actions were classified as moderately involved, whereas all others 
were seen as less involved. The construction of groups was validated by the findings that 
more involved respondents are more interested in the field, participate more often in the 
political field and consume political products more often. These were only differences in 
degree, however: in the least involved group respondents were not totally uninvolved. 
Furthermore, the different groups are rather heterogeneous. 
The hypotheses that differences in attitude competence and centrality are related to 
involvement, social position and sex are supported by the findings of this study: less 
involved respondents, respondents with lower social positions and women are less 
competent and have less central attitudes and possibly more nonattitudes. In section 6.7, it 
was found that the effects of involvement, social position, and sex exist independently. 
Only the relationship between involvement and knowledge of ideology disappeared in the 
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more complex analysis. Although not all differences found are significant, they are very 
systematic and all point in the same direction, so that they are unlikely to be based on 
chance. On "no opinion" answers, the differences are rather slight. This can probably be 
explained, on the one hand, by the characteristics of the items, which dealt with 
long-lasting ideological controversies. On the other hand, it may be explained by the fact 
that less competent persons refused to participate in the study. 
Furthermore, the finding that respondents with lower social positions in the sophisticated 
sample are higher on competence and centrality than the respondents with higher social 
positions in the city sample indicates that the differences in attitude structures that were 
found are not caused by any limitations inherent in the cognitive apparatus of the lower-
educated. Rather, the formation of central attitudes depends on social processes related to 
involvement and interest taken in the political field. 
In sum, the hypotheses on the political field are supported in this study. 
The field of medicine 
The field of medicine was incorporated in this study for two reasons. Firstly, nearly all the 
studies in the Converse debate were carried out on the political field, which has led to 
much confusion over political and scientific interpretations of the findings. Secondly, the 
relation between the field and the public was expected to be different on the medical field 
from that on the political field, so that it would lend itself better to a study of the social 
processes involved in acquiring central attitudes. It was hypothesized that there are no 
differences in attitude competence and centrality according to social position and sex on 
this field, but only according to involvement. 
To measure the effects of involvement, three groups were constructed: the sophisticated 
sample on the medical field and the respondents with medical occupations were classified as 
more involved, although this is a very heterogeneous group. Respondents with personal 
experience with serious illness were classified as moderately involved and the remaining 
respondents as less involved. Again, the classification was validated by the level of interest, 
participation and consumption, although the differences are only differences in degree. 
As expected, more involved respondents have more knowledge about the medical field. 
However, the relationship between involvement and knowledge of medical names 
disappeared in the three-way analysis. As on the political field, attitude competence and 
crystallization rise with involvement, but not significantly. Attitude constraint appeared to 
be different for more and less involved. The more involved respondents saw alternative 
and orthodox medicine as complementary, whereas less involved respondents saw them as 
contradictory at the ideological level, but not at the practical level. It was argued that 
having experience with illness leads to people developing more qualified attitudes about 
medicine, instead of following the ideological division in the field. The complementary 
ideologies of different types of medical care were also found in other studies. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the differences are at least partly due to the rapid 
developments in the medical field, where alternative medicine is becoming more and more 
legitimate. 
118 Statements and stories 
There appeared to be no relationship of involvement with social position and sex in the 
medical field. Respondents differing in social position and sex do not differ much in 
interest, participation and consumption, although respondents with higher social positions 
talk and read about medical problems somewhat more. These findings support the 
argument that involvement in the field is distributed in a different way on the political and 
the medical field. 
No differences according to sex were found in attitude competence and centrality, as 
expected. Contrary to the hypothesis, respondents with higher social positions have more 
knowledge about medicine and more often give answers on the medical items. No 
differences according to social position were found in crystallization and constraint. It was 
argued that the pressure to give answers on the medical field is less great than on the 
political field, especially for the items about alternative healing, which dealt with relatively 
new ideological statements on the medical field. An analysis of variance specifying 
involvement, social position and sex as independent factors showed that social position and 
involvement contribute independently to the differences in competence and centrality. 
In sum, the assumption that involvement and interest are distributed differently on the 
medical field is supported by the findings. Furthermore, the hypotheses that attitude 
competence and centrality are related to involvement in the field but not to sex are also 
supported. Contrary to the hypothesis, respondents with higher social positions have more 
knowledge about the field, and indicated more often that they had thought about the issues 
they were asked about. However, in support of the hypothesis, no differences in 
crystallization and constraint were found for those respondents who gave answers. 
7.3 Logos, social competence and the opinion survey 
It was empirically shown, then, that the two basic postulates of opinion surveys are not 
correct: not all respondents have attitudes on the questions that are asked and not all 
answers reflect central attitudes. Respondents appeared to differ in the competence to 
produce opinions on the basis of the logos, even though the task to be fulfilled required 
only a minimal level of competence. Criticism of the logocentrism inherent in the survey 
was thus shown to be justified. Instead of the proportions of respondents giving "agree" or 
"disagree" answers, the most important findings of a survey are whether respondents give 
"no opinion" answers, and whether their answers are derived from central attitudes or are 
more like nonattitudes in disguise. Therefore, respondents should always be made to feel 
free to admit that they do not have an opinion on the questions asked them. Furthermore, 
the centrality of the attitudes from which answers are derived should always be measured. 
If reliability coefficients are used for this purpose they should be regarded as an attribute 
of the answers, depending on both the respondent and the question, instead of an attribute 
of the measurement instrument (see chapter 2). 
The competence to produce opinions from the logos appeared to be related to social and 
cultural processes and should not be seen, therefore, as a purely individual cognitive 
capacity. On both fields, greater involvement in the field is associated to greater 
competence, independent of social position (and thus of education), indicating that people 
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only develop attitude structures adjusted to the field if they become more involved in that 
field. This finding is supported by the few studies on attitude formation by social 
psychologists, who found that direct personal experience, personal involvement, 'repeated 
exposure', systematic cognitive elaboration, personal responsibility and accountability, and 
conflicts between important values (see section 2.2) all play a part in the acquisition of 
more central attitudes. Greater involvement in a field will be related to these factors in the 
formation of attitudes. 
However, it is also found that the processes leading to involvement and interest depend 
on the cultural field. Respondents with higher social positions and men develop central 
attitudes about politics more often, whereas this relationship is less clear on the medical 
field. The findings clearly support the line of reasoning that the distribution of social 
competence is different on the two fields, although respondents with more education and 
higher occupations always talk and read more about relevant problems in the field, have 
more knowledge and feel more competent to express opinions. Personal interest and 
experience are organized socially in a different way on the two fields. 
Furthermore, because of a different balance of power in the ideological division between 
orthodox and heterodox on the two fields, experience has a different effect on the 
organization of attitudes on each field. Whereas the answers given on the political field 
closely follow the long-established ideological divisions between left and right, and the 
more so when respondents are more involved, the effect of personal experience on the 
medical field is that people no longer answer according to the contrasting ideologies on the 
field but according to their appreciation of the different types of medical care as they 
experienced them personally. 
Attitude structures should therefore not be studied only as individual possessions, as is 
done by mainstream social psychology, which sees attitude structures as individual 
cognitive representations, but always in relation to the social and cultural structures in 
which they developed. This is true for the formation and organization of attitudes as well 
as for mastery of the logos. As a consequence of the dynamics of society and specific 
fields, the competence to produce opinions based on the logos is not evenly spread in the 
public. 
Until now attention was paid in particular to the question to what degree people are 
competent to produce opinions from the logos. It should also be asked, however, how 
people can otherwise relate to social reality if they do not have opinions adjusted to a field 
and constrained by reflexively accessible yardsticks. In the epilogue, the attention will be 
focused on this question. 

EPILOGUE 
In the present study it became clear that not everyone is competent to produce opinions in 
accordance with reflexively known yardsticks which are legitimate in a field. Other ways 
of producing opinions have until now been given only little attention in this book, so that it 
only became clear in what way people do not have attitudes about a cultural field. In this 
chapter an attempt will be made to formulate a theoretical and methodological perspective 
on how to study other ways of producing opinions. However, empirical studies are' 
necessary to elaborate on this perspective and to judge its value. The first section of this 
chapter will focus on the question how people who are not competent to produce opinions 
from the logos can still produce opinions otherwise. In the second section, it will be argued 
that in order to understand these different ways of producing opinions it is necessary to 
make a shift in theoretical perspective from the cognitive attitude psychology discussed in 
the second chapter to a discursive perspective which accounts for the constitution of 
meaning in talk. In the third section, some methods which can be used to study other ways 
of producing opinions will be discussed. In the last section, an explicit account will be 
given of the perspective on the relationship between theory and method as it has been used 
in this book. 
8.1 Ethos and logos 
In contrast to the logos, Bourdieu describes a principle of production of opinions which he 
calls ethos. Bourdieu (1984b, p.461) explains: "Between ethos and logos, practical mastery 
and verbal mastery, there is a radical discontinuity1. There is no necessary link between 
the practical mastery which can guide everyday practice, including all its (objectively) 
political aspects, without ever being made explicit or, still less, systematically 
conceptualized, and the symbolic mastery of experience which is expressed in discourse 
socially recognized as political and which presupposes the bracketing of all direct, 
exclusive reference to the concrete particularity of a situation." The ethos and the logos 
imply different relations towards social reality. The logos is a relation of distance, 
explication and reflection on everyday practice and experience, whereas the ethos is a 
relation of engagement in practice. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the ethos, Bourdieu's theory of practice will 
be presented briefly as far as it relates to the production of opinions2. The concept of 
habitus, which is described by Bourdieu as a generative principle of practices, will be 
explained first. Second, the logic of practice is discussed as the way habitus function. 
Habitus 
Habitus are described by Bourdieu as structures of perception, appreciation, thinking and 
practice. Bourdieu describes the structuralization of habitus by practice and experience as 
inculcation, embodiment3 or as a social birth in a culture or a field. While not the result of 
an explicit structuring intention, a habitus becomes structured because the material and 
122 Statements and stories 
social environment in which it is acquired is structured. For example, the social space of 
class positions, which structures modern society according to divisions like noble/base, 
distinguished/vulgar, official/unofficial is reflected in all the habitus which are part of this 
society (Bourdieu, 1979)4. 
These societal divisions which structure habitus are an example of the principles 
employed in the modality of the ethos. Hence, Bourdieu (1976a, 1979) found in a study on 
the perception of politicians that such basic schemes as strong/weak, higheiVlower and 
noble/base were applied. Furthermore, the opinions from the ethos, which are not 
structured in terms of the ideological divisions of a field, reflect the specific experience 
and practice associated with a person's social position and trajectory, as Bourdieu (1993a) 
and his colleagues found in a series of interview studies. 
The structuralization of habitus by practice and experience has three consequences. 
Firstly, since the habitus is acquired in a structured environment, practices and opinions 
are constrained. However, in contrast to the dominant paradigm of attitude psychology, it 
is not necessary to assume a need for consistency or an effort to achieve consistency to 
account for this constraint. Secondly, if people live in similar material and social 
conditions of existence (i.e. if their social positions are comparable), their habitus will 
also be comparable and alike. Therefore, people with similar positions will have similar 
viewpoints, as a result of the structuring experiences they have undergone. In this sense, 
opinions are not 'very personal', but always related to the conditions which brought them 
about, although it may become a habitus to present attitudes as a personal achievement. 
Thirdly, since habitus are acquired without explicit intentions, the principles of the ethos 
are applied without conscious reflection. 
The logic of practice 
The structured structures of the habitus are predisposed to function as structuring 
structures. In other words, mediated by habitus people are always engaged and interested 
in the practice of everyday life. This is captured by the term 'sens pratique', which is often 
translated as 'logic of practice'. In the logic of practice the principles employed by habitus 
are not reflected upon, because there are at least two constraints to reflection and 
rationality in the situated practice of everyday life. The first constraint stems from the fact 
that habitus are already structured. Since a habitus reflects the material and symbolic 
conditions of existence in which it was acquired, there is an immediate concordance 
between a habitus and a field, that makes it possible for a habitus to generate products in 
accordance with the requirements of the field in an implicit anticipation of material or 
symbolic profit. Hence, opinions, like all other linguistic expressions, are always 
'euphemized', i.e. they are implicitly and unconsciously self-censored via the process of 
anticipation of symbolic or material profit (Bourdieu, 1982a). Practices are therefore to a 
certain extent always an objectification and reproduction of the culture subjectively 
embodied in the habitus5. 
Secondly, habitus are not conditioned to the extent that all choice is impossible. Since the 
logic of practice is not merely the execution of rules, it is characterized by fuzziness and 
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uncertainty. Since practices are constrained by time, it is impossible to retreat from action 
to reflect on all alternatives and their consequences. Time is thus the second constraint on 
reflection and rationality. 
Hence, Bourdieu sees practical logic as a continuous, strategic improvisation, in which 
one tries to do the right thing at the right time. In other words, practical logic implies a 
feel for the game or an implicit anticipation of the social value of one's products (see also 
chapter 3). Instead of the reflexivity of rationalism and logos, Bourdieu (1990) speaks 
therefore of reflection in action. 
Conclusion 
It thus becomes clear how opinions are produced in ways other than from the logos6. 
Opinions from the ethos are not the kind of personal opinions derived from explicit 
principles which are legitimate in a field. Rather, they are opinions which stem from 
everyday experience, expressed in everyday language without a need for reflection on the 
principles of their production. They are consistent without being the product of a need for 
consistency and an expression of cultural meanings rather than 'very personal' 
achievements. It should be noted, however, that producing opinions from the logos can 
also become a habitus: these kinds of opinions also result from practical improvisation, 
implicitly directed towards a distinctive profit. 
8.2 The social practice of presenting attitudes in talk 
In order to understand the production of opinions from the ethos it is necessary to make a 
shift in the theoretical perspective of the cognitive psychology of attitudes used until now. 
Since the principles which are employed in the modalities of ethos and logos differ in 
content, it will be clear that the study of opinion production is a study of meaning. 
However, like cognitive psychology in general (Bruner, 1990; Shweder, 1984a), the 
cognitive psychology of attitudes discussed in chapter 2 has paid little attention to the study 
of meaning. Its main objects of study are the information-processing characteristics 
associated with attitude structures. As can be seen from the empirical indicators of attitude 
centrality which were derived from this perspective, the study of information processing is 
indifferent to content. This lack of interest in the study of meaning is also illustrated by the 
use of stimuli which are largely stripped of their meaning, reduced to attitude objects with 
no preexisting social meaning, like the 'neutral' stimuli in the opinion survey. The basic 
assumption appears to be that the same objects mean the same to everybody in the same 
way. However, as was argued before, even if respondents give reliable and constrained 
answers, they may arrive at these answers in different ways. 
Some social psychologists, who are critical of this cognitive paradigm in attitude 
psychology, have formulated another perspective on attitudes, which does account for 
meaning7. As a starting-point of this perspective Potter and Wetherell (1987, p.51) argue 
that "far from the object of thought being a simple already present entity, the object is 
formulated and constructed in the course of doing evaluation". This constitution of the 
meaning of attitude objects is studied in everyday speech. Proceeding from this 
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perspective, Lalljee, Brown and Ginsberg (1984, p. 239) redefined attitudes as "expressive 
communicative acts which occur and can be observed as features of situated social 
encounters"8. Thus, instead of the representation of attitudes in long-term memory, 
attention will be focused on the presentation or expression of attitudes in speech (cf. 
Welten, 1991). 
Discursive psychology 
The study of the presentation of attitudes in talk is based on a number of theories about the 
use of language. In accordance with Austin's (1962) speech act theory, language should not 
be seen here as an abstract system of propositions used for describing reality9. All 
utterances have the function of bringing something about. This is most apparent in 
commands such as "open the window", which specify what is to be done, or in institutional, 
ceremonial formulae, such as: "I hereby proclaim you doctor in the social sciences". On a 
broader level, talk is seen as the constitution of versions of reality, which people try to 
make true (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Thus, in speech act theory, language is attributed 
a performative or constitutive rather than a mere descriptive function10. Language use, or 
discourse, thus becomes a consequential practice in its own right, which is studied in 
discursive or rhetorical psychology11. 
Applied to the domain of attitudes, the expression of attitudes in talk is not seen as a 
mere description of the reality of some internal state. Instead, reality and attitude objects 
are constituted, as a person presents attitudes in talk. For two reasons at least, attitudes are 
not individual states or characteristics but social accomplishments. Firstly, Billig (1991) 
argues that the expression of attitudes always takes place in a wider social controversy and 
debate. He argues that the expression of attitudes is sprinkled with contradictions, 
controversies, counterattitudes and counter-evidence. For example, people very often use 
phrases like "on the one hand I like..., on the other I don't like it", or "I'm not a racist, 
but...". Billig et al. (1988) term these kinds of expressions found in everyday life 
"dilemmas". These dilemmatic aspects of the presentation of attitudes pose a threat to the 
concepts of a true attitude and of attitude consistency which prevail in the cognitive attitude 
psychology. 
Since expressing an attitude always implies taking a position in a social controversy, the 
meaning of the attitude is not determined by its intrinsic structure, but by its relation to the 
controversy, much like the meaning of an opinion relates to the state of the field in 
Bourdieu's theory. This implies that the meaning of an attitude is never definite, but that it 
changes with the situation in which it is expressed. Billig (1991) refers to this as the 
implicit meaning of an attitude, which comes to the surface once the situation changes. 
Attitudes are never completely finished products, therefore, and are adapted each time to 
novel situations. This poses a further threat to the idea of a 'true' attitude as it is used in 
attitude scaling and opinion surveys. 
As the second reason why attitudes should be conceived of as social accomplishments it 
is important to realize that the presentation of attitudes in talk is always a social process: 
one always talks to someone else. Even in private situations, where people talk to 
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themselves, they still take into account the supposed or imagined reactions of others 
(Billig, 1987, 1991; Hermans and Kempen, 1993). To make certain accounts of reality 
acceptable and to persuade others of one's attitudes12, they have to be complemented with 
arguments. In other words, the performative function of attitudes expressed in discourse 
does not speak for itself, but has to be realized through argumentation. Discursive 
psychology is mainly concerned with the structure and function of arguments in discourse. 
Building partly on classical studies of rhetoric (Billig, 1987), this theory distinguishes 
different discursive or rhetorical devices which are used to accomplish the performative 
function of discourse13. 
Stories 
A specific discursive device that deserves some more attention here is the story. Edwards 
and Potter (1992) show that stories have a rhetorical function: as a kind of 'thick' 
description, they can contribute to the acceptability of an account. Stories have been given 
some attention by narrative psychologists (e.g. Sarbin, 1986; Bruner, 1990), who present 
the study of stories as a way of studying the constitution of meaning14. Stories are 
important here, because they are built from experience, in accordance with the production 
of opinions from the ethos: they are a public and shared narrativization of personal 
experience. The process of narrativization is captured by the concept of mimesis, which 
Bruner borrowed from Aristotle: "mimesis is the capturing of 'life in action', an 
elaboration and amelioration of what happened" (Bruner, 1990, p.46). 
The overall configuration of the elements of a story is described as a plot or fabula, 
which contains an Actor, an Action, a Goal, a Scene, and an Instrument (Burke (1945), 
cited by Bruner (1990)). Stories are woven around Trouble. In everyday life Trouble' 
implies that stories are invoked whenever experiences differ from the normal course of 
action (Bruner, 1990). The main function of a story is to make such a deviation from a 
normal pattern comprehensible and to bring the abnormal back to the normal. Since 
normal patterns are always constituted within a certain culture, stories are always 
informed by that culture and, therefore, social accomplishments. 
Conversations 
A point that has been given relatively little emphasis in discursive and narrative 
psychology is that stories and argumentation are conjoint accomplishments in the course of 
conversations: "it takes work to start and to end them" (Moerman, 1988, p.82). In 
conversation analysis (a branch of social studies initiated by Harvey Sacks) conversations 
are studied as the socially organized sequences in which talk occurs in social interaction. 
Different sequences are identified that describe the structure of conversations. Phenomena 
such as how a conversation is begun, how speakers take turns, how their speech overlaps, 
how laughter functions in a conversation are studied (see Moerman, 1988 for a review). 
Conversations are exactly the kind of regulated improvisations that Bourdieu analyzes in 
more abstract terms in his theory of practice. Conversation implies, for example, a 
sequencing of talk restricted by time. Specific instances of conversations are interactive 
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processes which are, most often, undeliberate, and unanticipated. Hence, meaning is 
enacted in conversations instead of reflected upon. 
As a more concrete description of the practical logic of the habitus, the analysis of 
conversation (at least as Moerman (1988) presents it) also takes into account the power 
relations between the people that participate in a conversation. Power is thus seen as 
situated and interactive and accomplished time and time again. Consequently, power is 
found, for example, in conversational elements like who opens up a conversation, who 
closes it, who has a legitimate right to ask questions or give instructions, who may 
interrupt the other etc. Similarly, some conversations do not lend themselves to 
storytelling, such as conversations between patients and doctors or standardized survey 
interviews (Mishler, 1986). For individuals with the right symbolic capital it is not even 
necessary to complement their attitudes with arguments to have them accepted. On the 
other hand, conversational elements can also be used in order to establish co-operation or 
to show that people are single-minded, like in laughing together, or in helping the other 
find the right words to express himself. 
Conclusion 
Instead of the study of the cognitive representation of attitudes in long-term memory 
which dominates contemporary social psychology, the focus was shifted in this section to 
the presentation of attitudes in talk, which is seen as a consequential practice in itself. 
Discursive psychologists have directed their studies mainly to the power of arguments or 
rhetoric in discourse, whereas narrative psychologists have studied the structure and 
functions of the story. However, as both Bourdieu's theory of practice and conversation 
analysis remind us, rhetoric and storytelling should always be studied within the broader 
social structures in which they are enacted. Instead of the ever-present characteristics of 
attitudes in talk, as psychologists are inclined to see them, they should be seen as modalities 
that can only become manifest in connection with a specific situation with specific power 
relations. 
In sum, the study of talk, and the way meaning and power are implied in talk, requires a 
social and cultural approach in addition to a cognitive psychological study: the participants 
in conversations should not be seen as mere recipients of information, but as active 
participants in the enactment of meaning (see also Moerman, 1988). 
8.3 In search of other methods 
Since the opinion survey was characterized as logocentric, it is necessary to look for other 
methods which are more adequate to study opinions which are produced in the modality of 
the ethos. In this section some methods that can shed light on the practical schemes of the 
ethos are discussed, assuming that these schemes are enacted rather than reflected upon. 
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The opinion survey and the ethos 
First of all, it might be asked whether it is possible to construct opinion surveys that are 
closer to the modality of the ethos. It can be concluded from the theoretical perspective on 
the production of opinions from the ethos that there are at least two possible ways to 
construct survey questions that are closer to the practical schemes of the ethos. First, 
instead of the items on legitimate issues in a cultural field, items can be formulated about 
personal experience and practice. Second, to assess the practical schemes of the ethos that 
are not specifically adapted to a cultural field, one might think of items and answer options 
that rely less on the explication and reflection inherent in the logos. In this respect, 
techniques like the semantic differential are closer to the ethos. Using the semantic 
differential, in which concepts are rated on lists of adjectives, Osgood, Suci and 
Tannenbaum (1957) revealed that, besides an evaluative factor (good-bad), there were two 
other semantic principles, potency (strong-weak) and activity (active-passive), which can 
be interpreted as the kind of practical yardsticks implicitly employed in the ethos. 
However, even if these kinds of items and answer options are indeed closer to the ethos, 
it should never be assumed a priori that all respondents have equally central attitudes about 
these items. Furthermore, surveys have two inherent restrictions when applied to the study 
of the presentation of attitudes in talk. First, as regards the constitution of meaning, it is 
assumed that all respondents who give reliable answers apply the same meaning to the 
items. As a result, surveys always project only one way of attributing meaning on all 
respondents, whereas it is clear by now, that even respondents with more central attitudes 
can make sense of the same question in a lot of different ways. 
Second, surveys always seek to measure the 'true' characteristics of the respondents (see 
Chapter 1). However, it became clear in the previous section that the idea of a true attitude 
is questionable, since the production of attitudes is always related to the situation in which 
they are produced. Since a neutral situation is always created to measure 'true' attitudes, 
only private attitudes are asked for in surveys. The strategies of presentation and 
persuasion, which are always related to the social situation and the people one is talking to, 
can never be the object of study in a survey15. 
Because of these two restrictions inherent in survey research with closed questions, 
other methods of assessing attitudes as they are presented in talk should be looked at. 
Open questions in surveys 
In contrast to closed questions, open questions can reveal the differential ways of 
constituting attitude objects. The scarce evidence on open questions in surveys shows that 
open questions can be constructed that allow respondents to express more central attitudes 
(Converse, 1964; Geer, 1988, 1991) in a language that need not be the same as the one 
employed by a researcher (Janssen, 1990; Van Holsteijn, 1993). Furthermore, it has been 
found that open questions can indicate how respondents understand the concepts asked 
about and how they use these concepts in their own argumentation (Pijnenburg, 1994). The 
possibilities of the few open questions that are used from time to time in survey research 
remain limited, however. Although much depends on the specific way the question is 
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asked, most open questions only ask for some enumeration of important issues or aspects 
of attitude objects and do not provide opportunities for argumentation or storytelling. 
Ethnographic interviews 
A more detailed view on the presentation of attitudes and the constitution of meaning can 
be found in interviews16. In ethnographic interviews as presented by Spradley (1979) the 
position of the interrogated individuals is radically different from that of the interviewees 
in the survey. Instead of respondents, Spradley (1979) uses the term 'informants' in 
accordance with the anthropological tradition. In contrast to survey research, the subject 
that is talked about, and the way in which it is talked about are negotiated between 
interviewer and informant in ethnographic interviews. Instead of the one-sided questioning 
and answering game of surveys (whether with open or closed questions), ethnographic 
interviews can be arranged in such a way as to facilitate a joint construction of meaning by 
both the researcher and the informant. Hence, the informant can speak of his own personal 
situation with its troubles and amazements and amusements. The specific way in which 
questions are posed can result in the presentation of attitudes according to the modality 
addressed (reflection, narration, or argumentation). 
Indeed, interview studies have shown the different phenomenologically derived, but 
culturally constituted ways of making sense of attitude objects17. Illustrative of the 
possibility of a constitution of meaning that is not reflected upon, it has been found that 
interview talk does indeed have a conversational structure (Paget, 1983) and that it can 
have a narrative structure (e.g. Mishler, 1986; Vosmeer, 1992) or an argumentative 
structure (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1988). 
However, although one may attempt to come as close as possible to the practical world 
of everyday life and not to bracket or disrupt it, it should be emphasized that it is not the 
practical logic which guides the appreciation of personal experiences at the moment itself. 
Instead, the interview talk is informed by the practical sense of telling a researcher about 
one's own life. In fact, the talk in ethnographic interviews is a result of a joint construction 
of meaning, in which things may be said that are otherwise not spoken of, or that were 
never before spoken of as clearly by the informant. It is obviously a restriction of the 
ethnographic interview that it cannot shed light on the situated strategies of presenting 
attitudes18. 
Attitudes in everyday life 
Only a study of the presentation of attitudes in everyday life can be used to assess the more 
practical-strategic aspects of such a presentation19. Such research lends itself to the study of 
the situational variance of the expression of attitudes that is excluded from surveys and 
interviews. In the situated talk of everyday life the performative function and the social 
consequences of presenting attitudes in a specific form can be understood as well as the 
implicit censoring and euphemizing of attitudes that takes place in connection with the 
social position of the speaker and with the relations of dominance between the actors. As 
explained in the previous sections, it is important to realize that the presentation of 
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attitudes is inspired by practical sense, and is never only the result of rational calculation, 
nor of the implementation of rules. 
Conclusion 
Although some possibilities to study the differential constitution of the meaning of attitude 
objects and the practical-strategical aspects of the presentation of attitudes in talk were 
discussed in this section, it was not intended to give a full account of the different methods, 
as was done for the opinion survey in this study. Only empirical studies can give a decisive 
answer as to whether the suggestions given in this section are valid. 
8.4 Towards a new methodology of attitude research 
Until now, a number of different theoretical perspectives have been discussed, as well as a 
number of methods that can be used to assess attitudes. In this last section, we will attempt 
to formulate a more comprehensive perspective on attitudes and on attitude research, first 
with regard to the different theoretical perspectives, then with regard to the relationship 
between theory and method. 
Epistemological rupture 
The development of a theoretical and methodological perspective on attitudes to be found 
in this book followed the maxim of Bourdieu's social epistemology that a threefold 
epistemological rupture is the essential moment in developing theories in the social sciences 
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron, 1968; Bourdieu, 1992). First, there is a rupture 
with everyday common sense; second, with scientific common sense; and third, with the 
inherent position of the scientist as a distant observer. The goal of this triple rupture is to 
prevent the social scientist from unwittingly projecting his own categories of thought on 
the object he studies. It enables us to develop a more comprehensive view on our object of 
study. Without this epistemological rupture, implicit accounts of the social world are taken 
for granted, and scientists will contribute to the reproduction of these implicit accounts and 
the related power relations. 
In the case of attitude theory as it was discussed in this book, the break with common 
sense implies a break with the taken-for-granted belief in opinion surveys20. As was found 
in Chapter 4, the dominant paradigm of survey research mirrors the political ideology of 
democracy, attributing the right and the capacity to express attitudes to everyone and 
attributing the same political impact to all answers. The social history of the survey was 
briefly sketched to show that the type of survey that has become taken for granted 
nowadays, with its very peculiar form of interrogation, is in fact the outcome of a 
historical social process. This break with everyday common sense is all the more necessary 
with regard to the interpretation of survey response because the survey is legitimized by 
'scientific' principles (see Chapter 1). However, since there is no scientific basis for the 
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postulates that everyone has opinions on survey questions and that all answers refer to 
central opinions, this legitimization of surveys as a scientific practice is unwarranted21. 
However, to arrive at a more critical scientific interpretation of survey answers a 
rupture with common sense is not sufficient. As Bourdieu (1992) asserts, it is also 
necessary to break with the institutionalized scientific boundaries, that prevent a more 
comprehensive outlook on one's research object. In the present study boundaries were 
crossed between disciplines (especially between psychology and sociology, but some 
anthropological and linguistic insights were also included), between research domains 
(boundaries that are especially important in the division of labour in sociology: political 
vs. medical sociology; political science as an independent scientific institution), and 
between research traditions (especially the strongly dominant cognitive psychology, with 
its emphasis on laboratory studies, and the dominated discursive and narrative 
perspectives). This is, however, not an eclecticism that acknowledges that there is some 
truth in every theory. Instead, it is acutely necessary to counterpose different theoretical 
traditions in order to demonstrate the limitations inherent in each tradition. By crossing 
the different institutionalized scientific boundaries, it becomes possible to break with the 
tacit censorship which would otherwise remain taken for granted within each discipline.22 
The third, and most important, rupture that needs to be made is that with the theoretical 
perspective inherent in the position of the scientist. Since social scientists have the privilege 
of being able to observe social phenomena from a certain distance they are inclined to 
make the 'scholastic' mistake of projecting this theoretical distance on the practical logic of 
the behavior of the subjects they try to understand. Here, Bourdieu (1980a) counterposes 
the knowledge of the scientist to the 'praxeological' knowledge of their subjects23. The 
logocentrism of the opinion survey serves as a good example of how a relation of distance 
and reflection on everyday practice and experience is incorrectly projected on all 
respondents answering questions. Specifically important for (social) psychology is the 
critique of the reification by social psychologists of different modalities of opinion 
expression, the disregard for the cultural content in the cognitive perspective or for the 
social conditions of effective talk in discursive and narrative psychology. Cognitive 
psychologists even reify attitudes to the point where they become 'actors' in information 
processing. The theory of Bourdieu was used especially to identify the social processes and 
structures involved in the expression of opinions, because his theory does not fall back into 
a radical objectivism, but acknowledges the necessity to simultaneously investigate the 
mental structures in connection with the social structures in which they developed and 
function. Nevertheless, psychologists have developed methods of assessing these mental 
structures in greater detail than Bourdieu himself did.24 
In the course of this epistemological process, which started from the widely accepted 
definition of an attitude as an evaluation of an object, it was shown that there is much more 
to an attitude than an evaluation: its cognitive centrality and the consequential structural 
embeddedness, as well as the differential ways in which meaning is constituted in situated 
talk and the consequential social valuation. These perspectives on attitudes were always 
related to the social and cultural processes and structures in which attitudes function.25 
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The methodological construction of research objects 
In accordance with the dominant positivist scientific theory, opinion surveys are seen 
predominantly as a neutral technique to assess attitudes. In this study it was found, 
however, that the opinion survey is built on implicit assumptions which were found to be 
untenable. Hence, it must be concluded that this method can never be neutral: it reflects the 
scientist's theoretical perspective on attitudes. Likewise, the other methods discussed in this 
chapter also reflect a specific theoretical perspective on attitudes. Before even thinking of 
the verification of hypotheses, the most important scientific act is, therefore, the 
construction of the object (see also Bourdieu, 1992). 
Thus, opinion surveys in which attitudes are methodologically constructed as evaluations 
of preconstituted objects, pose questions to respondents that enable them only to express 
these evaluations (agree or disagree). Only since cognitive psychologists identified 
structural characteristics of attitudes defined as cognitive representations in long-term 
memory, did it become possible to construct indicators of the cognitive centrality of 
attitudes and to broaden the scope to the crucial question that should be answered in survey 
research: do respondents have attitudes about the questions asked them? Only since 
Bourdieu pointed to the social significance of having and expressing attitudes did it become 
possible to assess the social distribution of the logos. Likewise, if researchers study the 
constitution of meaning of attitude objects from the perspective that attitudes are 
interactively accomplished presentations in talk, then they will select open questions, or 
ethnographic interviews as their research methods, and if they are interested in the 
strategic implications of situational variance in the expression of attitudes they will study 
different situations in everyday life. Hence, methods always bear the mark of the 
researcher's perspective on attitudes, a mark that often remains hidden and taken for 
granted. 
The observation that methods are not neutral does not imply any relativism, however: a 
scientific culture does not make anything right or wrong. Relativism can only be avoided 
and a weighted evaluation of different methods of assessing attitudes can only be found, 
however, if the assumption that methods are neutral is done away with. This requires a 
new perspective on methodology, one which does not reduce methodology to the status of a 
subdiscipline of the social sciences preoccupied with methodological techniques that are 
empty of theoretical considerations. As theory and method are one, the separation between 
them in the dominant positivist tradition needs to be replaced by a substantive methodology 
that comprises at the same time an attempt to formulate a more comprehensive perspective 
on the research object in the sense explained above and an application of this perspective 
on the way data are produced. Instead of taking for granted that the data are given facts, it 
is necessary to account for the way data are constructed or produced by a researcher. In 
the case of questionnaires or interviews, this should also include an account of the way 
respondents or informants produce their answers on the questions asked. Otherwise stated, 
if people are asked about their attitudes, the answers they give should not be taken as given 
facts without taking into consideration the process of giving answers, from the more 
comprehensive perspective on attitudes developed here. 
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Only under these conditions will it become possible to arrive at a grounded evaluation of 
different methods. If a more comprehensive perspective on attitudes is developed first, 
then it becomes possible to identify the assumptions and reductionisms implicit in each 
method that is discussed. And only after these postulates have been made explicit in this 
way can they be subjected to empirical verification, as was shown in this study in the case 
of opinion surveys. In the present study, it was found that it is possible to assess the 
implicit postulates of the opinion survey and to account for the limitations inherent in 
opinion surveys. Of course, this does not mean that opinion surveys are worthless. There 
can be many practical considerations why it is necessary to conduct them. However, if one 
wants to understand more about attitudes the opinion survey can never be more than a part 
of a broader research program that also comprises other methods, such as open questions, 
ethnographic interviews or presentations in everyday life. Although some considerations 
for the study of the presentation of attitudes in situated talk were given, these can only be 
brought to maturity by a full-scale study which would also reflect on the assumptions 
inherent in these other methods. 
APPENDIX 1 
INSTRUCTION TASKS 
metric task 
In the first exercise, the metric task, respondents are asked to give numbers to lines of 
different lengths and to draw lines to different numbers. Here, the procedure to give 
numbers to lines is presented (number estimation task). The procedure used to give lines to 
numbers is identical: only 'number' has to be substituted for 'line' and 'line' for 'number' 
(the line drawing task). The order of the number estimation task and the line production 
task is random. 
On the first page, all lines are presented. The first line is 20 mm. long, the others are 2, 
5, 15, 40, 100, and 200 mm. When numbers are presented, the first number is 40, the 
other 4, 10, 30, 40, 80, 180, and 400. The following instructions are read to the 
respondents: 
"On the screen you see some lines of different length. Some lines are longer than the first one, 
others are shorter. We will call the first line (he reference line. You are asked to compare the other 
lines with the reference line. You will do that by giving numbers to the lines. I will explain to you 
how you do this." 
The second page shows the reference line of 20 mm. A number has been given to it: 40. 
People are then instructed as follows: 
"The number 40 represents the length of the reference line. All the lines from the first page will be 
presented to you one by one. You will be asked to give them a number. The number represents the 
length of the line, as compared with the reference line. If the line presented is longer than the 
reference line, the number will be higher than 40. For example, if the line is twice as long, you 
will give a number twice as high: 80. If (he line is 5 times as long, you will give 200, since 200 is 
a number 5 times higher. But, if the line Is shorter than the reference line, you will give a number 
that is lower than 40. For example, if the line is 4 times as short, you will give 10, since 10 is one 
fourth of 40. Or if the line is 20 times as short, you will give a number 20 times as small, which is 
2£ 
Respondents are presented the lines in a random order, one at a time and asked: 
"please write down the number that represents the length of the line". 
Thus, respondents are asked to give ratio scores. 
sound task 
After the metric task, another exercise is presented: the sound task. This task was chosen 
because in pilot study 1 respondents used school marks for their judgments of evaluative 
words and in pilot study 2 some respondents were reluctant to judge occupations, saying 
that all jobs are equal. For this reason, the sound task was considered a more appropriate 
instruction task. The sound task proved to function adequately as an instruction task in pilot 
study 2 and was therefore used in the final study. Because some descriptions of sounds 
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proved to be somewhat vague in pilot study 2, they were changed for the final study, (see 
appendix 4). 
As in the metric task, respondents are asked to estimate numbers and draw lines, but this 
time they were to match them to descriptions of sounds: the sound task. The descriptions 
were: 'a crowded pub' as reference; whispering, a local bank office, a middle class car on 
the highway, a heavy truck driving past, a tumultuous stadium, and a jet plane flying low. 
The respondents were first shown all descriptions of the sounds to be judged. The 
following instruction was read in the number estimation task. In the line drawing task 
'lines' should be substituted for 'numbers' and 'numbers' for 'lines'. Again, the order of 
number estimation and line drawing was random. 
"We've now practised lines and numbers. But you can give numbers and lines to other things as 
well. Here are some descriptions of sounds. You are to give numbers to Indicate how loud the 
sounds are. You compare the sounds with 'a crowded pub'. First, you give a number to 'a 
crowded pub'. In the other task, I determined the number. This time, you do it yourself every 
time. It may be the same number each time, but also a different one. Then you answer whether (he 
next sound is louder or less loud than that of 'a crowded pub'. Here, things are a bit different than 
before. You always give a higher number than the number for 'a crowded pub'. Thus, if the sound 
is 3 times as loud, you give a number 3 times as high. If a sound is 25 times as loud, you give a 
number 25 times as high. But, If a sound is less loud, you also give a higher number than the one 
you gave for 'a crowded pub'. If a sound is 10 times less loud, you give a number 10 times 
higher. Or, when the sound is 5 times less loud, you give a number 5 times as high." 
It may seem strange that respondents always had to give larger number or longer lines, 
even if the sound was less loud. In pilot studies 1 and 2, however, respondents were asked 
to give higher numbers if the sound was judged to be louder and lower numbers if the 
sound was judged to be less loud. Since some respondents used difference scores, the scores 
for the items that are judged less loud were more extreme than the scores for the items 
judged louder. In order to avoid these differences in extremity related to the positive or 
negative evaluation of items, respondents were always asked to give higher numbers and 
longer lines. Lodge (1981a) always asked his respondents to give higher scores than the 
reference score in the attitude task. To prepare respondents in fulfilling the attitude task in 
the right way, it was considered to be appropriate to make the instructions of the sound 
task similar to those of the attitude task. 
The descriptions of the sounds are then presented in a random order. For each 
description, the respondent is asked: 
"Give a number that represents the loudness of the sound in 'a crowded pub"' 
After giving a reference score, respondents were asked: 
"Is the sound louder or less loud than in 'a crowded pub'?" 
If the sound was judged to be less loud, respondents were asked: 
"Indicate by giving a higher number how much less loud the sound is than in 'a crowded pub'" ] 
If the sound was judged to be louder, respondents were asked: 
APPENDIX 2 
DUTCH FORMULATIONS 
OF ATTITUDE ITEMS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
Attitude items on the field of politics 
1. Werklozen hebben het meestal aan zichzelf te danken dat ze geen werk hebben. 
2. Als de gemeenten niet genoeg geld hebben om alle bijstandsuitkeringen te betalen moet 
de regering in Den Haag ze het geld geven dat ze nodig hebben. 
3. De regering moet zaken als gezondheidszorg en huisvesting helemaal overlaten aan 
particuliere bedrijven en instellingen. 
4. Nederland moet meer economische hulp geven aan de landen van de Derde Wereld, zelfs 
als die landen die hulp niet kunnen terugbetalen. 
5. Het probleem van de apartheid in Zuid-Afrika moet dat land zelf maar oplossen. 
Nederland kan zich daar beter niet in mengen 
6. De verschillen tussen de inkomens van de werkenden en niet-werkenden moeten groter 
worden. 
7. De greep van de overheid op banken en multi-nationals moet veel groter worden. 
Attitude items on the field of medicine 
11. Er zijn mensen die, zonder dat van zichzelf te weten, de gave hebben om mensen van 
hun kwalen af te helpen. 
12. Elke ziekte bevat een boodschap over onszelf en over hoe wij leven; je geneest alleen 
als iemand je helpt deze boodschap te begrijpen. 
13. Alleen door een degelijke medische studie aan de universiteit kun je leren mensen beter 
temaken 
14. Bij ziekte en gezondheid gaat het altijd om dingen waar de erkende wetenschap nooit 
achter zal komen. 
15. Alternatieve geneeswijzen zijn alleen dan aan te wanneer de gewone medische 
wetenschap niets kan uitrichten. 
16. Geneeswijzen mogen alleen toegepast worden als ze op een wetenschappelijke manier 
getest zijn. 
17. Ziekte en kwalen kunnen samenhangen met onopgeloste problemen uit vorige levens. 
Magnitude scaling instructions 
For each task the instructions are first presented for line drawing, then for number 
estimation. Since the order of these modalities was random, some respondents were given 
the number estimation task first. In that case the words lines and numbers have to be 
changed. The instructions are read to the respondents. Every block corresponds to a new 
screen on the computer. Each item was presented separately on a new screen in a random 
order. The items presented below only serve as an example. 
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Metric task 
Op het scherm ziet u een aantal getallen staan van velschillende grootte. Sommige getallen zijn groter dan het 
eerste getal, andere kleiner. Het eerste getal (40) noemen we het vergelijkingsgetal. U moet straks de getallen 
vergelijken met dit vergelijkingsgetal. U doet dat door de getallen weer te geven met lijnen. Ik zal u dadelijk 
uitleggen hoe dat moet. Als u op de brede balk onderaan drukt komt de volgende bladzijde. 
De lijn op het scherm geeft de grootte van het vergelijkingsgetal 40 weer. Dadelijk komen achter elkaar weer 
de getallen die u zojuist zag. Onder elk getal moet u een lijn trekken. De lijn geeft weer hoe groot het getal is, 
vergeleken met het vergelijkingsgetal (40). Hoe groter het getal is, hoe langer de lijn, vergeleken met de lijn 
die bij 40 hoort. Als het getal bijvoorbeeld 80 is dan trekt u een lijn die 2 keer zo lang is. Bij een getal dat S 
keer zo groot Is (200 dus) trekt u een lijn die S keer zo lang is. Maar als een getal kleiner is dan 40, dan trekt u 
een lijn die korter is dan de lijn bij 40. Bijvoorbeeld: is het getal 10, dan trekt u een lijn die 4 keer zo klein is, 
want 10 is een vierde van 40. Is het getal 20 keer zo klein, 2 dus, dan trekt u een lijn die 20 keer zo klein is. 
Kijk nog eenmaal goed naar de lijn die bij 40 hoort. Als u op de balk drukt krijgt u het eerste getal te zien. 
Trek een lijn welke het getal hieronder weergeeft 
Nu gaan we andersom werken. Op het scherm staan een aantal lijnen van verschillende lengte. De eerste lijn is 
weer de vergelijkingslijn. U moet dadelijk de lengte van de lijnen weergeven met getallen. Hoe korter de lijn 
Is, hoe kleiner riet getal. Hoe langer de lijn is hoe groter het getal. Druk weer op de balk. 
De lijn op het scherm wordt weergegeven door het gelai 40. U moet zo onder elke lijn een getal zetten, dat de 
lengte van de lijn weergeeft, vergeleken met de lijn op het scherm. Als de lijn bijvoorbeeld 2 keer zo lang is, 
dan geeft u een getal dat 2 keer zo groot is, dus 2 keer 40 is 80. Maar als de lijn 5 keer zo kort is, geeft u een 
getal dat een vijfde is van 40, dus 8. Dus: zoveel keer langer de lijn, zoveel keer groter het getal. Zoveel keer 
korter de lijn, zoveel keer kleiner het getal. Kijk nog eenmaal goed naar de lijn. Daarbij hoort dus het getal 40 
Schrijf hieronder het getal dat de lengte van deze lijn weergeeft 
Sound task 
We hebben nu geoefend met getallen en lijnen. Maar Je kunt ook getallen en lijnen geven aan allerlei andere 
dingen. Op het scherm staan nu een aantal geluiden. U moet nu lijnen gebruiken om aan te geven hoe sterk 
deze gelulden zijn. U vergelijkt steeds met een druk cafe. Eerst trekt u een lijn bij een druk cafe. Net hadden 
we al een lijn gelrokken. Nu doet U dat iedere keer zelf. Het mag steeds dezelfde lijn zijn, maar ook steeds een 
andere. Dan geeft u aan of het geluid harder Is dan in een druk cafe of dat het minder hard is. Vanaf hier gaat 
het iets anders dan zoeven. U trekt nu iedere keer een langere lijn dan de lijn bij een druk cafe. Als een geluid 
bijvoorbeeld 3 keer zo hard is, dan trekt u een lijn die 3 keer zo lang is. Als een geluid 25 keer zo hard is, trekt 
u een lijn die 25 keer zo lang is. Maar ook als het geluld minder hard Is trekt u een lijn die langer is dan de lijn 
bij een druk cafe. Als een geluld bijvoorbeeld 10 keer minder hard is, trekt u toch een 10 keer zo lange lijn. Of 
als het geluid 5 keer minder hard is, trekt u een 5 keer zo lange lijn. 
1. Trek een lijn die de sterkte van het geluld in 'een druk cafe' weergeeft. 
2. Is het geluld Harder of Minder hard dan in 'een druk cafe'? Druk op H of M 
За. [Indien harder:] Geef nu met een langere lijn aan hoeveel harder het geluld Is dan in 'een druk cafe' 
3b. [Indien minder hard:] Geef nu met een langere lijn aan hoeveel minder hard het geluid Is dan in 'een druk 
cafe' 
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Wat we nu gedaan hebben roet lijnen, gaan we nu met getallen doen. U geeft eerst weer een getal aan een druk 
cafe. Dat mag weer iedere keer hetzelfde zijn, maar het kan ook ledere keer anders zijn. Dan geeft u weer aan 
of het geluld harder of minder hard is. Als net geluid harder is, dan geeft u met een groter getal aan hoeveel 
keer harder het geluid is. Maar ook als het geluld minder hard is, geeft u met een groter getal aan hoeveel 
minder hard het is. 
1. Zet een getal dat de sterkte van het geluid in 'een druk cafe' weergeeft 
2. Is het geluid Harder of Minder hard dan in 'een druk cafe'? Druk op H of M 
За [indien harder:] Geef nu met een groter getal aan hoeveel harder het geluid is dan in 'een druk cafe' 
3b. [Indien minder hard:] Geef nu met een groter getal aan hoeveel minder hard het geluid is dan In 'een druk 
cafe' 
Attitude task 
U bent nu klaar met het oefenen. Zo meteen krijgt u beweringen over de politiek en over ziekte en gezondheid 
te zien. Het zijn allerlei beweringen door elkaar. U krijgt er steeds een te zien. Niet ledereen heeft over alle 
uitspraken evenveel nagedacht. Het kan dus best dat u over een uitspraak geen mening heeft. Is dat zo, dan 
kunt u dat steeds aangeven. U krijgt dan de volgende vraag voorgelegd. Heeft u wel een mening over de 
uitspraak, dan wordt u gevraagd die te geven. Dat doet u weer door er getallen en lijnen aan geven, net zoals 
bij de geluiden. We vergelijken nu niet met een druk cafe maar met een mening 'er tussen in'. Dat betekent: 
"Ik ben het met deze bewering niet eens maar ook niet oneens." U trekt eerst een lijn bij 'er tussen in'. Dat is 
de vergelijkingslijn. Daarna geeft u uw eigen mening. U geeft eerst aan of u het met de uitspraak eens of 
oneens bent. Dan geeft u weer met een langere lijn aan, hoe sterk uw eigen mening is. Zoveel keer sterker uw 
mening, zoveel keer langer de lijn. Of u het nu met de bewering eens of oneens bent, de lijn die aangeeft hoe 
sterk uw mening is, is steeds langer dan de vergelijkingslijn. 
1. Trek nu een lijn die de mening 'er tussen in' weergeeft 
2. Bent u het met deze uitspraak Eens, Oneens of heeft u er Niet genoeg over nagedacht? 
Druk op E of O of N 
3a. [Indien geen mening: volgende item wordt gepresenteerd] 
3b. [indien eens:] Geef nu met een langere lijn aan hoe sterk u het met de uitspraak eens bent 
3c. [indien oneens:] Geef nu met een langere lijn aan hoe sterk u het met de uitspraak oneens bent 
Nu krijgt u dezelfde uitspraken nog een keer te zien. Nu moet u getallen geven in plaats van lijnen. U geeft 
eerst weer een getal bij 'er tussen in'. Dan geeft u weer aan of u het met de uitspraak eens of oneens bent, of 
dat u er niet genoeg over heeft nagedacht. Daarna geeft u met een groter getal aan hoe sterk u het met de 
uitspraak eens of oneens bent Zoveel keer sterker uw mening, zoveel keer groter het getal. 
1. Zet nu een getal dat de mening 'er tussen in' weergeeft 
2. Bent u het met deze uitspraak Eens, Oneens of heeft u er Niet genoeg over nagedacht? Druk op E of O of N 
3a. [Indien geen mening: volgende item wordt gepresenteerd] 
3b. [Indien eens:] Geef nu met een groter getal aan hoe sterk u het met de uitspraak eens bent 
3c. [Indien oneens:] Geef nu met een groter getal aan hoe sterk u het met de uitspraak oneens bent 
APPENDIX 3 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Part 1: To be filled out by the interviewer 
You have just used the computer to answer some questions on Dutch policies and on health and illness. Now, 
I would first like to talk with you some more about Dutch politics. 
1. You have given your opinions on various 
statements about such issues as employment, South-Africa, Social 
Security, the Third World. In general, are they issues that you 
are Interested in? 
2. Are you ever in the company of people who talk about these kinds 
of Issues? Do you usually take part in the conversation, do you listen 
with interest, or are you not interested? 
3. When there is an article in the newspaper about these kinds 
of issues do you read it? 
1. yes 
2. somewhat 
3. no 
1. never occurs 
2.1 usually participate 
3.1 listen with interest 
4. I'm not interested 
l . yes 
2. sometimes 
3. no 
4. And when there is something about them on television, for Instance 1. yes 
in current affairs programmes such as "Achter het Nieuws", 2. sometimes 
"Tros Aktua", "Brandpunt", do you watch it? 3. no 
5. Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections? 1. yes 
2. no 
6. Please gl ve as many names of political parties in parliament parties in parliament: 
(Lower House) as you know CDA, PvdA, WD, D'66, GL, 
SGP, GPV, RPF, CD 1 
7. Do you have a marked preference for any particular 1. yes, which one? 
political party? 2. no 
8. Are you a member of a political party? 1. yes, which one? 
are you an active member? 
2. no (go to question 9) 
9. Are you a member of a trade union? 1. yes, which one? 
are you an active member? 
2. no {go to question 10) 
10. Have you participated in actions or meetings which were 1. yes, regularly? 
organized by residents' associations, political parties or trade unions? what kind of actions? 
2. no (¿о to question 11) 
(present questionnaire I: items 11 to 20) 
On this paper you will find some statements in which something Is being said about the way the Netherlands 
should be governed. Each statement represents the views of a particular political party. Every party has its 
own thoughts about the best way to govern the Netherlands. I would like you to indicate which statement is 
likely to be made by which party. We have chosen some statements of the three major political parties. These 
are VVD, PvdA, and CDA. Some statements are more likely to be made by a politician of the W D . Other 
statements are more likely to be made by a politician of the PvdA. Finally, a politician of the CDA will more 
likely make still other statements. Can you indicate for each of the following statements by which party you 
think it is made? You can do this by drawing a circle around the correct answer. 
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Now, I will read to you some names of politicians. Please tell me whether you know this person. If you know 
the politician, do you also know to which party he or she belongs? Do you also know his or her function? 
21. Robin Llnschoten 
22. Hans van den Broek 
23. Marianne Sint 
24. Ria Beckers 
25. Thijs Woltgens 
l.yes 
1. yes 
1. yes 
1. yes 
1. yes 
2. no 
2. no 
2. no 
2. no 
2. no 
party 
WD 
CDA 
PvdA 
GL 
PvdA 
function 
Member of Parliament 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Party chairperson 
Member of Parliament 
Member of Parliament 
We have talked at length about Dutch politics. I would now like to talk with you about health and illness. On 
the computer you have judged some statements about health and illness, like on medical science, alternative 
medicine, reincarnation, studying at the university, and the best way to heal patients. 
26. Are these issues you are interested in? 1. yes 
2. somewhat 
3. no 
27. Are you ever In the company of people who talk about these kinds 1. never occurs 
of Issues? Do you usually take part in the conversation, 2.1 usually participate 
do you listen with interest, or are you not interested? 3.1 listen with interest 
4. I'm not Interested 
28. Do you sometimes read about these Issues? You may think not 1. yes 
only of detailed books, but also of leaflets of pharmacists 2. sometimes 
or chemists, for example. 2. no 
29. And when there is something about these Issues on television, 1. yes 
for instance In programmes such as "Vinger aan de Pols", 2. sometimes 
"Rondom Tien* or "Parallax", do you watch it? 3. no 
30. Are you member of an association of patients? 1. yes, which one? 
are you an active member? 
2. no (go to question 9) 
31 .What people think about health and illness will usually be related to their experience in this domain. If 
someone has experienced an illness, for example because he himself is ill or because a close relative or a good 
friend is ill, this will certainly affect the way he thinks about health and Illness. Someone who doesn't have 
any experience of severe diseases will think differently from someone who has had this kind of experience. 
That's why I want to ask you some things about your own experience with diseases. Have you ever gone 
through a serious illness, complaint or accident? Can you tell me something about It, what was happening? 
What did you think of it? 
- who was ill?; what illness?; when did he/she have experience with serious Illness?; 
- is the respondent well-informed about the course of the illness! 
- were doctors /medical specialists /alternative healers involved? 
- what did the respondent think of the course of the illness and its treatment? 
(present questionnaire II; items 32 to 41) 
On this sheet of paper there are again some statements. Now I would like to know which doctor or alternative 
healer could have made the statement Alternative healers often have opinions on health and illness which 
differ from those of normal doctors. Also, the different alternative healers do not always agree among 
themselves. Some statements are more likely to be made by a normal doctor. Others are more likely to be 
made by a paranormal healer. These are healers, who are also called magnetizer, layer-on of hands, or faith 
healer. Still other statements will be made by acupuncturists. Please indicate on this list whether you think a 
statement is made by a normal doctor, a paranormal healer or an acupuncturist. 
(present questionnaire III; items 42 to 51) 
A variety of doctors work at the hospital. All these doctors have their own specialisms, each of them with their 
own name. There are also a variety of alternative healers with different specialisms. On the paper you'll find a 
list of these names of medical specialists and alternative healers. Behind each name you'll find three 
descriptions. Can you Indicate which description is correct? 
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(present questionnaire TV; items 52 to 61) 
Here you see a number of concepts used In health care. There are concepts used by alternative healers as well 
as concepts used by normal doctors. Behind each concept there are three descriptions. One of these Is always 
the correct one. Please Indicate the one you think is correct 
Finally, I would like to ask you some background information. 
62. Do you have an occupation? 1. yes 
2. no (go to question 67) 
63. What Is your occupation? 
64. Are you in government service, otherwise employed or are you a. in government service 
self-employed? b. otherwise employed 
c. self-employed 
d. otherwise 
65. For what kind of company or institute do you work? 
66. Are you responsible for other people in your occupation? 1. yes, How many persons? 
2. no 
67. Did you have an occupation before? 1. yes 
2. no 
if yes: why don't you have it any more? a. enduring disability/Incapacity for 
questions 63 to 66 should be posed in past tense work 
b. unemployed/looking for a job 
с retired/living on private means 
d. otherwise 
if no: what is your situation at the moment? a. studying 
b. unemployed/looking for a job 
68. What is your age? years 
69. What is the highest level of educational 1. Primary school 
that you followed? 2. VGLO/LAVO (lower secondary) 
3. LBO (lower vocational), viz 
4. MULO, ULO, MAVO (lower secondary) 
5. HBS, MMS, Atheneum, Gymnasium 
(pre-unlversity) 
6. MBO (intermediate vocational), viz 
7. HBO (higher vocational), viz 
8. Universiteit (University), viz 
Part 2: Knowledge tests to be filled out by the respondent 
Questionnaire I 
11. The government should intervene more often to see to the 
recovery of the economy. l.CDA 2. PvdA 3.VVD 
12. The government itself lays down too many rules 
on business. l.CDA 2. PvdA 3. VVD 
13. The family is the cornerstone of society. l.CDA 2. PvdA 3.WD 
14. A person who achieves more and performs better in his job should 
have a higher salary than others. 1. CDA 2. PvdA 3. VVD 
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15. The tax burden on privale people should be alleviated a great deal. 1. CDA 
16. Government spending must be kepi as low as possible. Thai is 
the best condition for good policy. 1. CDA 
17. New houses and house improvement should primarily benefit 
the low-income people 1. CDA 
2. PvdA 3. WD 
2. PvdA 3. VVD 
18. Income differences should be reduced in order to make sure 
that the lowest incomes do not fall. 
19. Citizens should be better protected, for example by a strengthened 
police force. 1. CDA 
20. People should look after each other more and take more care of 
each other when times are hard. 1. CDA 
Questionnaire II 
32. In healing one acts on one's intuition. 
33. Feeling a person's wrist can tell you what kind of illness he or she has. 
34. Using a pendant can tell you what kind of illness a person has. 
35. Life energy follows certain pathways in the body. 
36. In the final analysis It is a matter of chance whether a person becomes 
ill or not. 
37. It is always possible to get to know the patient's complaint, even if the 
patient does not tell you about It 
38. Dlness should be cured by remedies that counteract the illness. 
2. PvdA 3. W D 
1. CDA 2. PvdA 3. VVD 
2. PvdA 3. VVD 
2. PvdA 3. W D 
39. Every organ is linked to a certain spot on the body. 
40. One can only cure people in the right way if one has a thorough knowledge 
of all parts of the body. 
41. In the final analysis one doesn't cure, one only transmits energy. 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal neater 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
1. normal doctor 
2. paranormal healer 
3. acupuncturist 
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Questionnaire III 
42. urologist 
43. oncologist 
44. haptonomist 
45. orthopaedist 
46. iiidologist 
47. dermatologist 
48. auriculotherapist 
49. chiropractor 
50. radiologist 
51. homeopathist 
Questionnaire IV 
52. fluïdum 
53.D20 
54. auscultation 
55. aura 
a. specialist for kidney diseases 
b. specialist for urinary passages and genital organs 
с specialist for venereal diseases 
a. specialist for internal diseases 
b. specialist for inflammations 
с specialist for malignant tumors 
a. alternative healer, who works with cosmic powers 
b. alternative healer, who relies on touch, feelings and emotional life 
с alternative healer, who uses certain diets 
a. specialist of the locomotor apparatus 
b. specialist of the feet 
с dentist 
a. specialist of the eyes 
b. specialist who uses a certain instrument to study the internal organs 
с alternative healer, who diagnoses diseases by looking people in the eye 
a. specialist of the skin 
b. specialist of the Intestines 
с specialist of the kidneys 
a. alternative healer who treats patients by stimulating certain parts of the auricle 
b. ear doctor 
с alternative healer, who finds out diseases by looking at the radiation around a 
body 
a. specialist who performs operations 
b. expert of the lines of the hand 
с bonesetter 
a. alternative healer, who uses positively or negatively charged particles of air 
b. specialist, who uses radiation therapy 
с alternative healer, who uses sound waves 
a. alternative healer using only botanical medicines 
b. alternative healer, who cures similar diseases what with similar medicines 
с alternative healer, who Includes the whole person In treatment 
a. medicinal liquid 
b. medicinal energy 
с medicinal injection 
a. vitamin 
b. specification of homeopathic dilution 
с substance used in enzymotherapy 
a. percussing a patient 
b. internal examination 
с listening to internal organs 
a. omen of an Illness 
b. auricle 
с radiation surrounding a body 
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56. syndrome a. signs which are characteristic of a certain disease 
b. pain which is characteristic of a certain disease 
c. diseases occurring at the same time 
57. meridian a. cross section of an organ 
b. certain path on the body that Ufi energy runs along 
c. imaginary midpoint of the body 
58. virus a. kind of bacterium 
b. kind of fungus 
с very small pathogen 
59. anamnesis a. history of an illness 
b. anaesthetic 
с distorted picture of disease 
60. X-ray a. photograph made with sound waves 
b. photograph made with invisible beams 
с photograph, on which the sick parts of the body are brighter 
61. holism a. theory on internal organs 
b. theory on illness that includes the whole person and not only the body 
с theory cm illness that includes the positions of the stars 
Part 3: Observation scheme to be filled out by the interviewer 
70. Sex 
71. Place of residence 
72. Civil status 
77 .Were other persons present during the interview? 
If yes, who? 
Did they listen? 
Did they intervene? 
78. Were there other disturbing Influences? 
If yes, which? 
79. Did the respondent think the questionnaire was? 
80. Was the respondent....? 
l.male 
1. Nijmegen 
1. married or 
living together 
l.yes 
l.yes 
1. yes 
l.yes 
1. pleasant 
1. difficult 
1. interesting 
1. tense 
1. concerned 
2. female 
2. elsewhere, viz. 
2. unmarried 
2. no 
2. no 
2. no 
2. no 
2. unpleasant 
2. easy 
2. boring 
2. relaxed 
2. indifferent 
1. concentrated. 2. not concentrated 
81. Give the respondent a school mark on a scale from 1 to 10: school mark:.... 
-10 points are for the Ideal respondent, I.e. a respondent who understood all questions at once, 
who gave complete and reliable answers etc. 
- and 1 point for the worst respondent imaginable. 
82. Has the respondent had any experience with computers? 
83. Has the respondent been asked for an interview? 
1. yes 2. no 
l.yes, participates 
2. yes, doesn't participate 
3. no 
APPENDIX 4 
RATIO SCORES IN MAGNITUDE SCALING 
As described in Chapter 5, respondents are asked to give ratio scores in magnitude scaling. 
However, one of the questions which has given rise to much debate about the usefulness 
and validity of magnitude scaling is the question of whether or not the respondents do 
indeed give ratio scores. 
Some observations of the actual strategies used by the respondents to nil out the 
questionnaire can shed some light on this question. These observations relate to the 
strategies used in the non-metric instruction tasks in the pilot studies 1 and 2 and in the 
present study. The metric task uses a commonly known metric, so that it is likely that 
indeed ratio scores were given (Poulton, 1989). Indeed, respondents often thought of 
centimeters when giving numbers to lines or lines to numbers. 
As can be seen in table al, the non-metric instruction tasks differed somewhat for the 
different pilot studies and for the final study. In pilot study 1, a semantic task was used, in 
pilot study 2, a sound task as well as an occupation task were used, and in this study a 
sound task. 
Respondents were found to use difference scores, categorical judgements of the more 
common Likert-type (somewhat more, somewhat less etc.), fixed maximum scores, and 
some common numerical distributions instead of ratio-scores. Below, these different 
strategies will be described. The proportion of respondents using a specific strategy will be 
mentioned whenever possible. 
Difference scores 
As has also been remarked by Rule and Curtis (1982), some respondents used difference 
scores. It is not possible to tell from a respondent's scores whether or not he or she used 
difference scores. There is one way, however, to show that difference scores were used by 
at least some respondents. The way in which respondents were asked to express their own 
judgments of the stimuli differed for the pilot studies and for the final study. In the final 
study respondents were asked to give longer lines and higher numbers to all items, whether 
these were judged louder or less loud than the reference (see appendix 1). In pilot studies 1 
and 2, however, respondents were only asked to give higher numbers and longer lines than 
the reference if an item was judged to be more positive (for evaluative words in study 1), 
louder (for sounds in study 2), or more prestigious (for occupations in study 2) than the 
reference item. They were asked to give smaller numbers or lines when the item was less 
large etc. than the reference item. 
Say, a respondent in one of the pilot studies gives a reference score of 10. If he gives 
difference scores a difference of 9 points the score given to the item will be 1 if the item is 
judged to be smaller than the reference item. If the item is judged to be bigger than the 
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Table al Stimuli of the instruction tasks 
study 1 
study 2 
study 2 
final 
study 
name 
semantic 
occupation 
sound 
sound 
reference 
so-so 
nurse 
a crowded pub 
a crowded pub 
items 
absolutely perfect, excellent, very good, outstanding, good, 
sufficient, moderate, not so good, obviously insufficient, 
bad, lousy, very bad, horrible 
lavatory attendant (female), waitress in a cafeteria, 
machinist, hairdresser (female), foreman of a department 
(industrial), stenographer (female), primary school teacher 
(female), public notary, secretary of state 
whispering, a local bank office, a middle-class car on the 
highway, a heavy truck, a tumultuous stadium, a |et plane 
whispering, a local bank office, a middle-class car on the 
highway, a heavy truck driving past, a tumultuous 
stadium, a Jet plane flying low 
Table a2 Range mean scores on instruction tasks (pilot study 1, pilot study 2, city sample of final study) 
number line 
mean score per item 
study 1, studenti* 
study 1, non-students* 
study 2** 
final study 
task maximum minimum maximum minimum 
semantic 2.5 5.0 3.7 6.7 
semantic 2.7 4.1 3.0 4.1 
occupation 2.0 3.3 1.8 2.5 
sound 3.0 9.0 2.7 5.5 
sound 8.2 5.5 4.1 3.7 
* note: in study 1 28 college students and 4Э persons with predominantly lower educational levels filled out the 
questionnaire 
** note: only 25 respondents of study 2, who used the computer, are incorporated in the analysis; 25 respondents, who 
used the paper-and-pencil version are left out of account, because a computer was also used in pilot study 1 and the final 
study 
reference score a difference of 9 results in a score of 19. The ratios to the reference score 
are 10 and 1.9, respectively. Thus, if a respondent gives difference scores instead of ratio 
scores, the scores will be more extreme for the items that are judged to be smaller than for 
the items that are judged to be bigger. Table a2 shows that for the non-metric instruction 
tasks in the pilot studies, the minimum ratio is indeed more extreme than the maximum 
ratio. 
In the final study, however, the maximum ratio is larger than the minimum ratio, 
whereas the items are more or less similar to those in pilot study 2. This finding can be 
explained by the differences in instructions mentioned above. In the final study respondents 
were always asked to give higher numbers and longer lines to the items, whether these 
were judged to be louder or less loud than the reference item. Thus, if a reference score of 
10 was given, a difference of 9 points always results in an absolute ratio score of 1.9 
(minus 1.9 if the item is judged to be less loud, plus 1.9 if the item is judged to be louder 
than the reference item). 
The maximum scores are somewhat higher than the minimum scores, although the items 
are more or less comparable to those of the sound task in study 2. It can be concluded that 
the differences in maximum and minimum scores in the pilot studies are not found because 
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the items judged smaller etc. were more extreme. Therefore, it is concluded that these 
findings are evidence of the use of difference scores. Of course, this is not to say that 
difference scores were not used in the final study. Because of the differences in the 
minimum and maximum scores observed in pilot studies 1 and 2, respondents were always 
asked in the final study to give a higher number or a longer line after having indicated first 
whether the item was more or less loud than the reference item. 
Categorical judgements 
While some respondents appear to give difference scores, others used categorical 
judgements instead of ratio judgements. This was indicated by the fact that, when asked to 
reason aloud, respondents used phrases like "this sound is somewhat louder" or "this word 
is much more positive" and consequently drew a line that was 'somewhat longer' or gave a 
number that was 'much larger' than the reference. This may result in scores not unlike the 
difference scores mentioned above, but it is difficult to tell from the distributions of the 
scores whether or not respondents used this strategy to obtain their responses. 
Fixed maximum scores 
It was observed that some respondents first thought of a maximum score they were going 
to give besides a fixed reference score. Only after having set this standard did they think of 
giving scores in between the reference and the maximum2. In the line drawing modality the 
maximum score was often referred to as 'a screen full'. Of course, the fact that the 
maximum length of a line actually was 'a screen full' would suggest that the task of line 
drawing was in fact different from the task of number estimation where no such fixed 
maximum existed. It is difficult to assess whether a maximum score was thought of from 
the beginning of a task, because respondents always gave a maximum score to the most 
extreme item. 
Some common numerical distributions 
The use of numbers as a response modality reminded some respondents of some often used 
numerical distributions. Two of these were actually used by some respondents: percentages 
and school marks. 
If respondents use percentages, this is indicated by the use of a reference score between 
40 and 60 and a maximum score of 100. In study 1, 4 students (14%) and 4 non-students 
(10%) gave percentage scores; in study 2, 2 respondents (8%) gave percentages to the 
sound task and 3 (12%) to the occupation task; in the present study, 5 respondents (5%) 
used percentages in the sound task. In sum, about 8% of all respondents used percentages in 
the instruction tasks. 
The use of school marks (also a form of category scaling) is connected with the Dutch 
system, in which marks between 0 and 10 are given. Traditionally, these marks are 
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associated to explanatory evaluative words, which can always be found on the reports, 
ranging from very poor (for 0) through sufficient (for 6) to excellent (for 10). If 
respondents use these kinds of numbers, this is indicated by a reference score of 4, S or 6 
and a maximum score of 10. In study 1, 7 students (25%) and 9 non-students (22%) used 
school marks in the semantic task. In study 2, these kinds of numbers were neither used in 
the sound task nor in the occupation task. In the present study, only 2 respondents (2%) 
used school marks in the sound task. Thus, the use of school marks is limited to the 
semantic task where a match between numbers and evaluative words existed already in the 
form of school mark descriptions. As in the U.S. the use of school marks is different 
(running from D to A, instead of from 1 to 10) American researchers were not likely to 
find this kind of number estimation. 
While Poulton only described how the scores in response modalities with well-known 
numerical distributions can be ratio scores, it is observed here, that some well-known 
numerical distributions can also prevent respondents from giving ratio scores. 
Conclusion 
In sum, all four strategies described (difference scores, categorical scores of a Likert type, 
setting maximum scores or using one of the common numerical standards) result in either 
difference or categorical scores but not in the ratio scores that the respondents are asked to 
give. These differences in strategies may explain a large part of the individual differences 
in regression coefficients (see Saris, 1988). To check whether the individual differences in 
the use of the instrument are related to social characteristics of the respondents an analysis 
of variance was carried out. No significant differences according to the social position and 
sex of respondents were found in their scores on the metric and the sound task in the final 
study3. 
In view of these findings one might question whether scores should be calculated as the 
ratio between the item score and the reference score. It may be better, at least for some 
respondents, to calculate scores as the difference between the item score and the reference 
score. However, it was found, in both pilot studies as well as in the final study, that the 
results based on scores calculated as ratio scores fulfilled the magnitude scaling 
requirements rather well (Westerhof, 1989a, 1989b; Chapter 6). Although the use of 
school marks was found to result in a smaller regression coefficient on the power law, it is 
concluded that scores can be effectively calculated as ratio scores. 
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NOTES 
Introduction 
ι The abbreviation stands for "POlitieke VOorkeur", I.e. "political preferences". 
2 The 'higher' educational Institutes were VWO (pre-university level), and HAVO (higher secondary level); 
the lower" institutes were LBO (lower vocational level), and MAVO (lower secondary level). 
Chapter 1 Survey questionnaires 
1 J. Converse (1987); the Issue celebrating the 50th anniversary of the journal Public Opinion Quarterly (edited 
by Singer, 1987); Turner and Martín (1984); Van Ginneken (1986,1990); Champagne (1990); Blondiaux 
(1991). 
2 These Ideological legitimizations in terms of democratic and scientific principles will be critically examined In 
chapters 3 and 4. 
3 See Sudman and Bradbum (1987) on private, government, and university institutes; Gollin (1987) on the 
media; and Presser (1984) on universities. 
4 See Presser (1984) for some of the differences in the use of the survey across disciplines. 
5 See Alwin and Campbell (1987) for a short history of survey data analysis. 
6 See Thomas and Znanlecki (1920/1974); Allport (1935); Fleming (1967). 
7 In the United States the first census was held in 1790, In England in 1801 (J. Converse, 1987, p. 12). 
S See Frankel and Frankel (1987) on the development of sampling techniques. 
9 See Lazarsfeld (1944) for a contribution to the discussion about open and closed questions at that time. See 
J. Converse (1984) for a historical account, and Van Holsteyn (1993) on the disappearance of open 
questions in the Netherlands. See also section 8.3 on open questions. 
10 For example: the American Association for Public Opinion Research adopted a code in 1968, the Council of 
American Survey Research Organizations and the National Council on Public Poll both did so in 1979 
(Turner and Martin, 1984). 
И The following studies were used: Sudman and Bradbum (1974); Schuman and Presser (1981); Dijkstra and 
Van der Zouwen (1982); Turner and Martin (1984); J. Converse and Schuman (1987); Groves (1987); Van 
der Zouwen and Dijkstra (1989); Singer and Presser (1989); Abom (1991); Alwin (1989,1991); Schwarz 
and Sudman (1992); 't Hart and Kox (1992). 
12 In chapter 2, we will meet some problems relating to this analogy between psychological tests and opinion 
surveys. 
13 Another measurement model, developed by Rasch (I960), does not postulate a one-to-one relationship 
between a 'true score' and a measurement value. It postulates that the measurement value is obtained from 
the 'true score' with a certain probability. This model is seldom used In survey measurement, however. 
14 The term 'response effect is not appropriate: while It suggest an effect of the response It Is in fact the effect 
of some Independent variable upon the response. Common usage will, however, be followed. 
15 Psychometrists have studied similar phenomena in psychological testing, known as response sets. 
Strangely enough, there are virtually no references to the study of response sets in the literature on response 
effects. 
16 In these examinations, different methods have been used. 
- First, the answers can sometimes be checked against existing information obtained from other sources to 
see whether or not any distortions occurred. Of course, the information from external sources should also 
be reliable, which Is not always the case (Miller and Groves, 1985). 
• A second method of dealing with the quality of answers Is a 'construct' validity approach. Andrews 
(1984) used a multltrait-multlmethod design to assess the relative contributions to answers of specific 
response scales and concepts of interest. 
• Third, the magnitude of the effects has been assessed in so-called split ballot experiments. In these 
experiments, respondents are randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions and presented with 
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slightly different versions of a questionnaire. This method is used, for example, by Schuman and Presser 
(1981), and Bishop and colleagues (1979, 1980, 1982, 1983. 1986, 1990). The approach Is relatively 
limited in scope: whenever an effect occurs for one question, it does not necessarily occur for another 
question that Is different in content 
- Finally, three different approaches have been used to generalize the findings of the rather ad hoc 
experiments mentioned above: non-experimental examination of response effects at a more general level 
than at that of specific questions of different form and content (Molenaar, 1989), 'meta-analyses' on the 
split ballot experiments (e.g. De Leeuw, 1989; see also Van der Zouwen, 1989), and the construction of 
models that can be used to explain response effects (Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen, 1982; Van der Zouwen, 
1989). Recently, psychologists have tried to account for the occurrence of response effects from a cognitive 
psychological point of view (Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988; Schwarz and Sudman, 1992). 
Chapter 2 The Converse debate 
1 In the early sixties, Converse developed his arguments on three different occasions: together with Campbell, 
Miller and Stokes in "The American Voter" (I960), an attitudinal and field theoretical study of voting in 
presidential elections in the US; in a paper presented at the Seventeenth International Congress of 
Psychology (1963; published in 1970), which is the continuation of a dialogue started by Hovland (1959), 
comparing the results of the psychological experiment and the sample survey with regard to attitude change; 
and finally, and most forcefully, in his article "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964a), 
which is mainly about differences in political attitudes between the political elite and the mass public. In 
1964 he also published an article in French, relating to elite-mass differences (1964b). Later on, he 
participated actively in the debate that resulted from his arguments (1974,1975,1979a, 1979b, 1980; see 
also Converse and Markus, 1979). In 1985, with Roy Pierce, he published an analysis of French politics 
which closely follows the lines set out in his earlier statements. 
2 Converse uses the concepts of ЪеІіеГ and 'attitude' more or less interchangeably. 
3 The need for an interdisciplinary approach is explicitly underlined in "The American Voter" (1960) and In the 
preface by Eulau (1964) to the collection of essays in which Converse's 1964 article was included. 
4
 Converse thus uses the notion of ideology in a neutral sense, implying only a system of beliefs. Ideology 
has neither a positive meaning, being a system of ideas that serves as a guideline how to arrange society, nor 
a negative meaning, being the distorted view of reality that the concept has had ever since Marx. Converse 
himself is aware of the various connotations of the concept of 'ideology' in the social sciences (see 1964a, 
p.207). See Minar (1961) for an overview of the various meanings of the concept and Larraln (1979) for its 
history. 
5 See Heider (1946,1958) on balance, Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) on congruence, M.Rosenberg 
(1956,1960a, M. Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960) on affective-cognitive consistency, and Festinger (1957) 
on cognitive dissonance. See Boosch (1986) for an analysis of the relation of Converse's theory with 
various psychological consistency theories. 
6 He also mentions how co-occurring beliefs are related to configurations of interests and Information that 
characterize particular niches in societies. Having thus become related to Interests, this conception of belief 
systems comes closer to the Marxist meaning of the term Ideology. 
7 In the context of the differences In "what the parties stand for", respondents were asked: "Would you say 
that [either] one of the parties is more conservative or more liberal than the other?" and "What do you have in 
mind when you say that the Republicans (Democrats) are more conservative than the Democrats 
(Republicans)?". Respondents who said they saw no differences between the parties were also asked: "Do 
you think that people generally consider the Democrats or the Republicans more conservative, or wouldn't 
you want to guess about It?" and "What do people have in mind when they say that the Republicans 
(Democrats) are more conservative than the Democrats (Republicans)?" 
8 Average tau-gamma's are (table reproduced from Converse, 1964a, p. 229): 
within between within between 
domestic issues domestic and foreign foreign issues issues and party 
eUte .53 .25 .37 .39 
mass .23 .11 .23 .11 
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9 The fact that the 'power and housing' item fits best into the model is explained by certain characteristics of 
that item. The 'power and housing' item corresponds to a very basic political controversy, and it is rather 
abstract and remote from everyday experience. Furthermore, "while events like the crisis at Little Rock and 
exposés of waste in foreign aid were occurring in this period to touch off meaningful evolutions of opinion, 
little was occurring that might intuitively be expected to shake true beliefs on one side or the other" 
(Converse, 1964a, p.243). 
10 See also other reviews of this debate: Converse (1975); T. Smith (1984); Kinder and Sears (1985); 
McGuire (1985); Monroe (1981); Snlderman and TeUock(1986); Milbum (1991). 
11 Whether there Is a relationship between this recent interest and the publication of the new Handbook of 
Social Psychology In 1985, in which the debate was discussed in both the chapter on "Public Opinion and 
Political Action" by Kinder and Sears and the chapter on "Attitudes" by McGuire, Is an interesting question 
that cannot be solved here, however. 
12 E. g. Feldman (1983,1988); Chong, McClosky and Zaller (1983). 
13 The relations between higher-order beliefs and specific attitudes are also studied in expectancy-value 
theories of attitudes (e.g. Rotter, 1954). 
14 E. g. Levltin and Miller (1979); Conover and Feldman (1981); Brady and Sniderman (1986, cited in 
Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986); Chubb, Hagen and Sniderman (1984, cited in Sniderman and Tetlock, 
1986) on political parties. 
E. g. Carmines and Stìmson (1982); Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinskl (1984) on race. 
E. g. Knoke (1979) on social class. 
15 In 1964, he mentioned the importance of values: "Often such constraint (that is not in line with a 
conservative/liberal yardstick) is quasi-logically argued on the basis of an appeal to some superordlnate 
value or posture toward man and society, involving premises about the nature of social justice, social 
change, 'natural law', and the like. Thus a few crowning postures - like premises about the survival of the 
fittest in the spirit of Social Darwinism - serve as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific 
attitudes and beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole." (p.211 ). 
In the study on the American voter and in his article of 1964 he also mentioned the importance of social 
groups. Campbell et al. used the term 'ideology by proxy' in their coding of the levels of sophistication: 
There is little comprehension of 'long-range plans for social betterment', or of basic philosophies rooted in 
postures toward change or abstract conceptions of social and economic structure of causation. The party or 
candidate is simply endorsed as being for' a group with which the subject is identified or as being above 
the selfish demands of groups within the population. Exactly how the candidate or party might see to fit to 
implement or void group interests is a moot point, left unrelated to broader ideological concerns." (1960, 
p.234). 
16 Studies on cognitive complexity have been carried out by Scott (1962,1969); LinviUe (1982); Judd and 
Lusk (1984); Lusk and Judd (1988). Tetlock's studies (1983,1984,1986,1989), based on the integrative 
complexity coding scheme of Schroder, Driver and Streufert (1967), have recently gained much attention in 
social psychology. Although somewhat different in theory and methodology, the studies of S.Rosenberg 
(1987,1988) on political reasoning in the Piagetian tradition can also be seen as studies on cognitive 
complexity. See Milbum (1991), and Eagly and Chaiken (1993) for reviews of cognitive complexity. 
17 See the reviews on attitude research by McGuire (1986); Tesser and Shaffer (1990); Olson and Zanna 
(1993). 
18 Besides the structure between different attitudes (also called inter-attitudlnal structure), research is also 
carried out on the different components of an attitude (also called Intra-attimdinal structure). A well-known 
example of the last is the trichotomy of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of an attitude 
(McGuire, 1985; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). 
19 See Pratkanis, Breckler and Greenwald (1989), Olson and Zanna (1993). 
20 Attitudes are then defined as mental representations of (social) objects. A criticism, which focuses more on 
the presentation of attitudes in everyday talk, will be presented In the 'epilogue'. 
21 This theory strongly resembles the theories of cognitive schemata, which dominated much of social 
psychology In the eighties (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). These studies also refer explicitly to the 'Converse 
debate', for example in the case of Conover and Feldman (1984) and Milbum (1991) and in different 
articles In the volume on political cognition edited by Lau and Sears (1986). Differences In cognitive 
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schemata are specifically conceptualized as expert-novice differences. They closely resemble the differences 
in associative networks described by Judd and Krosnick (1989). 
22 As McGulre (1985, p.239) notes: "In most empirical studies specific attitudes are defined at least implicitly 
as responses thai locate 'objects of thought' on 'dimensions of Judgment"*. 
23 See Fazio (1990b) and chapter 5 for details on the measurement of response latencies and section 6.2 for 
some difficulties in the interpretation of response latencies. Recently, measurement of response latency has 
also been used in surveys (BassUl and Fletcher, 1991; Bassili, 1993). 
24 See Abelson (1988); Judd and Krosnick (1982); Krosnick and Schuman (1988); Schuman and Presser 
(1981); Raden (1989). In their recent book, Eagly and Chalken (1993) mentioned a monograph on attitude 
strength edited by Petty and Krosnick, which was not available, however, when this chapter was written. 
25 In the eighties, much research has focused on the organization of political cognitions: see the volume on 
"Political Cognition" edited by Lau and Sears (1986); Hamlll, Lodge and Blake (1985); Mllbum (1987); 
Lodge and Hamill (1986). 
26 "At the lower end of the continuum is the nonattltude. No a priori evaluation of the attitude object exists in 
memory. As we move along the continuum, an evaluation does exist and the strength of the association 
between that evaluation and the object and, hence, the chronic accessibility of the attitude, increases. In the 
case of a weak association, the attitude can be retrieved via an effortful, reflective process but is not capable 
of automatic activation. At the upper end of the continuum is a well-learned, strong association that is likely 
to be activated automatically upon mere observation or mention of the object" (Fazio, 1989, p. 159-160). 
27 Such as accessibility and number of links (Judd et al., 1991), knowledge and constraint (Norpoth and 
Lodge, 1985), knowledge and crystallization (Norpoth and Lodge, 1985). 
28 Such as those between stability and constraint, and importance (see the section on "Respondent 
Characteristics"), accessibility and importance (Krosnick, 1989), accessibility and centrality (Bassili, 
1993), and complexity and importance (Tetlock, 1989). 
29 See Hastie and Park (1986); Lodge, McGraw and Stroh (1989). 
30 See Krosnick (1989); Fazio (1986,1990a); Raden (1985). 
31 See Eagly and Chalken (1993); Olson and Zanna (1993). However, Converse (1970) and Fazio (1989) 
argue that most studies on attitude change carried out in psychological laboratories can be interpreted as 
studies on attitude formation, since they deal with Issues which are highly unfamiliar to the subjects who 
have to express their 'attitudes' on these issues. 
32 See for example the discussion started by E. Smith (1980), disputed by Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1981), 
Abramson (1981), E. Smith (1981); the work by Kllngemann (1973,1979) and by Pierce (1970; Pierce 
and Hagner, 1982,1983; Hagner and Pierce, 1982); Cassell (1984). 
33 See Nie and Andersen (1974), disputed by LeBlanc and Merrin (1977), Sullivan, Piereson and 
Marcus(1978), Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber (1978), Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bennett 
(1978), Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick (1978a, 1978b), Nie and Rabjohn (1979a), Sullivan, 
Piereson, Marcus and Feldman (1979), Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber and Bennett (1979) and Nie and 
Rabjohn (1979b); 
see also W. Bennett (1976); Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976); Brunk (1978), disputed by Petrocik (1978); 
and Converse and Markus (1979). 
34 In more recent years, similar processes of politicization are going on with regard to environmental issues. 
35 A question on economic welfare, for example, was worded as follows in 1956: "The government in 
Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. Now would you have an 
opinion on (his or not? (If yes): Do you think the government should do thls7" 
The 1964 format was: "In general, some people feel that the government in Washington should see to It that 
every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each 
person get ahead on his own. Have you been interested enough in this to favour one side over the other? (If 
yes): Do you think that the government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of 
living or should it let each person get ahead on his own?" 
36 See Carmines and Stimson (1982) for an analysis of racial Issues; Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), Chittick, 
Billinsley and Travis (1990), Wittkopf (1986). and Kegley (1986) on foreign affairs; Knoke (1979), and 
McClosky and Brill (1983) on the structure in various domains; Sullivan et al. (1979), Nie and Rabjohn 
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(1979a), and Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) analyzed Stouffer's tolerance items; Inglehait (1985) 
poet-materialism; Brown (1970) freedom and equality; Chong et al. (1983) democratic and capitalist values. 
37 Similarities in the wording of different questions about single Issues may have produced this kind of 
within-issue constraint. 
38 See Bishop and Frankovic (1981), and Kent Jennings (1992) on the U.S.; Converse and Pierce (1985) on 
France; Middendorp (1978) on the Netherlands; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1979) on Italian elites. 
39 E.g. Wray (1979), Axelrod (1967), Bishop (1976), Bishop, Oldendlck and Tuchfarber(1978). Nie and 
Anderson (1974), Judd, Krosnlck and Milbum (1981), Jackson (1979). 
40 Eg. Bennett (1976). Judd and Milbum (1980), Erikson (1979). 
41 E.g. Sullivan et al. (1978); Bennett (1976); Judd et al. (1981); Mueller and Judd (1981); Leighley (1991). 
42 E.g. Achen (1975); Brown (1970); Erikson (1979). 
43 In fact, all of the counter-arguments offered by McGuire (1985) in his short review of the 'Converse 
debate' can be Interpreted as specifications of the conditions under which stability and constraint will be 
greater. 
44 Item nonresponse Is also often assessed by "don't know" answers. The meaning of such answers is more 
ambivalent, however. As T. Smith (1984) pointed out, a "don't know" answer does not necessarily mean 
that a person does not have an opinion on an issue. It can also be given by a respondent who has a 
controversial opinion or an opinion that does not match the response alternatives. 
45 Bourdieu (1979); Ferber (1966); Filion (1975); Francis & Busch (1975); Bethlehem and Kersten (1986); S. 
Bennett (1988); Reuband (1990); Duncan and Stenbeck (1988). 
46 Schuman and Presser (1981); Andrews (1984); Krosnlck and Schuman (1988); Tourangeau and Rasinski 
(1988); Tourangeau, Rasinski and Bradbum (1989); Bishop (1990); Krosnick (1991); Schwarz and 
Sudman (1992). 
47 Pierce and Rose (1974), disputed by Converse (1974) and Rose and Pierce (1974); Achen (1975), disputed 
by Hunter and Coggin (1976), Stephens (1976), Arrington (1976), Achen (1976) and Etheredge (1977); 
Dean and Moran (1977); Erikson (1978, 1979); Jackson (1979). These were inspired by models of 
analysis of panel data, notably Heise (1971), Wiley and Wiley (1971) and Wheaton et al. (1977). Similar 
analyses on new data are reported, which try to separate 'true' attitudes from error: Judd and Milbum 
(1980), disputed by Converse (1980), Martin (1981), S. Smith (1981), Milbum and Judd (1981) and 
Judd, Krosnick and Milbum (1981); Norpoth and Lodge (1985). 
48 The major differences are: 
- whether the model allows for 'true' attitude change; 
- whether the model permits correlated measurement error; 
- whether it is assumed that measurement error is the same for all respondents or different for respondents 
with durèrent educational levels or political sophistication. 
In addition to these differences In assumptions, there are also differences in the data that have been used, 
due to recodings (e.g. dichotomizatlon) and the inclusion of "no opinion" answers. 
49 Converse (1964a) also used the answers to open questions to further assess the problem of reliability. 
Converse assumed that a specific issue would be central to those respondents (or issue public) who started 
to talk about It in their answers to open questions. The test-retest reliability of items dealing with these 
Issues was much higher for these respondents than for respondents who did not mention the issue in their 
answers to open questions. 
50 Cronbach (1960) also said that reliability coefficients also depend on the group of respondents who are 
interviewed, be it in a different way than Converse meant: "The reliability coefficient depends on the spread 
of scores in the group studied" (p. 129). 
51 In the 'epilogue' a further criticism of the idea of a true' attitude is given. 
52 This is not to say that reliability is only a characteristic of the respondents. The level of crystallization found 
will also depend on the way the questions are asked and the Issues they deal with. 
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Chapter 3 The sodai significance of producing political opinions 
1 Bourdieu is less Interested in the cognitive representation of attitudes, but more in (he actual manifestation of 
opinions and in the games and Interests behind them. See also the 'epilogue'. 
2 See for his studies on the political field Bourdieu (1973a, 1973b, 1976a, 1977b, 1979, 1980d, 1980e, 
1981a, 1981b, 1982a, 1984a, 1987b, 1988, 1989,1993a); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu and 
Champagne (1989); Bourdieu and Christin (1990). Raphael (1989) gives an outline of Bourdieu's political 
sociology. 
3 See especially Bourdieu (1979) and Bourdieu (1980a), and some interviews with Bourdieu (1987a, 1992). 
Brubaker (1985), Dimaggio (1979), Gamham and Williams (1980), and Honnelh (1984) give critical 
reviews of Bourdieu's work. Robbins (1991) provides a detailed outline of the work of Bourdieu and its 
development 
4 At the risk of simplifying them, some of Bourdieu's criticisms of other theories will be summarized very 
briefly In this and the following note to clarify his position in the field of social sciences. Unlike the 
structuralists (especially Lévi-Strauss), Bourdieu argues that actors are not Just executors of cultural rules. 
Unlike De Saussure, Bourdieu argues that speech is not just the execution of language as a system of 
objective relationships. Unlike Marxists, and more like Weber, he argues that mental structures and cultural 
products are not just an epiphenomenon of the economic substratum. Bourdieu also points out that the 
traditional use of statistics in sociology Implies an unjust relficatlon of social structures, and that statistics 
should always be complemented by ethnographical descriptions which can reveal the sodai processes lying 
behind those structures. (Bourdieu, 1987a, 1980a, 1992). 
5 Unlike psycho-analysis, Bourdieu conceives of processes such as repression as social, not as Individual 
processes. Against behaviorism, Bourdieu argues that stimuli will only elicit reactions from those people 
who are adjusted to the social structures in which the stimuli have social impact. Bourdieu also describes 
psychological practices, such as psycho-therapy and intelligence tests, as cultural products which are an 
expression of the world outlook of certain dass fractions. Unlike Sartre, Bourdieu argues that the possibility 
of formulating one's life project in freedom only exists under certain social conditions. Unlike Elster, he 
argues thai the capadty to act rationally is also bound by sodai conditions. Furthermore, Bourdieu argues 
that ethnomethodologlsts (e.g. Goffman), studying situated practice in detail, forget the social structures in 
which situated action takes place. (Bourdieu, 1987a, 1980a, 1992). 
6 See Bourdieu and Christin (1990), Bourdieu (1992). See also Memmi (1989); Lenoir (1992). 
7 See Champagne (1990) for the role of action groups and Champagne (1991) for the role of the media. 
8 See espedally Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976). 
9 These kinds of processes are studied by political sdentists as 'agenda setting'. 
10 For a more detailed description of the logics of delegation see Bourdieu (1984a). 
11 Of course, many more specific studies on political consumption, participation, and delegation have been 
carried out by other social scientists; see for example the political science textbook edited by Van Deth 
(1993). 
12 The value and Impact of an opinion will also depend on the situation in which it Is expressed. Situations 
which carry more political weight, such as meetings of parliament or the readers' letters in a 'quality' 
newspaper, require more strictly that the opinions offered should be legitimate political opinions than 
others. In a referendum or election, for example, all opinions count equally, irrespective of how they have 
been arrived at. Furthermore, the value of an opinion also depends on the authority or status of the person 
expressing It. Bourdieu (1982a) gives the example of a dty major who gains a profit by speaking In dialect 
But he can only make this profit because he Is also competent to speak the official language, whereas such a 
profit would be impossible for someone who can only speak in dialect. In the same way, politicians can 
gain a profit by explaining political issues in an easy, everyday language, but If they do not master the 
legitimate political language they are always at risk of being denounced as a 'populist'. 
13 Bourdieu first developed his criticisms of the political opinion survey in the early seventies In his papers 
"L'opinion public n'existe pas" (1973a) and "Les doxosophes" (1973b). Later on, he elaborated them, 
espedally In chapter 8 of "La distinction" (1979), entitled "Culture et Politique" and in an appendix to this 
book "Associations: A Parlour Game", which Is a restatement of an earlier article entitled "Le Jeu Chinois" 
(1976a); furthermore, in an exposé of the same title "Culture et Politique" (1984), and in an exposé, 
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published as "Le Sondage: Une 'Science' sans Savant" (1987b). See also e.g. Champagne (1990); Gaxle 
(1990); Michelet and Simon (1990). Champagne (1990) gives a critical review of the reception of 
Bourdieu's theory on opinion polls, 
u In contrast, Bourdieu (1992) put forward his program of a reflexive sociology, which explicitly states that it 
is necessary in scientific analyses to incorporate the relationship between the researcher and his object of 
study as well as the way a researcher constructs his object of study, so as to prevent the relationship 
between a researcher and his object from being projected in an uncontrolled manner on the object itself. See 
also Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968), Pels (1989). See also the 'epilogue'. 
Chapter 4 Toward research hypotheses 
1 One should realize however, that the acceptance of this assumption is, itself, the result of a historical 
process. As Champagne (1990) explains, public opinion was not always seen in terms of 'one man, one 
vote': in earlier times the competence to participate in public debates was limited to specific elites. 
2 In the 'epilogue', we will indicate how open interviews can be used to give voice to citizens in such a way 
that they can talk about their own problems of everyday life, independently of the dominant political 
principles of opinion production. 
3 Converse (1964a), too, pointed out the possibility that a similar distinction between experts in the field and 
spectators of that field can be made in other domains, like religion. 
4 See for example Aakster (1986) on concepts used in alternative medicine; Verbrugh (1978,1983) on the 
paradigms of orthodox and alternative medicine; Berliner and Salmon (1980) on the division between 
holistic and scientific medicine. 
5 For example, the dynamics of the scientific field are not entirely rational (Bourdieu, 1976b). This is 
illustrated very well by the appraisal of alternative medicines by orthodox medicine (see Webster, 1979; 
Vroon, 1983). The contacts between doctors and their patients are also not guided by scientific rules. 
6 It is already difficult to choose good terms to distinguish different types of medicines. First, on almost all 
designations of medicines some exceptions can be made. Second, different terms are not neutral 
descriptions, because they have an interest in the struggle between different medicines. 'Alternative 
medicine' has become the most widespread term in the Netherlands and will be used here mainly for 
pragmatic reasons. 
7 See Gevitz (1988), Salmon (1984). In fact, the political interventions in the processes of legitimation of 
alternative medicine are a good Illustration of the poUticization of social problems by political committees as 
described in the previous chapter (Westerhof, in preparation). In the Netherlands, different political 
committees have reflected on various politically important aspects of alternative medicine, such as 
legislation, financial aspects, public access, and quality standards (Muntendam, 1981; N.R.V., 1986, 
1988a, 1988b, 1990; Gezondheidsraad, 1993). 
8 See for example Foucault (1963); Armstrong (1983), Freund (1982), Rolles (1988). 
9 Accordingly, studies on ideas about health and Illness are often presented as studies of the lay' perspective 
(e.g. Blaxter, 1983; Calnan, 1987; Crawford, 1984; D'Houtaud and Field, 1984). Research into these 
Ideas, often carried out in the tradition of social representations (Herzlich, 1973, 1984), Is almost 
exclusively done by means of open interviews. Survey research using closed opinion questions is not often 
found (but see Visser, 1988; Fumham and Smith, 1988). 
10 see C.B.S. (1983, 1988); N.I.P.G. (1980); Visser (1988, 1989, Visser, Peters and Rasker, 1990) for 
studies on the clientele of alternative healers in the Netherlands. 
11 M. McGuire (1988), Cowie and Roebuck (1975), Foltz (1987), and Glik (1988, 1990) provide some 
studies on the production of belief in alternative healing settings. 
Chapters Design of the study and measurement procedures 
1 Items used by Halfens (1985), Fumham and Smith (1988), Visser (1988), and Wallston et al. (1976) 
provided some examples. 
2 To check for the readability of the items Flesch' readability yardstick was used. This yardstick was 
developed by Flesch (1948). It weighs the mean number of words in a sentence and the mean number of 
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syllables in a word. Scores range from 0 (most difficult) to 100 (least difficult). Douma (I960) adapted the 
yardstick to the Dutch language. He calculated the readability as 
206.84 - 0.77 * (number of syllables per 100 words) - 0.93 * (mean number of words per sentence). 
For the items used in study 4 the readability yardstick equals 54.4. According to Douma's interpretation this 
is 'fairly difficult'. 
3 In pilot study 3 a scale of 7 categories was used, with categories ranging from 'disagree very strongly' to 
'agree very strongly'. 'No opinion' was provided as an eighth response option. The 7 items on the political 
field have an internal reliability coefficient alpha of .77. They load from .38 to .76 on a 1-factor-solution 
with an explained variance of 34%. The 7 items on the field of medicine have an internal reliability 
coefficient alpha of .72. A one-dimensional factor analysis results in an explained variance of 28%. Except 
for item 14 (with a loading of .27) the factor loadings are above .35. 
4 After having read Parducci's article, however, I looked around for ratio judgements in everyday life, and did 
in fact hear some remarks like "that's 10 times worse". 
5 See appendix 4 for some problems with some other instruction tasks which were used in pilot studies 1 and 
2 as a second exercise. 
6 hi pilot studies 1 and 2, respondents were asked to give a higher score than the reference if they agreed with 
an item and a lower score than the reference if (hey disagreed. Because some respondents use difference 
scores, the disagree scores were more extreme than the agree scores. For this reason respondents were 
always asked to give scores higher than the reference, whether they agreed or disagreed. See appendix 4. 
7 Fazio (1990b) did not have these problems, because he did not use long verbal statements but words and 
images. Respondents only had to give an 'agree' or disagree' answer by pushing one button. 
8 See, for example. Saris (1991), Klesler and Sproull (1986). Computerized and paper-and-pencil versions of 
equivalent tesis have frequently been compared In psychological testing, resulting In some guidelines for 
computerization (AP.A., 1986), which were taken into account in the computerization of the questionnaire 
in the present study. See Burke and Normand (1987) for a review of computerized testing. 
9 On the political field this test Is a slightly revised version of a test presented in a textbook on sociology for 
pre-unlversity schools (Rijpkema and Schuurman, 1987). 
10 See Vosmeer (1992) for full details on the recruitment procedure. 
it Due to the time constraints of the research project and to some unexpected cuts in finances, it was not 
possible to Interview a greater number of respondents, or to recruit a greater number of sophisticated 
respondents on the medical field. 
12 The differences in recruitment strategy used in the pilot studies and in the present study demonstrate that a 
more official presentation of the researcher results in higher response rates. In the first pilot study only 28% 
of the people approached in a home-to-home canvass agreed to cooperate. In the second pilot study an 
official identification card of the University of Nijmegen was shown during the home-to-home canvassing. 
The response rate was 35%. Sending an official letter in advance and visiting each probable respondent 
three times in the present study raised the response rate to 47%. 
13 Gemeente Nijmegen (1989,1991). 
14 Unfortunately, due to the way In which addresses were sampled from the city register, a large part of these 
addresses were exactly the same as those used in a survey carried out during the winter of 1990-1991 on 
police performance in Nijmegen. 
15 Although one would expect corresponding figures for neighborhoods with lower Income and lower 
educational levels, this is not always Ine case. In the city council statistics, the neighborhoods distinguished 
according to income level are smaller units than the neighborhoods distinguished in the tables on 
educational level, which always comprise several neighborhoods with different income levels. 
16 In view of these kinds of reactions, which illustrate both the lack of self-ascribed competence and the way 
in which competence to form an opinion about politics is ascribed to others, the word politics was avoided 
in the final study. The domain was referred to as "beleid', a Dutch word meaning 'policy', but without the 
direct connotations of that word on the political field, or as "how things should be done in the Netherlands'. 
Hence, these kinds of reactions were not found during the recruitment of the city sample (negative reactions 
to the word politics, however, did appear later on, when the word was mentioned during the interview). 
The word politics was used only for the politically sophisticated group, since it could be assumed that those 
people were greatly interested in the field. 
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Chapter 6 The assessment of attitude structures 
1 As both judgements are made with some error, the 'error-in-both-variables' regression coefficient has been 
used: ß=Sy/Sx (Lodge, 1981a, p.SO). This coefficient will be used in ail analyses that relate to the 
cross-modality match of both the metric and the instruction task as well as the attitude task. 
2 On the political field they were items 2 (social security), 4 (development aid), and 7 (multinationals); on the 
healing field they were items 11 (gift of healing), 12 (message of illness), 14 (science negative), and 17 
(reincarnation). 
3 This is done in order to make sure that the results are comparable to the results of an analysis of constraint by 
(he intercorrelatlons among Items, to be performed in the following sections. 
4 Another measure of extremity would be the standard deviation of (he item scores. This measure is highly 
related to the mean of the absolute values of (he item scores (r = .87 on the political field; г =.92 on the 
medical field). Since it is possible to calculate a reliability coefficient for the mean of the absolute value of the 
item scores, this latter measure is used here. 
5 Hufford (1988, p.238) concludes: Folk medicine (Including alternative therapies) "generally accommodates 
modern medical knowledge quite easily, accepting medical ideas of etiology as one set of relatively 
immediate causes: the germ caused the disease, but it caused it in a particular person at a particular time 
because of sinfulness, evil eye, poor diet, spinal subluxation, decreased vital energy, (all examples may be 
advanced singly or in conceit), and so forth." 
6 Post (1990) even found that doctors who prescribe more alternative medicines also prescribe more orthodox 
medicines. 
7 The words lower, middle and higher are only used for pragmatic reasons: associations with other variables 
can be easily described. An evaluation or recognition that higher means better is not implied. 
8 Since involvement is related to sex and social position, the design is not orthogonal. Therefore, a least-
squares method was used to estimate the independent effect of the variables. A hierarchical estimation 
procedure was used, which requires an a priori ordering of all terms in the model (option ЪІегагспісаГ in Ine 
anova-procedure of spss-x). Each effect is adjusted only for those preceding it in the ordering (cf. Overall 
and Klett, 1972; Bock and Brandt, 1980). Since we wanted to know whether the results for involvement 
could be ascribed to social position and sex, such an a priori ordering appears justified. The order that was 
chosen was social position first, (hen sex and Involvement last. The contribution of Involvement, controlled 
for social position and sex, could thus be assessed. One might question the order of social position and sex, 
but changing the order of social position and sex had no effect on the results. All analyses were carried out 
on the city sample and the politically sophisticated (N=135). Since the number of respondents In each cell in 
the full factorial design is rather low, third order interaction effects were not computed. The lowest number 
of respondents in a cell is 7. 
9 Because the number of respondents in each cell was not equal in the analysis, a least squares estimation 
procedure was used. Since social position and sex are not related to involvement in the medical field, it is not 
plausible, however, to assume that the differences according to involvement will be related to social position 
or sex. It is, therefore, difficult to specify a hierarchy of independent variables. Hence, a complete linear-
model analysis (Overall & Klett, 1972) was carried out (option 'unique' in the anova-procedure of spss-x). 
In this analysis each effect Is adjusted for relationships to all other effects in the model. The analyses were 
carried out for the city sample and the sophisticated In medicine together (N=114). Since the number of 
respondents in the cells is rather low, third order interaction effects were not computed. The lowest number 
of respondents in a cell is 3. 
Chapter 7 Summary and conclusion 
l Instead of measuring the time between the presentation of one Item and the presentation of the next item on 
the computer screen, it would have been better to measure the time between the presentation of an item and 
pressing the button indicating 'agree' or 'disagree', so that the time necessary to express the magnitude 
judgments is not included in the response time. 
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Epilogue 
1 One might question bow radical the discontinuity is. It may be better to see ethos and logos as two poles on 
either side of a continuum. On the one side there are opinions derived from yardsticks that are reflexively 
known and are recognized as legitimate principles in a cultural field. As described in chapter 2, these 
yardsticks range, in the political field, from abstract ideological principles like liberalism-conservatism or 
left-right via values with more practical connotations, such as freedom or equality, to social groups, like race 
or political parties, which are much more concrete and therefore closer to the ethos. But all these yardsticks 
are specifically adapted lo and legitimate in the political field. The ethos itself, as the opposite side of this 
dimension, adds other yardsticks still: here, people reason from everyday experience which need not be seen 
as related to political realities. 
2 The theoretical formulation of l e sens pratique' has developed over the thirty years that Bourdieu carried out 
his studies. Subsequent theoretical formulations can be found in "Esquisse d'une Théorie de la Pratique" 
(1972), "Outline of a Theory of Practice" (1977c) and "Le Sens Pratique" (1980a). Robbins (1991) gives a 
detailed and fascinating analysis of the development of Bourdieu's work. While Bourdieu has often reflected 
on his own theory, not only in writings, but also in speech (see Bourdieu, 1987a, 1992), he has always 
stressed that these theoretical descriptions should not be considered separate from the empirical analyses 
guided by them. Elaborations and criticisms of Bourdieu's theory of practice can be found, for example, in 
Coenen (1989), Devisen and de Boeck (1989), Mortier (1989), Pinxten (1989). Voestermans (1991,1992) 
and Welten (1989, 1991, 1992) elaborate on Bourdieu's theory on habitus and practice in relation to 
psychology. 
3 See Voestermans (1991,1992) and Welten (1988,1989) for an elaboration on the corporeal nature of the 
habitus and the consequences for a psychology that is mostly concerned with cognitions. 
4 Even the production of opinions from the logos versus those produced from the ethos have their place in 
these basic social distinctions, where logos is dominant and ethos dominated. Thus, it was found in the 
present study that on both fields respondents with higher social positions relied more on the modality of the 
word. Attempting to master the competence to produce opinions from the logos can thus be seen as a 
specific form of 'noblesse oblige'. 
s The concept of habitus therefore plays a crucial role in understanding the dialectics of subjectlvatlon and 
objectivation of culture (Welten, 1988), without subjectlvist or objectivist reductions. 
6
 Bourdieu's theory on the habitus is closer to older conceptions of attitudes. First, before social psychologists 
made attitudes into cognitive entities, attitudes referred to bodily postures in sculpture and painting (Fleming, 
1967; see also Welten, 1988 for a similar, but psychological, conception of attitudes). Thomas and 
Znanlecki (1918-20/1974), who are credited for being the first to define social psychology as the study of 
attitudes, see attitudes as a kind of predisposition to activity, which is the individual counterpart of social 
values (for example objectified in instruments, coins, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific 
theory etc.) not unlike the habitus is a structure predisposed to activity in accordance with the field in which 
it was acquired. As early as the first review article on attitudes, Allport (1935) neglects the connection with 
sodai values and stresses only the predisposition to act in a certain way. Nowadays, attitude structures have 
become a legitimate object of study in themselves, even without any reference to practice. 
7 This section focuses on the works of Billig (1982,1987,1991; Billig et al., 1988), Potter and Wetherell 
(1987, 1988), and Edwards and Potter (1992). For more or less similar perspectives see Lalljee et al. 
(1984), Jaspers and Fraser (1983), J. Smith (1987). 'Social constructionism' (e.g. Gergen, 1985), the 
Russian 'socio-hlstorlcal' tradition (e.g. Cole, 1988, 1990) and 'cultural psychology' (e.g. Shweder and 
Sullivan, 1993; Voestermans, 1992; Welten, 1989) are also rather close to this perspective (see Edwards and 
Potter, 1992). From this perspective other psychological concepts have been criticized as well, like 
categorization (Billig, 1987), social representations (Billig, 1991), and memory and attributions (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992). 
8 One might ask whether it is still useful to speak of attitudes, when such a radical reconceptualizatlon takes 
place. Concepts like opinions, ideology, views (Billig, 1991), social representations (Jaspers and Fraser 
(1983) and discourse (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) have been advocated as possible contenders. 
9 See also Bourdieu (1982a) and Potter and Wetherell (1987) for a critique of this view of language. 
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io The many intricate classifications which linguists have developed to describe language use will not be 
discussed here. 
11 This focus is shared with Bourdleu's sociolinguistics and conversation analysis. It stems from some 
ancestral theories, such as Austin's speech act theory, and Goffman's social interactionism. Chomsky's 
psycholinguistlcs and Saussure's structural linguistic theory are more critically received. See Bourdieu 
(1982a), Potter and Wetherell (1987), and Moerman (1988) for the use and criticisms of these theories In 
the three theoretical currents presented in this chapter. Thompson (1984,1991) made an elegant analysis of 
Bourdleu's position In respect to other language theories. 
The idea of language as practice Is not unknown in mainstream social psychology. In his review on 
language use and language users In the "Handbook of Social Psychology" Clark (1985) also develops a 
perspective on language as a practice from more or less the same theories. He does not draw a link with 
attitudes, however. 
12 Of course, a large number of studies on persuasion are also carried out on the basis of the cognitive 
paradigm in the social psychology of attitudes. However, these studies focus on the cognitive processing of 
persuasive messages by the receiver of those messages and the consequential attitude change (see especially 
the elaboration likelihood model of Petty and Cacloppo (1986) and the heuristic-systematic model of 
Chalken, 1987). T. Van Dijk (1990, p.173) observes a "lack of a direct link between persuasive discourse 
and opinion change". Although social influence Is an important research topic In social psychology, It has 
rarely been related to the study of attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). 
13 For example, dilemma's ("on the one hand..., on the other hand..."); disclaimers ("I'm no racist, but.."); 
extreme case formulations ("everybody does it"); consensus and corroboration ("other people agree with 
me", "you would have done the same thing if you were in my place"). Edwards and Potter (1992) give an 
outline of these kinds of discursive devices. 
14 Besides the study of stories, there is a growing emphasis on dialogue in contemporary psychology (see 
Hermans, Kempen and Van Loon, 1992; Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Sampson, 1993; Markovà and 
Foppa, 1990). 
15 Of course, some variations can be found in the expression of answers according to mode of administration, 
interviewer characteristics and behavior, the specific questions asked, as the studies on survey quality 
showed (see chapter 1). These variations should be taken seriously, and cannot be defined as "bias' from 
the perspective developed in this book. 
16 See Spradley (1979); Mlshler (1986); Billig (1987); Bourdieu (1991, 1993a, 1993c); Pialoux (1992); 
Weber (1992). 
17 See for example Lane (1962), Westerhof (1991), Bourdieu et al. (1993) on the constitution of meaning in 
politics In the modality of the ethos. See for example Herzlich (1973) and Calnan (1987) on the subtle 
differences and similarities between the constitution of meaning from a 'lay' and 'official' perspective in 
medicine and M. McGulre (1988) and Vosmeer (1992) on the meaning of alternative medicine from the 
patient's point of view. 
18 At the same time this Is also the political relevance of the ethnographic Interview: to a far greater extent than 
surveys, which project political opinions about politically Important issues on respondents, the 
ethnographic interview can give insight in the everyday 'misère' of the 'ordinary' man, who is otherwise 
seldom heard In public (Bourdieu, 1993a). 
19 For example, studies have been carried out on argumentation (Billig, 1991) and narration (Bruner, 1990) 
between family members. Billig (1991) also studied the presentation of attitudes in different political 
situations throughout people's course of life. Furthermore, the presentation of attitudes In a specific field 
has been studied among professionals (e.g. in political commissions (Lenoir, 1992) or in medical scientific 
journals (Webster, 1979)) and between professionals and the public (e.g. public hearings (Defrance, 1988) 
and manifestations (Champagne, 1990), or visits to doctors (Mishler, 1986) and alternative healers (M. 
McGulre, 1988). 
20 A break with common sense also Implied a rupture with the extreme subjectivism of social psychology, 
which reproduces the particular western concept of the person as "a bounded, unique, more or less 
Integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement, and 
action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a 
184 Statements and stories 
social and natural background" (Geertz, 1983, p.62). See also Sampson (1983), and Henriques et al. 
(1984). 
21 This legitimization should therefore be described as ideological In the negative, Marxist sense of the word. 
22 Using different traditions for this purpose is only one way of arriving at a more comprehensive perspective 
on one's research object. Another way would be to make a detailed study of the scientific field. Such a 
study would reveal, for example, that the history of social psychology and the development of the attitude 
concept In the specific sense attached to it by social psychologists and especially the development of attitude 
measurement are highly intertwined, to the point that attitudes are not only used as a concept to describe 
social reality, but also as a concept that credited social psychology as a discipline of the social sciences with 
the scientific capital it needed. 
23 In an older article, Bourdieu (1973c) explains the three forms of theoretical knowledge: subjectlvist 
(exemplified by Sartre), objectivist (exemplified by Lévi-Strauss) and praxeologlcal knowledge, which 
transcends the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism (see also Bourdieu, 1980a). 
24 Although very critical of academic psychology (see e.g. the preface to "La Noblesse d'Etat" (Bourdieu, 
1989)) and psychology as a practice (see chapter 6 of "Distinction" (Bourdieu, 1979) as well as his article 
on intelligence tests (Bourdieu, 1980f)). Bourdieu himself does not contribute to the development of the 
radically different psychology that he calls for. 
25 This does not imply that this is all there is to say about attitudes. For example, different evaluative 
dimensions should be distinguished in addition to the agree-disagree dimension mentioned here. Other 
modalities of presenting attitudes besides reflection, narration or argumentation should be studied as well, 
for example metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). 
Appendix 
1 Text in Italics specify the correct answers on the knowledge questions. 
2 This strategy gives some credit to the finding of Saris et al. (1987) that more valid Judgements are obtained 
when the researcher specifies not only one reference score, but a maximum score as well. 
3 The technical details of this analysis are as follows. The analysis was performed by the Manova procedure of 
SPSSX. A repeated measurement design was specified. As the metric and the sound task have a different 
number of items (7 and 6 respectively), a special transformation matrix was specified to obtain the 
orthogonal contrasts between the tasks, the modalities and the individual items. The first rows of this matrix 
are: 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 
6 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
-1 -1 -1 -1-1 -1 
•6 -6 -6 -6-6 -6 
1 
6 
-1 
-6 
1 1 1 1 1 
-7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
1 1 1 1 1 
-7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
1 1 1 
-7 -7 -7 
1 -1 -1 
-7 7 7 
1 1 1 1 
-7-7 -7 -7 
-1-1 -1 -1 
7 7 7 7 
In each row the first 7 numbers correspond to the 7 numerical estimation scores of the metric task, the 
second 7 numbers to the 7 line drawing scores of the metric task, the following 6 to the 6 numerical 
estimation scores of the sound task and the last 6 to the 6 line drawing scores of the sound task. 
The first row creates the total score, the second the contrast between the metric and the sound task and the 
third creates the contrasts between the numerical estimation and the line drawing modality. The fourth row 
specifies the interaction between task and modality. 
The following rows of the transformation matrix specify the contrasts between an item and the first item in 
each task and modality. Thus, the 5th row Is: 
1 - 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
and the 20th row, for instance, is: 
o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 1 0 0 0 - 1 o o o o o o o 
There are thus 6+6+5+5 rows that specify the contrasts between the Individual items, resulting in a matrix 
with a total of 6+6+5+5+4 (=26) rows by 7+7+6+6 (=26) columns. 
The default regression solution was used, which corresponds to a calculation of the unweighed means 
when there are no empty cells (as is actually the case). Social position and sex are specified as independent 
variables. An interaction term for these variables was also included. No significant differences were found 
according to social position, sex or the interaction between them. 
SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
Uitspraken en verhalen: Naar een nieuwe methodologie van attitude-onderzoek 
In attitude-onderzoek wordt veelvuldig gebruik gemaakt van gestructureerde vragenlijsten 
waarbij ondervraagden hun mening moeten geven over een aantal uitspraken. Daarbij 
wordt er doorgaans stilzwijgend van uitgegaan dat alle ondervraagden een opvatting 
hebben over het betrokken onderwerp en dat alle antwoorden een opvatting weerspiegelen 
die ook daadwerkelijk in de vorm van die uitspraak bij de ondervraagden aanwezig is. In 
de hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 7 van dit proefschrift worden nagegaan in hoeverre deze 
uitgangspunten juist zijn. In de epiloog wordt een theoretisch en methodisch kader gegeven 
dat een eerste aanzet biedt om ook andere manieren van het uitdrukken van opvattingen te 
onderzoeken dan de in vragenlijsten gebruikelijke. 
Om beter te begrijpen hoe het komt dat het huidige attitude-onderzoek zo sterk 
gedomineerd wordt door het gebruik van gestructureerde vragenlijsten wordt in 
hoofdstuk 1 de geschiedenis van deze methode beschreven. Er blijkt een sterke 
verwikkeling van dit onderzoek met maatschappelijke praktijken die gericht zijn op het 
beïnvloeden van meningen, zoals reclame, verkiezingscampagnes en oorlogspropaganda. In 
de loop van deze eeuw is er onder attitude-onderzoekers een consensus ontstaan over de 
vraag wat goed attitude-onderzoek is. Ten eerste moet de steekproef representatief zijn 
voor de onderzoeksgroep. De representativiteit wordt bedreigd doordat niet alle mensen 
mee willen of kunnen werken aan een onderzoek. Ten tweede moeten de antwoorden 
zinvol zijn. Daarbij nemen attitude-onderzoekers op basis van theorieën over 
psychologische tests aan dat elke meting bestaat uit een 'echte' waarde en een meetfout. Uit 
de pogingen van onderzoekers om hun methode te verbeteren blijkt dat de 'echte' waarde, 
waarop hun interesse zich richt, de persoonlijke opvattingen van respondenten zijn die niet 
beïnvloed worden door de manier waarop de vragen gesteld zijn. Met andere woorden: het 
meetinstrument moet neutraal zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat er niet zonder meer kan worden aangenomen dat mensen ook 
zo'n 'echte' persoonlijke opvatting hebben. Philip Converse verrichtte hiernaar 30 jaar 
geleden het eerste systematische empirische onderzoek. In de sociale psychologie werd er 
destijds van uitgegaan dat naarmate een onderwerp meer centraal staat in de aandacht van 
mensen hun meningen coherenter en stabieler zijn. In een representatieve Amerikaanse 
steekproef bleek echter dat de coherentie en stabiliteit van politieke opvattingen erg laag 
was. Converse concludeert hieruit dat slechts een gedeelte van de mensen een 'echte' 
mening had over de vragen. Zelfs nadat gevraagd was of zij wel een mening over de 
uitspraak hadden gaf een groot deel van de mensen een mening door willekeurig een 
antwoord te kiezen. Dergelijke willekeurige antwoorden noemt Converse 'nonattitudes'. 
186 Statements and stories 
In meer recent sociaal-psychologisch onderzoek naar de structuur en functie van 
opvattingen in het geheugen worden attitudes en nonattitudes opgevat als twee polen van 
een continuum. In dit proefschrift wordt hiernaar verwezen met de term 'centraliteit' van 
opvattingen. Meer centrale opvattingen zijn gerelateerd aan meer kennis; ze zijn 
makkelijker toegankelijk in het geheugen, coherenter en complexer georganiseerd, 
duidelijker uitgekristalliseerd en stabieler. 
Critici maken duidelijk dat echt willekeurige antwoorden minder vaak voorkomen dan 
Converse veronderstelde. De proportie nonattitudes blijkt samen te hangen met de mate 
waarin het politieke debat gepolariseerd is, met de vorm en inhoud van de vraagstelling 
(т.п. abstractie-nivo) en met achtergrondkenmerken van de ondervraagden (т.п. 
betrokkenheid bij de politiek, opleiding en sexe). De conclusie van hoofdstuk 2 luidt dan 
ook dat in attitude-meting niet bij alle ondervraagden een 'echte' waarde van een opvatting 
is vast te stellen. In tegenstelling tot wat vaak wordt aangenomen is de betrouwbaarheid 
daarom geen kenmerk van een onderzoeksinstrument maar een kenmerk van de relatie 
tussen onderzoeksinstrument en ondervraagde. 
In de wetenschappelijke studies die in hoofdstuk 2 besproken werden, is nauwelijks 
aandacht besteed aan de vraag hoe het komt dat sommige mensen wel beschikken over 
'centrale' attitudes en andere niet. Het werk van Pierre Bourdieu biedt inzicht in de 
sociaal-culturele processen die daarbij een rol spelen. In navolging van Bourdieu wordt in 
hoofdstuk 3 het beantwoorden van attitude-vragen opgevat als een specifieke competentie. 
Deze wordt aangeduid als 'logos'. De logos' impliceert dat respondenten met een zekere 
distantie reflecteren over de alledaagse sociale werkelijkheid. Uit het werk van Bourdieu 
wordt afgeleid dat deze competentie niet alleen is vast te stellen op basis van de louter 
cognitieve indicatoren van centraliteit die sociaal psychologen gebruiken: ze blijkt ook uit 
de manier waarop mensen politieke opinies 'consumeren' en deelnemen aan het politieke 
spel. Waar sociaal psychologen deze competentie beschrijven als een cognitieve 
vaardigheid, onderzoekt Bourdieu de sociale waardering ervan. Zo kan hij begrijpen 
waarom ze niet evenredig verdeeld is over de bevolking. Opvattingen worden net als alle 
andere cultuurprodukten sociaal gewaardeerd. De sociale waardering van politieke 
opvattingen komt tot stand in een maatschappelijk spel, waarbij het professionele veld van 
de politiek een belangrijke rol speelt. In dit veld moeten opvattingen op een manier 
verwoord worden die door de deelnemers aan het politieke spel als 'juist' of legitiem 
wordt gezien. Hoewel in principe iedereen het recht heeft politieke opvattingen te uiten, 
voelen veel mensen zich toch niet competent, omdat ze dit niet op de juiste manier (denken 
te) kunnen. Zo is het mogelijk dat mensen die wel over de juiste competentie beschikken 
hieraan sociaal aanzien ('distinctie') ontlenen. Met Bourdieu wordt geconcludeerd dat in 
attitude-onderzoek ten onrechte wordt aangenomen dat iedereen competent is om de 
vragen te beantwoorden en dat alle antwoorden op de vragen op dezelfde manier tot stand 
zijn gekomen. 
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In hoofdstuk 4 wordt besproken hoe in de empirische studie met de middelen van het 
traditionele attitude-onderzoek deze impliciete veronderstellingen kunnen worden getoetst. 
Om de sociaal-culturele voorwaarden voor het hebben van centrale opvattingen beter te 
analyseren, werd niet alleen het politieke domein onderzocht maar ook het domein van 
ziekte en gezondheid. Aan dit domein ligt een andere ideologische polariteit aan ten 
grondslag dan aan het politieke domein: reguliere versus alternatieve geneeswijzen in 
plaats van links versus rechts. Daarnaast wordt verwacht dat de competentie om legitieme 
opvattingen te produceren op dit domein andere over de bevolking verdeeld is. Op het 
politieke veld wordt verwacht dat mensen die minder bij het veld betrokken zijn, mensen 
met lagere sociale posities (i.e. meer opleiding en hoger beroepsnivo) en vrouwen minder 
centrale attitudes hebben. Op het medische veld zijn sociale positie en sexe naar 
verwachting niet gerelateerd aan het hebben van minder centrale opvattingen, maar 
betrokkenheid bij het veld wel. 
In hoofdstuk 5 en б staan de onderzoeksopzet, het meetinstrument en de bevindingen van 
de studie centraal. De attitude-vragen op elk van beide domeinen, politiek en geneeswijzen, 
werden opgesteld in overeenstemming met de regels van attitude-onderzoek. Naast de 
attitude-vragen moesten de respondenten ook enkele achtergrondvragen beantwoorden en 
op elk domein een aantal vragen naar kennis en betrokkenheid. 
Via een willekeurige steekproef uit het bevolkingsregister werden inwoners van 
Nijmegen tussen de 40 en 55 jaar geworven. Via partijen en vakbonden werden mensen 
geworven die sterk betrokken zijn bij het politieke veld. Via genezers werden mensen 
geworven die veel ervaring hebben met alternatieve geneeswijzen. De verdeling van de 
nonrespons en de redenen ervoor geven enkele aanwijzingen die de verwachtingen omtrent 
de sociale verdeling van de competentie op elk domein steunen. 
Op elk domein werden valide en betrouwbare maten voor de centraliteit van opvattingen 
geconstrueerd: kennis, competentie, kristallisatie en coherentie. Respondenten die minder 
betrokken zijn bij het politieke veld blijken op grond van deze maten minder centrale 
opvattingen te hebben. Op het politieke veld blijkt dat respondenten met lagere sociale 
posities (op basis van opleidings- en beroepsnivo) en vrouwen minder centrale opvattingen 
hebben. De verwachtingen voor de verdeling van de competentie over het politieke veld 
zijn dus juist. 
Respondenten die minder betrokken zijn bij het medische veld hebben daarover minder 
centrale opvattingen. Met betrekking tot de coherentie wordt echter gevonden dat de meest 
betrokken groepen niet zozeer verschillen van de minst betrokken groep in de mate van 
samenhang van hun antwoorden, maar wel in de wijze waarop de antwoorden 
samenhangen. Wanneer de minst betrokken groep instemt met de reguliere geneeswijze 
wijst ze de alternatieve geneeswijze af en vice versa. De meest betrokken groepen 
daarentegen stemmen meer in met alternatief naarmate ze ook meer instemmen met 
regulier. Op basis van de theorieën van Converse en Bourdieu wordt hiervoor als 
verklaring aangevoerd dat persoonlijke ervaringen kunnen leiden tot een andere 
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ideologische structurering van opvattingen dan wanneer men een domein alleen van 'horen 
zeggen' kent. 
Op het medische domein blijken respondenten met lagere sociale posities minder kennis 
te hebben en minder competent te zijn, maar hun opvattingen blijken niet minder 
uitgekristalliseerd en coherent. Mannen en vrouwen blijken niet te verschillen m.b.t. de 
centraliteit van hun opvattingen over ziekte en gezondheid. De verwachtingen over de 
verdeling van de competentie op het medische veld zijn dus grotendeels juist. 
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat de centrale conclusies van de studie. De gebruikelijke 
vooronderstellingen, dat iedereen een mening heeft over de vragen in een attitude-
onderzoek en dat alle antwoorden op dezelfde manier gegeven worden, zijn onjuist. Het 
attitude-onderzoek berust inderdaad op een specifieke competentie voor het verwoorden 
van opvattingen. Uit het feit dat de competentie verschillend verdeeld is op verschillende 
culturele domeinen, en dat deze groter wordt naarmate men meer ervaringen met een 
domein heeft, kan geconcludeerd worden dat deze competentie niet moet worden opgevat 
als een individuele cognitieve capaciteit, maar als een sociale verworvenheid. 
Omdat het inderdaad zo blijkt te zijn dat de competentie voor het verwoorden van 
opvattingen in de modaliteit van de logos een sociale verworvenheid is, waarover niet 
iedereen beschikt, ligt het voor de hand op zoek te gaan naar mogelijkheden om 
opvattingen te onderzoeken die op een andere manier tot stand komen. In de epiloog wordt 
hiertoe een eerste bescheiden aanzet gegeven. Tegenover de logos, waarin men met een 
zekere afstand tot de alledaagse praktijk systematisch en expliciet over de sociale 
werkelijkheid reflecteert, stelt Bourdieu de 'ethos'. De ethos staat voor een directe, 
onbereflecteerde verhouding tot de sociale werkelijkheid, waarbij men juist verwikkeld is 
in de praktijk van alledag. Daarbij maken mensen maken gebruik van principes die niet 
zijn afgestemd op een specifiek cultureel veld zoals het politieke links-rechts principe. Of 
en hoe men zijn opvattingen verwoordt ziet Bourdieu als een strategische improvisatie die 
gebonden is aan de tijdsdruk van het moment en aan de machtsverhoudingen tussen de 
gesprekspartners. 
In tegenstelling tot het heersende cognitieve paradigma van de sociale psychologie, 
waarin opvattingen gezien worden als evaluatieve representaties van de werkelijkheid in 
het geheugen, wordt in de discursieve psychologie als uitgangspunt genomen dat 
opvattingen in alledaags taalgebruik gepresenteerd worden. In plaats van de waarheid te 
spreken over de eigen opvattingen, zoals in attitude-onderzoek, gaat het dan om de 
constructie van betekenis en het overtuigen van anderen. Zoals taal ook gebruikt wordt om 
mensen dingen te laten doen of om een werkelijkheid te creëren, heeft taalgebruik hier dus 
een andere functie dan het doen van mededelingen of het beschrijven van de werkelijkheid. 
De discursieve psychologie onderzoekt op welke manier mensen in gesprekken proberen 
anderen te overtuigen van hun opvattingen en op welke wijze opvattingen beargumenteerd 
worden binnen sociale discussies en controverses. Een discursief element, dat in het kader 
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van dit proefschrift van belang is, is het verhaal. De narratieve psychologie analyseert de 
structuur en functie van verhalen. In verhalen presenteren mensen geïmproviseerd en 
onbereflecteerd hun opvattingen. 
Terwijl in de discursieve en narratieve psychologie voornamelijk de structuur en functie 
van argumentaties en verhalen geanalyseerd worden, maken de conversatie-analyse en 
Bourdieu's theorie van de praktijk duidelijk dat argumenten en verhalen evenmin als de 
modaliteit van de logos los van de sociale context en de machtsverhoudingen tussen de 
gesprekspartners bestudeerd moeten worden. 
Hoewel het in principe mogelijk is gesloten attitude-vragen te bedenken die dichter bij 
de praktische principes van de ethos staan, wordt in de epiloog geconcludeerd dat er twee 
inherente beperkingen aan het traditionele attitude-onderzoek zijn, die het ongeschikt 
maken voor de bestudering van opvattingen die verwoord worden in de modaliteit van de 
ethos. Ten eerste is het onmogelijk de verschillende manieren waarop respondenten 
betekenis geven aan de sociale werkelijkheid te onderzoeken. Open vragen in attitude-
onderzoek kunnen daarbij behulpzaam zijn, maar het zijn voornamelijk interviews, waarin 
mensen verhalen kunnen vertellen naar aanleiding van eigen ervaringen, die onderzoek 
daarnaar mogelijk maken. Ten tweede is het onmogelijk om de strategische 
geïmproviseerde presentatie van opvattingen in verschillende situaties te analyseren. 
Daartoe dient de presentatie van attitudes in het alledaagse leven bestudeerd te worden. 
Uit het feit dat verschillende methoden zijn afgestemd op verschillende manieren van het 
verwoorden van opvattingen blijkt dat er geen neutrale methoden bestaan. Het traditionele 
attitude-onderzoek sluit aan bij theorieën waarin opvattingen gezien worden als cognitieve 
representaties, terwijl interview-onderzoek en onderzoek naar opvattingen in het dagelijks 
leven aansluiten bij theorieën waarin opvattingen gezien worden als presentaties in 
alledaagse taal. Elke methode heeft dus zijn eigen vooronderstellingen die gebonden zijn 
aan het theoretisch kader van waaruit men werkt. In plaats van te spreken over 'data' of 
'gegevens' moet geprobeerd worden te begrijpen hoe in verschillende methodes gegevens 
geconstrueerd worden vanuit een bepaald perspectief op de sociale werkelijkheid. Daartoe 
is het nodig een zo breed mogelijk theoretisch perspectief te ontwikkelen dat voorbijgaat 
aan arbitraire scheidslijnen tussen disciplines als psychologie, politicologie en sociologie en 
tussen theoretische stromingen als cognitieve en discursieve psychologie. 
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